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ABSTRACT 
The aftermarket business is a highly profitable activity for companies, and they 
can earn considerable profits from selling spare parts. Spare parts demands are more 
uncertain and intermittent in comparison with finished goods and associated work in 
progress parts. In the aftermarket, the demand uncertainty of the spare parts for the 
OEMs is complicated by the fact that the other competitors, known as market players 
or will-fitters, supply substitutable parts usually with lower cost of production and 
deliver them to the market at cheaper prices. This uncertainty makes spare parts 
management challenging, and this study develops strategic approaches for spare parts 
price setting and inventory level control to further exploit the benefits of the spare 
parts business. This dissertation is divided into four main parts. 
In the first part, a brief review of inventory system policies is provided. The 
review starts with an introduction to the inventory systems terminology and follows 
with a categorization of the inventory systems with the aim of developing spare parts 
inventory models. Moreover, a discussion about the computations related to the (Q,r) 
policy is provided. An algorithm is proposed to find the optimal re-order point/lot-size 
and a Monte Carlo simulation is designed to evaluate the mathematical optimization 
solutions including the new algorithm and the other classical methods. In the second 
part, a literature review related to spare parts management is presented. The literature 
review is organized in such a way that in the beginning the inventory control policies 
are introduced. Then the perspective of uniqueness of spare parts on the inventory 
management is illustrated. Next, spare parts clustering and demand are studied and 
forecasting methods are reviewed. The use of Game Theory for inventory systems 
  
planning is studied. Also spare parts pricing as a strategic method to increase the profit 
of the suppliers is evaluated. In the third part, to investigate the profitability of spare 
parts business, the notion of renewal cost versus the replacement cost is proposed. The 
replacement cost of a product is defined as the current market price of the product and 
the renewal cost of a product is the acquisition cost of spares to completely renew the 
product excluding labor costs. These costs are calculated for some products with 
specific characteristics, and the ratio between the renewal cost and the replacement 
cost as a scale to evaluate the sustainability of the spare parts pricing is determined 
which declares that the spare parts pricing is unfair. In the last part, Game Theory as a 
tool to find ideal decision-making in spare parts management taking into account the 
interactions among spare parts manufacturers. According to definite assumptions, 
spare parts inventory games in the form of normal, cooperative and non-cooperative, 
non-zero-sum, evolutionary, and competitive fringes are studied. The proposed games 
study the OEMs’ decision-making on spare parts pricing strategies, inventory levels, 
batch productions and re-manufacturing efforts. 
The proposed strategic spare parts pricing methods as an alternative for regular 
pricing can factor in customers’ willingness to purchase spare parts, demand 
uncertainty, market uncertainty, competitiveness of the parts in the market, stability of 
the cooperation or competition in price setting, marginal costs of designing an 
agreement for cooperation, and the marginal cost of production and inventory. 
Furthermore it is possible to add the notion of renewal cost and the replacement cost 
ratio to the price sustainability description and to include it in the suggested strategic 
pricing formulations as a factor that affects the demand and supply curves. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. MOTIVATION 
 
The aftermarket business is a highly profitable activity for the companies, and 
they can earn considerable profits from selling spare parts. Spare parts functions are 
different from finished goods (products to be delivered to the market) or work in 
progress parts (as a source to smooth production rate) and demands for the spare parts 
are more uncertain and intermittent in comparison with them. This uncertainty makes 
spare parts management challenging, and companies develop strategic approaches to 
exploit the benefits of the spare parts business.  
In a real world situation, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) manufacture 
final products and introduce them to the market. In after-sale services, they provide 
spare parts to maintain or repair the final products or equipment, which forces OEMs 
to deal with high level of inventory investment for customer satisfaction in after-sales 
services. For instance, GM has over 10 million square feet of spare parts storage space 
in the United States with hundreds of thousands of different parts, and the value of 
spare parts inventories for the United States military exceeds $100 billion (Muckstadt, 
2004).  
On the other hand, studies show roughly 50% of the customers of the America’s 
biggest car manufacturers face unnecessary delays in after-sale services because 
 2 
 
dealers do not have the right spares on-hand (M. A. Cohen, Agrawal, & Agrawal, 
2006). The suppliers manufacture final goods with specific level of quality and 
quantity rates. Based on different factors such as the number of products sold, quality 
of parts and quality of the maintenance, products will face failure, which gives rise to 
the need for the spare parts to keep the products in working condition. To keep 
products operative, different parts should be on-hand and each part has its own price 
and criticality factor. Therefore, to ensure timely repair of these products, an extensive 
supply chain system must be set up. 
Spare parts, which are stocked in suppliers’ inventories, satisfy the rising 
demands. Most inventory problems deal with a single supplier or decision maker who 
makes decisions on the purchase/production rate under certain assumptions on the 
demand, planning horizon, etc. Therefore, the resulting policies are indifferent to the 
other suppliers’ decision-making. In the aftermarket, the demand uncertainty for the 
spare parts for the OEMs is complicated by the fact that the other competitors, known 
as market players or will-fitters, can supply similar parts, usually with lower quality 
and cost of production and deliver them to the market at cheaper prices. In this 
complex scenario, the OEM as a decision maker should decide on his spare parts 
production and inventory policies. However, these actions or strategies are influenced 
by other competitors’ strategies including pricing and quality.  
A Game theoretical approach can study the interactions among spare parts 
manufacturers, who are the players of the aftermarket business game, to find ideal 
decision-making on inventory levels, quality, Green manufacturing and pricing 
strategies. Figure 1 depicts the strategic spare part flow line (based on influence 
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diagram) for the oil-leveling sensor for a BMW 320i vehicle. As we can see, the OEM 
manufactures the vehicle as a parent product, which has a certain designated life cycle. 
Each product, according to its complexity, consists of different numbers of parts, in 
this case the car has its own major components (powertrain), main groups (engine), 
subgroups (engine housing), and sub subgroups (oil pan) which each consists of 
different parts and our desired part belongs to this category.  
 
Figure 1: Strategic spare parts flow line (Oil leveling sensor-BMW 320i) 
 
The OEM has to decide on the quality, production rate, Green manufacturing 
effort that is the use of recycled parts (in general the use of manufacturing methods to 
minimize emission of Greenhouse gases, use of non-renewable or toxic materials, and 
waste generation) and price of the original product and introduce it to the market, 
which is the initial phase of the product. Then, the product will face failure during its 
working period and this failure relates to its durability or life cycle, quality, working 
condition, maintenance quality or any unpredictable factors. In this phase because of 
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defects and aging, failure happens that generates the need for spare parts and OEMs 
can satisfy this need, which is the repetitive phase of the product. However, other 
competitors intervene into the market and diminish the market share of the OEMs by 
supplying substitutable parts. This interaction creates the aftermarket game and 
players of the game are OEMs and will-fitters who have different strategies to take to 
manufacture and stock spare parts. 
 
1.2. OBJECTIVES 
 
The primary objectives of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
• To provide a literature review covering spare parts management and 
Game Theory 
• To develop a novel method to evaluate the sustainability of spare parts 
prices; 
• To develop a method for the strategic spare parts pricing and inventory 
level under uncertainty of the market; 
• To develop a method to determine the OEM’s spare part pricing level, 
Green manufacturing effort and inventory level in competition with will-
fitters and uncertainty of the market type; 
• To develop a method to study the stability of the OEM’s strategic spare 
parts pricing and inventory level; 
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• To develop a method to investigate the competitive or cooperative spare 
parts pricing, Green manufacturing effort and inventory level strategies in 
different scenarios of centralized and decentralized inventory systems; 
• To develop a method to study the OEM’s spare parts price and inventory 
level determination in a price leadership market; 
 
1.3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate sustainability of the spare parts pricing. This 
problem will be addressed by examining a newly introduced concept of the renewal 
cost vs. replacement cost of consumer products. Then we will study OEMs’ decision-
making in aftermarket business games in six steps, and the output of research answers 
fair strategic decision-making for spare parts pricing levels. 
Aftermarkets in industries such as automobiles, white goods, industrial 
machineries and information technology companies have become four to five times 
larger than the original equipment businesses. To investigate the profitability of spare 
parts business (specifically in mentioned industries) the research comes up with the 
idea of renewal cost versus the replacement cost. The replacement cost of a product is 
defined as the current market price of the product and the renewal cost of a product is 
the acquisition cost of spares to completely renew the product excluding labor costs. 
Customers purchase products from OEMs and to keep them in working condition, they 
replace failure parts with spare parts. The price of products and its spares are set by 
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OEMs and our study looks for fair or sustainable spare parts pricing via investigation 
of replacement and renewal costs. This study follows the following procedure: 
First, a review of inventory systems will be presented with the aim of developing 
spare parts inventory models. 
Second, we review articles related to fair spare parts pricing and provide a survey 
for earlier literature to present a literature review related to the spare parts inventory 
management and Game theory. This review updates previous surveys and highlights 
the different issues considered and the methodologies used in spare part inventory 
modeling. A categorization from the perspectives of spare parts inventory control 
policies, uniqueness of spare parts, spare parts clustering and demand, inventory 
systems and Game Theory and spare parts pricing will be done. 
Third, we check replacement and renewal costs for some products with specific 
characteristics, and compare the ratio between the renewal cost and the replacement 
cost as a scale to evaluate the sustainability of the spare parts pricing. 
Fourth, from Game Theoretical perspective, the market, which puts intermittent 
demands on the spare parts, is a player of the aftermarket game. We will review 
previous methods of modeling the market as an agent or player from different aspects 
of the monopolistic or competitive situations, dummy player, and demand 
distributions to select proper models for the market. 
Fifth, Price adjustment and Green manufacturing effort are two factors that 
contribute to fair spare parts pricing. Pricing strategy as a factor that can guarantee the 
competitiveness of companies in the market will be investigated. Meanwhile, Green 
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manufacturing or re-manufacturing and its implementation on the production cost and 
credibility of the parts in the market will be considered in the study.  
Sixth, payoffs of the OEMs and market players based on, inventory levels, re-
manufacturing efforts and sale price will be formulated. Then, the resulting payoffs of 
the OEMs and will-fitters in cooperative or competitive environment will be studied 
by using Game Theoretical methods to investigate sustainability of the spare parts 
prices. 
 
1.4. CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
According to definite assumptions, spare parts inventory games in the form of 
normal, cooperative and non-cooperative, non-zero-sum, evolutionary, and 
competitive fringes will be investigated. The proposed games will study the OEMs’ 
decision-making on spare parts pricing strategies, inventory levels, batch productions 
and re-manufacturing efforts. The outputs of the research contribute to spare parts 
inventory games, which are finite non-zero-sum games, answers fair strategic 
decision-making for spare parts pricing levels in the following format: 
1. Comparison of renewal cost and replacement cost to evaluate the cost of 
spare parts. 
2. Spare parts inventory level decision-making in a monopolistic market; a 
non-cooperative two-person game that can determine the 
production/purchase rate and inventory level. 
 8 
 
3. Implication of the theory of games on spare parts inventory control 
policies; a non-cooperative three-person game that can determine pricing 
strategies, inventory levels and re-manufacturing efforts. 
4. Evolutionary spare parts inventory games; a two-person game that can 
study stable pricing strategies and quality levels. 
5. Cooperative spare parts inventory games; a co-operative three-person 
game that can determine cost allocations and inventory levels in case of 
cooperation between suppliers. 
6. Competitive fringe spare parts inventory games; a non-cooperative multi-
player game that investigates decision-making on the spare parts price and 
inventory level. 
 
1.5. THESIS OUTLINE 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 starts with a brief 
review of inventory system policies with the aim of developing spare parts inventory 
models. Then, a discussion about the errors of the (Q,r) policy is provided along with 
Monte Carlo simulation and proposed algorithm to find the optimal control variables. 
Chapter 3 provides a discussion on the importance of the aftermarket business and its 
profitability for the OEMs. A literature review related to the spare parts inventory 
management and Game theory is subsequently presented. Chapter 4 describes the 
novel measurement of the renewal cost versus the replacement cost. Then, the ratio 
between these costs as a scale to evaluate the sustainability of the spare parts pricing is 
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determined. Chapter 5 describes spare parts inventory management as the spare parts 
inventory games. According to definite assumptions, spare parts inventory games in 
the form of normal, cooperative and non-cooperative, non-zero-sum, evolutionary, and 
competitive fringes are investigated. Conclusions are provided in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. INVENTORY CONTROL MODELS 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter a brief review of inventory system policies is provided. The review 
starts with an introduction to the inventory systems terminology and follows by a 
general categorization of the inventory systems. Inventory systems can be categorized 
into deterministic and probabilistic policies and the most commonly used methods in 
each group are introduced. A discussion is presented about spare parts management 
and how to relate inventory control policies to spare parts management. Moreover, a 
discussion about the errors of the (Q,r) policy is provided and a Monte Carlo 
simulation is designed to evaluate the mathematical optimization solutions. An 
algorithm is proposed to find the optimal policy for reorder points and lot-size that 
minimizes the inventory cost and a comparison between the classical method, the most 
reliable algorithm for (Q,r) and the newly suggested algorithm is presented. 
 
2.2. TERMINOLOGY 
 
An inventory system is a system that has three significant types of costs. All these 
costs are controllable and can be listed as follows: 
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• The cost of carrying inventories: It is the cost of investment in inventories, 
storage, handling the items, obsolescence, etc.; 
• The cost of incurring shortages: It is the cost of lost sales, loss of good 
will, overtime payments, special administrative efforts (telephone calls, 
memos, letters), etc.; 
• The cost of replenishing inventories: It is the cost of machine setups for 
production, preparing orders, handling shipments, etc.; 
These costs are typically included by most production systems. In this system 
costs can be controlled by a variety of means including decision-making related to raw 
materials ordering, manufacturing semi-goods and finished goods and stocking goods 
which are ready for shipment.  
The sum of those costs is known as the total cost. Interestingly, these costs are 
closely related to each other and increase (decrease) of one of them may results in 
decrease (increase) of the others. But the total cost can be controlled by means of 
suitable decision-making; in this case we say that costs are controllable. 
According to the different costs and their controllability, inventory systems can 
be grouped into 4 types (Naddor, 1982): 
• Type 1: Where carrying and shortage costs are controllable; 
• Type 2: Where carrying and replenishing costs are controllable; 
• Type 3: Where shortage and replenishing costs are controllable; 
• Type 4: Where all costs are controllable; 
Decision-making related to inventory systems seeks to minimize the total cost of 
the inventory. Mainly two types of decisions are concerned: 
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• When should the inventory be replenished? 
• The inventory should be replenished when the amount of inventory 
reaches to a specific level known as reorder point; 
• The inventory should be replenished after specific time intervals; 
• How much should be added to the inventory? 
• The quantity to be ordered is a fixed value known as lot-size; 
• The quantity to be ordered will bring the a mount of inventory to a 
certain value known as inventory order level; 
Also, the inventory problem can be considered as the balancing of the costs. For 
example, in some situations when carrying cost and replenishment cost are equal and 
balanced, the total cost will be minimized. When the time interval between placing an 
order and its addition to the inventory known as lead-time is significant, the inventory 
order level and reorder point are calculated respectively. 
Based on the above discussion inventory policies can also be categorized as: 
• Zero lead-time; 
• Non-zero lead-time; 
An analysis of an inventory system consists of four major steps: 
• Determination of the properties of the system; 
• Formulation of the inventory problem; 
• Development of the model; 
• Derivation of a solution of the system; 
The establishment of the properties is the first step to analyze an inventory 
system. The properties of each system consist of four components: 
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• Demands: What is taken out of inventory; 
• Replenishment: What is put into the system; 
• Costs: carrying, Shortage and replenishment costs; 
• Constraints: Various administrative, physical and other factors that place 
limitations on the rest of the properties; 
The most important component is demand, because inventories are kept to meet 
the demand. Demands are not controllable in either ways of directly or indirectly, 
because people who are outside the inventory system make decision on the quantity of 
demands. However, the following properties related to demand can be studied: 
• When do customers place an order; 
• How much do they need; 
• Is demand is higher at the beginning of the month than the end of it; 
• Does any accurate information about future requirement exist; 
• Shortage/backorders tolerated; 
Demand size is the quantity required to satisfy the demand for the inventory. 
Demand size may be considered to be the same from one period to the other (constant 
demand), or otherwise it can be assumed to be variable. Demand is known when there 
is precise information about the demand size, and related inventory systems are called 
deterministic systems. Sometimes the demand size is not known but it is possible to 
find a probability distribution for them and these inventory systems are called 
probabilistic systems. 
In probabilistic systems, probability of the occurrence of a demand size is 
assumed, or estimated. Demand rate is the demand size per unit of time. In 
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probabilistic systems the average rate of demand is used. Demand pattern is the way 
that demand occurs in a period of time, in other words if we consider a period of time 
in which demand size occurs there are different ways of taking out the quantities and 
each way in known as demand pattern. 
Replenishing is the quantities that are be added to the inventory based on a 
schedule according to the time they are ordered and they actually are added to the 
stock. The following three elements are important to replenishment: 
• The schedule period: the time length between consecutive decisions. It can 
be prescribed and in this situation the only controllable variable is 
replenishment size. If it is not prescribed and there exists equal schedule 
periods, it is called constant scheduling periods; 
• The replenishment size: the quantity scheduled to be added to stock. 
Replenishment period is the time length in which the replenishment is 
added to the stock and the replenishment rate is the ratio of the 
replenishment size and its period. If replenishment period is insignificant, 
the rate is infinite and can be said replenishment is instantaneous. If it is 
not instantaneous, the way it is added to stock over the period is important 
and studied as replenishment pattern; 
• The lead-time: the time length between placing an order and its actual 
addition to the system. Lead-time most of the time is prescribed and 
constant which means it is similar for each decision; 
As it was mentioned before costs in inventory systems consist of carrying, 
shortage and replenishment. Each of them has its own parameters: 
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• Carrying cost: The cost of carrying inventory per unit time. For many 
industries the fraction of carrying inventories is about 5-25% per year. 
The carrying cost has different elements including: 
• The cost of money tied up in inventory; 
• The cost of storage; 
• The cost of taxes on inventory; 
• The cost of obsolescence; 
• The cost of insurance of inventories; 
• Shortage cost: The most difficult cost to calculate is the shortage cost. 
Most managers believe that it is impossible to calculate exactly the 
amount of shortage and they assume this cost is infinite, so they never let 
shortage occurs in the inventory. Mostly it depends on the quantity of 
shortage and the duration of time in which over time the shortage exists. 
The following elements are included in this type of cost: 
• Overtime costs; 
• Special clerical and administrative costs; 
• Loss of specific sales; 
• Loss of goodwill; 
• Loss of customers; 
• Replenishment cost: The replenishment cost in general can be categorized 
into two groups: 
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• Costs of replenishment regarding ordering parts from the out-
bound agency (the ordering cost). It may include clerical and 
administrative costs, transportation costs, unloading costs, and etc.; 
• Costs of manufacturing parts within the under study organization 
or in-bound system (the setup cost). It may include labor setup 
costs, cost of material used during setup testing, cost of shutdown 
time during the setup that manufacturing stops, and etc.; 
Also there are some constraints that their properties affect the inventory system. 
First of all, units can be continuous or discrete. Moreover demand can have some 
constraints including: 
• Making up the shortage: In some cases it is impossible to make up the loss 
sales and in this situation the property of the demand has an important 
effect on the shortage cost; 
• Negative demand: In some cases it is possible to return parts from the 
customer which is known as the negative demand; 
• Dependent demand structure: If the demand for the next period is 
dependent to the previous periods that would be very complex to analyze 
the system; 
Replenishment also has its own constraints. The major ones are: 
• Space constraints: The amount of space available for sorting and stocking 
inventory is limited; 
• Scheduling and reviewing constraints: The scheduling and reviewing 
periods can be prescribed which inserts constraints to the system; 
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• Inventory level: In some cases shortage is impossible so the level of 
inventory should be specific times of the average demand to assure that 
shortage is not happening; 
 
2.3. INVENTORY SYSTEMS CATEGORIZATION 
 
Inventory systems can be categorized according to their related demand. Based on 
type of the demand including known or expected demands, inventory systems are 
divided into two groups: 
1. Deterministic systems: 
• Lot-size systems: Orders are placed in lots of a fixed size so the goal is 
to balance carrying cost against replenishing cost. Replenishments are 
made whenever the inventory level reaches to zero and since the 
replenishment rate is infinite and there is no lead-time, no shortages can 
occur; 
• Order level systems: Since the scheduling is prescribed the cost of 
replenishment is not controllable so the goal is to balance the carrying 
cost against shortage cost. Lot-size systems and order level systems are 
identical except that in order level systems shortages are allowed and 
there is no prescribed scheduling period; 
• Order-level-lot-size system: The cost of carrying, shortage and 
replenishment can be balanced. The lot-size system is a special case of 
the order-level-lot-size system when the cost of backorder is infinite; 
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• Lot-size systems with various cost properties: In these systems it has 
been assumed that the cost of carrying and replenishment is not 
constant. Major conditions can be listed as follows: 
• Quantity discount: Where purchasing price is not constant and it 
depends on the quantity ordered and can be decreased while 
number of orders increases. This discount also can be continuous 
or discrete; 
• Price change anticipation: Where the price of the parts to be 
replenished anticipated increasing which can motivate the 
inventory systems to order them in advance and carry them. The 
price change can be known (the price increases a certain amount 
after specific time) or variable (the price changes in a probabilistic 
manner); 
• Carrying-cost functions: Carrying cost can follow different 
functions based on the types of the parts. This can be exclusively 
studied for perishable parts and expensive-storage parts; 
• Deterministic systems with non-constant demand: Demands for these 
systems are known but it is not constant. It can be increasing demand or 
variable known demand during each period; 
2. Probabilistic systems: 
• Probabilistic scheduling-period systems: In these systems demand is 
not known with certainty and the goal is to determine the optimal 
replenishment scheduling period and order level; 
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• Scheduling-period-order-level systems: Scheduling –period system 
tries to balance carrying cost and replenishment cos. In other 
words, since shortages are not allowed the order level should be 
large enough to meet the maximum demand in each period. The 
order-level system balances the carrying cost and backorder cost 
while the replenishment scheduling period is prescribed; 
• Scheduling-period-order-level systems with lead-time: These 
systems are similar to previous category except that replenishment 
lead-time is considered; 
• Probabilistic reorder-point-order-level systems: In these systems 
demand is not known with certainty and the goal is to determine the 
optimal replenishment scheduling period and order level; 
• Probabilistic order-level system: The goal is to balance carrying 
cost and replenishment while there is no lead-time; 
• Probabilistic order-level system with lead-time: It is similar to 
previous system except that replenishment lead-time exists; 
• Probabilistic reorder-point system: The goal is to balance carrying 
cost and backorder while there is no lead-time; 
• Probabilistic reorder-point system with lead-time: It is similar to 
previous system except that replenishment lead-time exists; 
• Probabilistic reorder-point-order level system: The goal is to 
balance carrying cost, backorder and replenishment cost while 
there is no lead-time; 
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• Probabilistic reorder-order level systems with lead-time: It is 
similar to previous system except that replenishment lead-time 
exists; 
 
2.4. DETERMINISTIC INVENTORY MODELS 
 
The following inventory models assume that the demand is known in advance. In 
this section two deterministic models which are widely used are introduced. 
 
2.4.1. THE ECONOMIC ORDER QUANTITY MODEL (EOQ) 
 
The application of the mathematic to the factory management can be investigated 
through early work of Ford W.Harris 1913 by manufacturing lot-size determination 
known as EOQ model. 
 
2.4.1.1. SOLUTION 
 
Solution for this problem includes balancing the setup and carrying costs. If the 
manufacturer produces more parts in each run he can reduce the setup cost more and 
in contrast if he produces and stocks more parts he would spend more cash on storing 
and holding parts in inventory. So the main question is how many parts to make at 
once in order to compromise among the above mentioned costs. The sum of the labor 
and material costs to ready a shop for manufacturing a part is defined as the setup cost. 
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Larger lots will decrease the setup cost and smaller lots would decrease the inventory 
cost. The balance between those two concerns can be answered by EOQ model. The 
lot-size mathematical formula is derived regarding following assumptions for the 
manufacturer: 
• Production is instantaneous: The entire lot can be produced 
simultaneously and there is no capacity limitation; 
• Delivery is immediate: In order to satisfy the demand, there is no time lag 
between production and availability of parts; 
• Demand is deterministic: The quantity and timing of the demand is certain 
• Demand is constant over time: Which means if the demand is 7 units over 
a week the daily demand is one; 
• A production run needs a fixed setup cost: The setup cost is constant and 
indifferent from the lot-size or the factory condition; 
• Products can be analyzed individually: Means there is only a single 
product or there is no interaction between products; 
 
2.4.1.2. FORMULATION 
 
The optimal production lot-size can be computed regarding mentioned 
assumptions. The following parameters are needed to generate the formula. 
• D: Demand rate (in units per year); 
• c: Unit production cost excluding setup or inventory costs (in dollars per 
unit); 
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• A: Fixed setup cost (in dollars); 
• h: Holding cost (in dollars per unit per year) also can be represented as an 
annual interest (ir) on money tied up to the production h = 	ir × c; 
• Q: The lot-size or decision variable (in units); 
Number of orders per year equals to D/Q and timing to place an order per year, 
know as order interval equals to Q/D which is a fraction of year. The total cost per 
year including inventory, setup and production costs would be formulated as follows 
(the cost is a function of the lot-size): 
  YQ = hQ2 + ADQ + cD 
   (1) 
The lot-size that minimizes the total cost is: 
  
Q∗ = 2ADh  
   (2) 
Moreover, the optimal order interval can also be calculated T = Q/D: 
  
T∗ = 2AhD 
   (3) 
This square root formula is known as EOQ and referred to as the economic lot-
size. This formula tells us that there is a tradeoff between lot-size and inventory. Also 
the sum of holding and setup costs is insensitive to lot-size: 
  Y∗ = hQ∗2 + ADQ∗ = √2ADh		 	 (4)	
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Now consider that we use an arbitrary lot-size which is different from the optimal 
lot-size. The ratio of annual cost (holding and setup costs) can be written as: 
  YQ/Y∗ = 12 Q/Q∗ + Q∗Q/   (5) 
Also, this can be extended for order interval too. 
  Y(T/)T∗ = 12 (T/T∗ + T∗T/)   (6) 
This tells us that 100% error in calculating the lot-size will result in 25% in 
inventory cost. 
One of our assumptions was that the production is instantaneous, which means 
the production or replenishment is infinitely fast. Now, we can assume the production 
rate (P) is finite but deterministic. This model known as economic production lot 
(EPL), and the optimal level of lot-size is: 
  
Q∗ =  2ADh(1 − DP)   (7) 
If (P) is infinite we get the same result as before. 
 
2.4.2. DYNAMIC LOT-SIZING 
 
In order to implement more randomness into the inventory system mathematical 
model, relaxing the deterministic demand is studied as dynamic lot-sizing. 
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2.4.2.1. SOLUTION 
 
The solution for this problem comes with the idea of finding the batch size over a 
random demand. The simplest possible solution would be producing exactly same 
amount of parts at the beginning of each week. This known as lot-for-lot rule which 
can be justified in some situations, but in general it forces a lot of setup cost into the 
system. The other possible solution can be producing fixed amount of parts each time 
the production is performed. This known as fixed order quantity and it is better than 
lot-for-lot policy because less setup cost is implemented. Although it is not optimal, 
cause considerable cost is forced to the system as carrying parts to next weeks. The 
optimal solution is the Wagner-Whitin method and its main approach is determination 
of the production batch size while demand is deterministic over the specific time 
horizon but it is time-varying in each time period. A continuous time model is not 
valid for a time-varying demand, so the demand should breaks into periods of days, 
weeks and etc. Depending on each system different schedule might be used from daily 
production for a high-volume system and fast changing demand to a monthly 
production for a low-volume system and slow changing demand. 
 
2.4.2.2. FORMULATION 
 
The basic goal is to satisfy the demand with minimal cost including inventory, 
holding and production costs. In order to facilitate the problem solving and model 
representation following notations are considered: 
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• t: Time period, the range of time periods is t=1,…,T which is the planning 
horizon. It is assumed that the intervals are weekly; 
• Dt: Demand rate in week t (in units); 
• ct: Unit production cost in week t excluding setup or inventory costs (in 
dollars per unit); 
• At: Fixed setup cost in week t (in dollars); 
• h: Holding cost (in dollars per unit) to carry a part from week t to week 
t+1 also can be represented as an annual interest (ir) on money tied up to 
the production h = 		 ir × c/52; 
• It: Inventory left over at the end of week t (in units); 
• Qt: The lot-size or decision variable in week t (in units); 
Wagner-Whitin method states that under an optimal lot-sizing policy either the 
inventory carried to week t+1 from a previous week will be zero or the production 
quantity in week t+1 will be zero.  
  Z∗ = A		 	 (8)	
	 	Z∗ = min A + hD		Z∗ + A produce	in	week	1produce	in	week	2'		 	 (9)	
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By introducing the optimal cost in week t as Z:∗ and optimal last week of 
production j:∗, an algorithm would be proposed to find the lot-sizing during different 
periods, Equations (8-10). 
 
2.5. PROBABILISTIC INVENTORY MODELS 
 
Previous models assumed that the demand is known in advance but in realistic 
situations the demand is uncertain. There are two major approaches to face these kinds 
of problems: 
• Model demand deterministically and then modify the solution regarding 
the uncertainty; 
• Explicitly take into account the uncertainty into modeling; 
Statistical inventory models are not new and they back to Wilson 1934 with two 
major parts: 
• Order quantity determination, the amount of inventory that will be 
purchased or produced with each replenishment; 
• Reorder point determination, the inventory level at which a replenishment 
would be triggered; 
Generally three major situations can be considered regarding random demands: 
• Periodic review model, in which we are interested in a single 
replenishment and only determining the order quantity, is an issue. The 
replenishment occurs periodically and it is known as the Newsvendor 
model; 
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• Base stock model, in which the inventory replenished one unit at a time so 
the target is to find the reorder point known as base stock level; 
• Continuous review, in which the reorder point r and order quantity Q are 
determined during a random demand and parts arrive after a lead-time L 
which may cause the stock out situation; 
 
2.5.1. THE NEWSVENDOR MODEL 
 
Consider a situation where there is a sale season. Demand is uncertain and occurs 
prior to the sale, the inventory on shelves will be sold and if there is no part the sale 
will be lost. Moreover the cost of holding the inventory till next sale is high, so unsold 
items will be discounted steeply after the sale. 
 
2.5.1.1. SOLUTION 
 
An appropriate production quantity would be chosen considering two sets of 
information: 
• Anticipated demand; 
• The cost of production too much or too little; 
In order to develop a mathematical model, some assumptions are needed 
including: 
• Products are separable, there are no interactions between products; 
• Demand is random, it is characterized as a known probability distribution; 
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• Planning for a single period, inventory is not carried to the next period so 
the effect of current decision on future situation is negligible; 
• Deliveries are made in advance of demand, all stock is available to meet 
demand; 
• Cost of overage and underage are linear, the cost of having too much 
inventory or too little is proportional to the amount of overage and 
underage; 
 
2.5.1.2. FORMULATION 
 
In order to facilitate the problem solving and model representation following 
notations are used: 
• X: Demand which is a random variable (in units); 
• g(x): Probability density function (PDF) of demand; 
• G(x): Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of demand; 
• µ: Mean demand (in units); 
• σ: Standard deviation of demand (in units); 
• c=: Cost per unit of overage (in dollars); 
• c>: Cost per unit of shortage (in dollars); 
• Q: Production or order quantity or decision variable (in units); 
To minimize sum of expected overage and shortage cost, an optimal order 
quantity will be chosen which satisfies the critical fractile: 
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  GQ∗ = ΦAQ∗ − μσ D = c>cE + c>   (11) 
  z = AQ∗ − μσ D   (12) 
Where (Φ) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution and (z) is the value in 
the standard normal table or from the following formula in Excel: 
  Φ(z) = NORMDIST(z, 0,1, TRUE)   (13) 
In general speaking, for Newsvendor models three conclusions can be made: 
• For uncertain demand, the optimal order quantity depends on the demand 
probability distribution and costs of overage and shortage; 
• For normal distribution of demand, increase of mean leads to increase in 
order quantity; 
• For normal distribution of demand, increasing variability of demand (i.e. 
standard deviation of demand) can increase or decrease the order quantity. 
If the critical fractile is greater than 0.5, the order quantity increases as the 
variability of demand increases. If the critical fractile is less than 0.5, the 
order quantity decreases as the variability of demand increases; 
 
2.5.2. THE BASE STOCK MODEL 
 
Consider a situation where there is a store who sells a particular part. Because of 
some difficulties like space and delivery seller decides to place an order when one 
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single part is sold. But the replenishment takes time so seller needs to carry some parts 
in stock. The base stock model discusses about how much should be stocked, when the 
space available is limited. 
 
2.5.2.1. SOLUTION 
 
In order to develop a mathematical model by use of continuous-time framework, 
some assumptions are needed including: 
• Products can be analyzed separately - there are no interactions between 
products; 
• Demand occurs one at a time - there is no batch order; 
• Unfilled demand is backordered - there are no lost sales; 
• Replenishment lead-times are fixed and known - there is no randomness in 
delivery lead-times; 
• Replenishments are ordered one at a time, there is no motivation such as 
setup costs or minimum order size for batch replenishments; 
• Demand can be considered following a continuous distribution; 
 
2.5.2.2. FORMULATION 
 
In order to facilitate the problem solving and model representation following 
notations are used: 
• Q: Replenishment lead-time (in days); 
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• X: Demand during replenishment lead-time (in units); 
• g(x): Probability density function (PDF) of demand during replenishment 
lead-time; 
• G(x): Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of demand during 
replenishment lead-time; 
• ϴ: Mean demand (in units) during lead-time; 
• σ: Standard deviation of demand (in units) during lead-time, for Poisson 
distributed demand, standard deviation equals to √R; 
• h: Cost to carry one unit of inventory for one year (in dollars per unit per 
year); 
• b: Cost to carry one unit of backorder for one year (in dollars per unit per 
year); 
• r: Reorder point (in units), decision variable; 
• R: r+1 inventory position (in units); 
• s: r-ϴ safety stock level (in units); 
• S(r): Fill rate (fraction of orders filled from stock); 
• B(r): Average number of backorders; 
• I(r): Average on-hand inventory level; 
In base stock model, the inventory would be monitored and whenever the 
inventory level or inventory position drops to the reorder point, the replenishment will 
be placed. The optimal reorder point r that minimizes the inventory cost including 
holding plus backorder cost is calculated as following: 
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  Gr∗ + 1 = GR∗ = bb + h   (14) 
Also, we assume that (G) is normal so this formula has the same fractile structure: 
  G(R∗) = Φ AR∗ − μσ D = bb + h   (15) 
  z = AR∗ − μσ D   (16) 
In base stock model, service level, backorder level and inventory level are 
important and it is possible to determine each level regarding the normally distributed 
demand: 
• Service level: G(R∗)  is the fraction of the demand that can be filled from 
stock, so it is called the fill rate and equals to the service level: 
  S(r) = G(R∗)   (17) 
• Backorder level: This is a very important component for inventory 
control, because it measures the amount of unmet demand and also relates 
to the loss function. If (Φ) is the cdf and (T) is the PDF of the standard 
normal distribution and (z) is the value in the standard normal table or 
from the following formula in Excel: 
  B(r) = (θ − R)W1 − Φ(z)X + σϕ(z)   (18) 
  Φ(z) = NORMDIST(z, 0,1, TRUE)   (19) 
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  ϕ(z) = NORMDIST(z, 0,1, FALSE)   (20) 
• Inventory level: The expected on hand inventory equals to: 
  I(r) = r + 1 − θ + B(r)   (21) 
 
2.5.3. THE (Q,R) MODEL 
 
When demand for parts is inherently unpredictable (for example it is a function of 
machine breakdowns) and the setup cost is significant (means one-at-a-time 
replenishment is impractical), the manager should decide both how much inventory to 
carry (r) and how many parts to order (Q). The solution for this problem can be 
answered by (Q,r) model. Larger values of (Q) results in few replenishment but high 
average inventory level, and smaller values results in low average inventory, but a lot 
of replenishment per year. A higher reorder point (r) leads to high level of inventory 
and low chance of Stock out and vice versa. The replenishment quantity (Q) affects 
cycle stock, means holding inventory to avoid extra replenishment, the EOQ approach. 
The reorder point (r) affects safety stock, means holding inventory to avoid Stock out, 
the base stock model approach. The (Q,r) model is compromising among two models. 
 
2.5.3.1. SOLUTION 
 
In excess of assumptions for base stock model, we need two assume one of the 
following statements: 
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• There is a fixed cost for a replenishment order; 
• There is a constraint on the annual replenishment numbers; 
 
2.5.3.2. FORMULATION 
 
In order to formulate the problem two different optimization functions can be 
used: 
• Min (fixed setup cost + backorder cost + holding cost) 
• Min (fixed setup cost + Stock out cost + holding cost) 
Backorder cost assumes a charge per unit time when a customer demand is 
unmet, and Stock out cost assumes a fixed charge for each unmet demand. To develop 
the model following notations are used: 
• D: Expected demand per year (in units); 
• l: Replenishment lead-time (in days); 
• X: Demand during replenishment lead-time (in units); 
• g(x): Probability density function (PDF) of demand during replenishment 
lead-time; 
• G(x): Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of demand during 
replenishment lead-time; 
• ϴ: Dl/365 mean demand (in units) during lead-time; 
• σ: Standard deviation of demand (in units) during lead-time, for normal 
distribution it is √θ; 
• A: Setup cost per replenishment (in dollars); 
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• c: Unit production cost (in dollars per unit); 
• h: Cost to carry one unit of inventory for one year (in dollars per unit per 
year); 
• k: Cost per Stock out (in dollars); 
• b: Cost to carry one unit of backorder for one year (in dollars per unit per 
year); 
• Q: Replenishment quantity (in units), decision variable; 
• r: Reorder point (in units), decision variable; 
• s: r-ϴ safety stock level (in units); 
• F(Q,r): Order frequency (replenishment orders per year); 
• S(Q,r): Fill rate (fraction of orders filled from stock); 
• B(Q,r): Average number of backorders; 
• I(Q,r): Average on-hand inventory level; 
In (Q,r) model following costs are included in modeling: fixed setup cost, Stock 
out cost, backorder cost and holding cost. 
As it was mentioned before two different approaches can be used to formulate the 
problem: 
• Backorder cost approach: The total cost is the sum of setup, backorder and 
inventory carrying and the goal is to make a reasonable balance between 
setups, service and inventory. The optimal reorder quantity is calculated 
from Equation (2). The optimal reorder point equals to (based on 
backorder and holding costs) where Φ and z are calculate from Equation 
(13): 
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  Gr∗ = Φ Ar∗ − μσ D = bb + h 
   (22) 
  z = Ar∗ − μσ D 
   (23) 
• Stock out cost approach: The total cost is the sum of setup, stock out and 
inventory carrying and the goal is to make a reasonable balance between 
setups, service and inventory. The optimal reorder quantity is calculated 
from Equation (2). The optimal reorder point equals to (based on 
backorder and holding costs) where Φ and z are calculate from Equation 
(13): 
  Gr∗ = ΦAr∗ − μσ D = kDkD + hQ 
   (24) 
  z = Ar∗ − μσ D 
   (25) 
 
2.5.3.3. PROPOSED ALGORITHM 
 
The (Q,r) policy has been used in industry and widely studied in the literature 
since Hadley and Whitin introduced this method in their classical textbook in 1963. 
The classical method as described in previous section, optimize the inventory cost 
based on the use of EOQ and base stock model to evaluate reorder point and lot-size. 
However this method does not determine the optimal policy that minimizes the 
inventory cost. In order to check the error of the classical method a simulation is 
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designed. We assume that demand arrives as a Poisson process and arises on a unit-by-
unit basis. Due to use of simulation, a decision tree of the (Q,r) policy for different 
values of the Q and r has been implemented and the surface of the inventory cost 
is graphed. The inventory cost is convex and the result of the simulation proves that 
the classical method is not able to determine the actual minimum inventory cost 
(Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Inventory cost vs. Q & r - D=100, A=15, h=30, b=100, L=365 
Classical method: Q=10, r=15 Cost=404.3 & Optimal solution: Q=14, r=9 Cost=320.7 
 
A new algorithm is proposed to determine the optimal reorder point and lot-size 
which optimizes the cost of inventory. The suggested method is an iterative analytical 
method that uses curve fitting. The inventory cost which is the sum of setup and 
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purchase order cost, backorder cost, and inventory carrying cost can be written into a 
mathematical formulation: 
  EWCQ, rX = ADQ + bBQ, r + hIQ, r 
  (26) 
According to (Zipkin, 2000), I(Q,r) can be written as: 
  I(Q, r) = Q + 12 + r − λL + B(Q, r) 
  (27) 
The loss function B(r) which represents the average backorder level in a base 
stock model with reorder point r, can be computed as following: 
  
B(r) = - `x − (r + 1)bf(x)de3fg  
  (28) 
The loss function B(Q,r) for the (Q,r) model as the average of the backorder 
levels of the base stock model for reorder points from (r) to (r + Q − 1): 
  
B(Q, r) = 1Q - B(x)
fgh2
e3f
 
  (29) 
Now we can rewrite the cost function as Equation 30: 
EWC(Q, r)X = A DQ + b i1Q - - `y − (x + 1)bf(y)
d
k3eg
fgh2
e3f l
+ h iQ + 12 + r − λL + 1Q - - `y − (x + 1)bf(y)
d
k3eg
fgh2
e3f l 
  (30) 
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The optimal (Q,r) are the values that minimize the expected cost function. In 
other words differentiating E[C(Q,r)] with respect to Q and r will determine the 
optimal lot-size and reorder point. 
  ∂EWCQ, rX∂Q = 0 → Q∗ 
  (31) 
  ∂EWC(Q, r)X∂r = 0 → r∗   (32) 
As we can see it is difficult to calculate the derivatives analytically: 
  − ADQ − b + hQ A∂B(Q, r)∂Q D + h2 = 0 
  (33) 
  (b + h) ∂B(Q, r)∂r + h = 0   (34) 
It is sometimes difficult to use exact expressions in optimizations, so various 
approximation methods have been offered. In an approximation method, Zipkin 
approximated B(Q,r) with the base stock backorder B(r) as Equation (18). This 
simplification relaxes the (∂B(Q, r))/ ∂Q  term in Equation (33). In other words, the 
optimal order quantity simply is derived from Equation (2). Now, treating (Q) as a 
continuous variable and replacing B(Q,r) with B(r) in Equation (34) provides the 
optimal re-order point from the base stock model formulation Equations (14-16).  
In our proposed algorithm, in order to solve the optimization problem without 
approximation we introduce the following method: 
1. Calculate Qo∗ = pqrs ; 
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2. For a given Q∗ = Qo∗ Graph B(Q∗,r) for different values of r or generate the 
trend of B(Q∗,r) versus r; 
  1Q - - `y − x + 1b e2tuλLky! 					∀	r ∈ 	 W0,∞
d
k3eg
fgh2
e3f  
  (35) 
3. Fit a curve to the B(Q∗,r) and generate the curve fitted function fz; 
  fz = Polyfitr, BQ, r ∴ 	 fzr 
  (36) 
 
4. Solve b + h }~}f + h = 0 for r that determines ro∗; 
5. Calculate EWCQo∗, ro∗X, if EWCQo2∗ , ro2∗ X < EWCQo∗, ro∗X stop; 
6. Qo∗=Qo∗+1 and i=i+1 go back to 2; 
In this section we prepare a sensitivity analysis on the cost function based on 
variation of D, b, h, L, A and compare the result of our algorithm with the result of the 
classical method which is shown as `x`b. 
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Table 1: Sensitivity analysis based on variation of annual demand (D) 
D Q` r` cost` Q r cost 
14 4 3 167.5 5 0 118.6 
50 8 8 289.5 9 4 226.7 
100 10 15 404.3 14 9 320.7 
150 13 22 498 16 15 392.6 
200 15 29 580.4 19 20 453.4 
 
 
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis based on variation of backorder cost (b) 
b Q` r` cost` Q r cost 
100 4 3 167.5 5 0 118.6 
500 4 4 197.6 5 2 161 
1000 4 5 226.5 4 3 180.3 
5000 4 6 256.5 4 4 213.7 
10000 4 7 286 4 4 231.6 
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Table 3: Sensitivity analysis based on variation of holding cost (h) 
h Q` r` cost` Q r cost 
15 6 4 121.8 6 1 87.8 
25 5 3 150.2 6 0 110.3 
30 4 3 167.5 5 0 118.6 
50 3 3 236.5 4 0 146.5 
80 3 2 263.5 4 0 180.8 
 
 
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis based on variation of lead-time (L) 
L Q` r` cost` Q r cost 
10 4 1 146.2 4 0 118.3 
30 4 2 154.5 4 0 114.4 
45 4 3 167.5 5 0 118.6 
55 4 4 185.4 5 1 124.4 
75 4 5 193.1 5 1 132.5 
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Table 5: Sensitivity analysis based on variation of setup cost (A) 
A Q` r` cost` Q r cost 
5 3 3 123.9 3 1 86.3 
15 4 3 167.5 5 0 118.6 
20 5 3 185.7 6 0 132.1 
30 6 3 214.4 6 0 155.4 
40 7 3 239.2 7 0 175.8 
 
 
According to (Federgruen & Zheng, 1992) for a period of 30 years there has been 
no efficient algorithm for calculating the determination of an optimal (Q,r) policy. In 
the following we compare the result of our proposed algorithm for the continuous 
review (Q,r) policy with Federgruen policy, as the most reliable algorithm, and 
compare the results with the Monte Carlo simulation for the long time horizon (5000 
years). 
Table 6: Comparison of Federgruen Alg, Proposed Alg. and Simulation - D=50, L=1, h=10, b=25 
 
Proposed Algorithm Federgruen Algorithm Simulation 
A Q r cost Q r cost Q r cost 
1 7 51 96.15 7 50 95.46 7 50 95.56 
5 12 49 116.1 12 48 115.3 12 48 115.58 
25 23 44 171.1 23 44 171.1 23 44 171.24 
100 40 38 289.3 40 38 289.3 40 38 289.48 
1000 120 15 852.5 120 15 852.5 120 15 852.24 
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Table 7: Comparison of Federgruen Alg, Proposed Alg. and Simulation - D=50, L=1, h=10, b=100 
 
Proposed Algorithm Federgruen Algorithm Simulation 
A Q r cost Q r cost Q r cost 
1 5 58 143 7 56 142 7 56 142.79 
5 11 55 165.3 12 54 165.2 11 55 165.23 
25 20 52 227.4 20 52 227.4 20 52 227.39 
100 36 49 357.7 37 48 357.8 36 49 357.77 
1000 107 40 978.5 107 40 978.5 107 40 978.44 
 
Table 8: Comparison of Federgruen Alg, Proposed Alg. and Simulation - D=50, L=1, h=25, b=25 
 
Proposed Algorithm Federgruen Algorithm Simulation 
A Q r cost Q r cost Q r cost 
1 6 46 153 6 46 153 6 46 153.44 
5 11 44 177.2 11 44 177.2 11 44 177.49 
25 19 40 245.5 19 40 245.5 19 40 245.09 
100 31 34 394.8 31 34 394.8 31 34 394.87 
1000 91 4 1131.8 91 4 1131.8 91 4 1131.77 
 
The results of our sensitivity analysis that are provided in Tables 1-5 state that the 
classical method is not able to determine the minimum inventory cost and there is a 
considerable difference between the optimal inventory solution and the classical 
solution. However, our algorithm is able to provide the optimal re-order point and 
order quantity that leads to the minimum inventory cost. 
The comparisons of our new algorithm, Federgruen algorithm and the simulation 
that are depicted in Tables 6-8 shows a general consistency of the optimal policy and 
minimum inventory cost in two methods and simulation. There are some cases that the 
suggested values for Q and r by algorithms are different from each other, but 
comparison of the results with the simulation declares that the error is less than 0.5% 
which is negligible. 
 
 45 
 
2.6. SPARE PARTS MANAGEMENT 
 
In this chapter we have reviewed inventory systems with the aim of developing 
spare parts inventory models. In order to achieve this goal, we need to consider spare 
parts characteristics from the managerial point of view.  
Spare parts management looks for achieving the original products (parent 
products e.g. machines, equipment and etc.) availability at an optimum cost. The 
downtime of parent products is expensive and prohibited from the point of view of 
customers and non-availability of spare parts mostly contributes to 50% of the total 
downtime cost. Also, the cost of spare parts contributes to more than 50% of the total 
maintenance cost in most industries. Therefore, there is a paradox to complain about 
non-availability of the spare parts in contrast with increasing the locked up investment 
to stock spare parts to reach high level of availability. 
The unique problem that deals with spare parts management is the element of 
uncertainty. This uncertainty comes from when a spare part is required or when a 
product fails and once it fails what is the quantity of parts required for replacement. It 
is a fact that the failure of a component is unpredictable so demand for spare parts is 
uncertain. On the other hand, most of the time demand for spare parts is low and spare 
parts are considered as slow moving items. This leads to low level of availability of 
the parts in the market and usually high lead-time of spare parts supply especially 
when the complexity of parts is high. Furthermore, the number and variety of spare 
parts are high (for a medium scale engineering industry can be around 15000 parts and 
for a large scale industry may be around 100000 parts), and the rate of consumption of 
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spare parts for some parts are high and for some parts are low. For example in a case 
study for a system, over 80% of the cumulative annual demand was concentrated in 
about 8% of the items and over 50% of items contributes to less than 1% of the 
cumulative annual demand. In automotive industry it is common that the number of 
demands per dealer per year is less than one unit for some parts. Even for items with 
more than 20000 units demanded annually, considerable fraction of dealers demand 
the items less than one on average per year. 
Regarding aforementioned characteristics for spare parts, a good inventory 
control policy should determine the ordering procedure and optimal level of inventory 
to provision spare parts in a right time with efficient cost. Under these circumstances 
suggested inventory control policies should factor in unpredictable demand for spare 
parts known as intermittent demand, considerable lead-time to supply parts and variety 
of parts. Based on these considerations suggested inventory models for spare parts 
management can be divided into two groups: 
1. Negligible setup cost: 
• Newsvendor inventory policy; 
• Order-up-to level inventory policy; 
2. Non-negligible setup cost:  
• Two parameters policies such as (Q,r) policy; 
• EOQ based inventory policies; 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The spare part business is defined as the purchasing, warehousing, selling and 
delivering of spare parts to customers. Extended activities including customer services 
and handling warranty issues are also included within the definition of the spare part 
business (Suomala, Sievänen, & Paranko, 2002). Spare parts, for many companies 
producing durable products, is the most profitable function of the corporation (Wagner 
& Lindemann, 2008). 
 
Figure 3: Spare parts business activities 
 
Despite absence of reliable data, it is acknowledged that the spare parts business 
is very profitable. It is believed that spare parts contribute to one-third of the net sales 
and two-third of the profits (Suomala et al., 2002). Spare parts only contributes to 10% 
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of the global sales but can contribute to more than 50% of the net income for an 
average industrial company (Noeuvéglise & Chevenement, 2011). 
Aftermarkets in industries such as automobiles, white goods, industrial 
machinery, and information technology have become four to five times larger than the 
original equipment businesses. In 2001, GM earned more profit from 9 billion US 
dollars sales in after-sales revenue than 150 billion US dollars income of car sales (M. 
A. Cohen et al., 2006). In 2005, the supply of aftermarket parts (that covers everything 
from replacement toner cartridges to engines of cruise ships) was a 400 billion US 
dollar business and recently this amount has reached to 700 billion US dollar (T. 
Gallagher, Mitchke, & Rogers, 2005). In 2006, the sale of spare parts and after-sales 
services in the United States was at 8% of annual gross domestic product (GDP), that 
means American costumers spent about 1 trillion US dollars annually on assets they 
already own (M. A. Cohen et al., 2006). In 2010, according to Rolls-Royce group 
annual report, Rolls-Royce engine-maker generated more than half of its revenue 
(more than 5.5 billion British pounds) from service activities.  
The share of a company’s spare parts revenue is an indicator to show the 
importance of the spare parts business. In a case study for different firms, on average 
companies generate 13.3% of their revenues from the sale of spare parts (Wagner & 
Lindemann, 2008). In automotive industry, the profit margins of spare parts sales are 
three to four times higher than the margins in car sales. Some firms sell their primary 
products (i.e. machines) with the price close to the production cost with goal of 
attracting future demands for spare parts (Dennis & Kambil, 2003).  
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After-sale services are high-margin business, and they are considered as a huge 
portion of corporations profits. The profit of spare parts for manufacturing and 
engineering-driven firms including after-sale services is significant. It contributes to 
about 25% of all revenue, although it is 40% to 50% of all profits (Dennis & Kambil, 
2003). 
In spite of profitability of spare parts business, it is very challenging and 
expensive to handle spare parts inventory and customer satisfaction. In recent years 
the value and share of the spare parts inventory in manufacturing companies has 
increased significantly. Few years ago the value of the spare parts inventory for a 
manufacturing company was about 2 to 10 million US dollars, but now it is about 5 to 
15 million US dollars, which shows a significant increase on spare parts inventory 
investment.  
 
Figure 4: The value of the spare parts inventory for a typical manufacturing company 
 
In aircraft industry for instance, the supply of spare parts for Boeing airplanes is a 
7 billion US dollars per year business with more than 2000 suppliers. For another 
instance, TNT post group uses more than 3 million square feet of warehouse space to 
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handle 120,000 tons of shipments and 34.6 million orders per year for Fiat spare parts 
in Europe and South America (Parker, 1999). However, it has to be mentioned that the 
maturation of technologies such as the Internet, WIFI, RFID, etc. have made it easier 
to track products over their life cycle, and have allowed product and component 
replacements to be planned strategically instead of mostly on an as-needed or 
emergency basis.  
Furthermore, there are constant challenges between original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM) and market players or competitors called will-fitters. The lower-
cost producers attack the profit of aftermarkets. Risks of after-market business for 
OEM can be listed as following: 
• Buying non-OEM and used parts; 
• Refurbishing instead of replacing parts; 
Traditional OEM remedies, which are discounting the price of original parts and 
recovering lost profits by selling parts and services at higher margin, does not work 
efficiently anymore. Although, OEMs still have some advantages, according to (T. 
Gallagher et al., 2005) advantages of OEM compared to lower-cost producers are: 
• Stronger relationship with customers; 
• Better distribution system; 
• Deeper engineering resources; 
• Advanced technical support; 
• Superior quality assurance; 
On average, OEMs carry 10% of their annual sales as spare parts. Most of OEMs 
do not get the best out of those assets because most of the time their people and 
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facilities are idle, and inventory turns is once or twice per year that means about 23% 
of their parts become obsolete yearly (M. A. Cohen et al., 2006).  
The major problem of the OEMs to support service parts is the high risk of 
obsolescence and sudden increase of the prices. After the final phase of a product 
production, demand for parts decreases dramatically, which increases the price of the 
production even more than 300% (R. H. Teunter & Klein Haneveld, 2002). Spare parts 
are usually manufactured along with the parent product and the OEM keeps the stock 
of spares for replacement during warranty, post warranty and after sale services. 
Availability of the spare parts during the product life cycle; the time span before the 
end-of-production and the period between end-of-production and end-of-service is a 
major factor to keep OEMs competitive in the market. For instance, in the automotive 
market in Germany, the life cycle of the product is 15 years which is a long time to 
stock spare parts (Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008). 
In spite of the aftermarket’s obvious benefits, most organizations waste its 
potential. Companies should use systematic approaches to increase their benefits in the 
aftermarket business and this is possible by focusing on three following strategies (M. 
A. Cohen et al., 2006): 
• Improve after-sales service quality levels; 
• Reduce investment in service assets; 
• Cut operating costs; 
In previous survey paper in 2001 by (Kennedy, Wayne Patterson, & Fredendall, 
2002) the spare parts management has been studied specifically in case of 
maintenance policies, where spare parts as repairable parts are being used to maintain 
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equipment in working condition. To perform the study, the authors conducted a 
literature review based on the intermittent property of the spare parts demand and its 
effects on proposed inventory management policies. Also, the role of the modern 
technologies like Internet in tracking parts in supply chain is being notified as an 
important factor to improve the material and information flow in the supply chain 
management via faster and more up to date communication between customers, 
retailers and manufacturers. 
Spare parts or service parts are distinguished in three control situations including 
(Botter & Fortuin, 2000): 
• Service parts to maintain own (production) facilities and systems; 
• Service parts to service (professional) systems installed at customer sites; 
• Service parts to repair consumer products at service workshops; 
Service parts can be divided into two categories: 
• Repairable parts: Service parts that are repairable (both technically and 
economically). When failure happens, failed parts are replaced with a new 
part and sent to repair facility.  
• Consumables: Service parts that are not repairable (both technically and 
economically). When failure happens, failed parts are replaced with a new 
part and scrapped. 
In this literature review, first, the importance of the spare parts business is 
studied, then a review is provided to show related techniques and policies which are 
applied in spare parts inventory systems. In order to set up the review, the literature 
review is organized in such a way that in the beginning the inventory control policies 
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are introduced. Then the perspective of uniqueness of spare parts on the inventory 
management is illustrated that makes them to be distinguished from finished good 
products or work in progress products. Next, spare parts clustering and demand are 
studied and forecasting methods are reviewed. The use of Game Theory for inventory 
systems planning is studied. Also spare parts pricing as a strategic method to increase 
the profit of the suppliers is evaluated.  
 
3.2. SPARE PARTS INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 
 
Spare part inventory management is considered as a special case of general 
inventory management with special characteristics, especially high-variety, low-
volume demand and high risk of obsolescence. The main goal is to achieve adequate 
service level with minimum inventory investment and operating costs. Despite the 
importance of the spare parts business, the previous literature on spare parts 
management is limited.  
There are some literature reviews including spare parts and maintenance models 
(Kennedy et al., 2002, Nahmias, 1981, Pierskalla & Voelker, 1976) (José Roberto do 
Regoa, 2011) that discussed about the maintenance inventories, the maintenance 
policies including procure, inspect, and repair or replace units for stochastically failing 
equipment, and finally demand forecasting and inventory control decisions on the 
different life cycle Stages of spare parts.  
In general categorizing, spare parts management can be divided into two major 
groups: 
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• Planning and operational aspects (the determination of optimum spare 
parts level) consists of demand forecasting, service levels and inventory 
levels. 
• Strategic and organizational aspect consists of outsourcing, locations, 
channels of distributions, supply chain type, information and 
communication technologies. 
The need for spare parts arises when a component fails and must be replaced. The 
failure rate is not deterministic and it has a link to the quality of maintenance. This, in 
turn, causes an unpredictable demand for spare parts. Maintenance for each machine 
can be categorized into preventive and corrective groups. From a spare parts 
manufacturer’s perspective, preventive maintenance can result in periodic but 
stochastic demand. On the other hand demand for corrective maintenance is 
deterministic under the assumption that only one failure can occur at any instant of 
time, but stochastic in the time of arrival. Therefore, in both cases the nature of 
demand is intermittent and forecasting methods can predict demands.
 
 
Figure 5: Stocking levels impact on inventory management 
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In this manner stocking level affects cost and liability of the suppliers. Over-
stocking leads to expensive inventory planning and even obsolete inventory while 
under-stocking contributes to poor customer satisfaction. The body of literature in the 
field of planning is adequately extensive, while there have been few studies in the field 
of strategic and organizational matters including logistic system design and strategic 
concepts which lead to a service-to-profit supply chain (Wagner & Lindemann, 2008). 
In order to determine the optimal level of inventory, different inventory 
management concepts have been developed that can be clustered according to their 
complexity as follows: 
1. Simple repair shops: (Scudder, 1984) improved scheduling rules and spares 
stocking policies for a repair shop supporting multi-item repairable inventory system. 
2. Multi-hub systems: (Wong, Cattrysse, & Van Oudheusden, 2005) presented a 
model for determining spare parts stocking level. This method applied for a single-
item, multi-hub, multi-company, repairable inventory system to minimize total system 
cost. The total system cost is defined as the combination of inventory holding, 
downtime and transshipment costs. 
3. Closed-loop supply chains: The goal is to study the return of products as a 
source of spare parts. The integration of product returns into business operations using 
information management, and its implication for the IBM company has been 
investigated by (Fleischmann, Van Nunen, & Gräve, 2003). (Spengler & Schrӧter, 
2003) integrated production and recovery systems which benefits from an Internet-
based information technology. The communication platform uses the system dynamics 
to evaluate spare-parts demand for the Agfa-Gevaert and Electrocycling GmbH. 
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4. Multi-echelon supply chains: Spare parts optimization as a part of 
Maintenance, Repair and Operation materials (MRO) needs an integrated approach 
that removes noise factors. Noise factors can be listed as the following: 
• Bad coding;  
• Lack of classification; 
• Poor network practices including uncoupled warehouses and poor relation 
with suppliers; 
• Poor data integrity known as non-centralized and non-real time data; 
The multi-echelon technique for recoverable item control can be used to model 
the inventory and it has been tried for two realistic systems including a subway system 
and a mobile telephone company in Venezuela (Diaz, 2003).  
Case studies on supply chain management for spare parts have been investigated 
in different industries such as: 
• The computer industry (Ashayeri, Heuts, Jansen, & Szczerba, 1996), 
(Thonemann, Brown, & Hausman, 2002); 
• The airline industry (Tedone, 1989); 
• The metal industry (Suomala et al., 2002); 
• The electronics industry (M. Cohen, Kamesam, Kleindorfer, Lee, & 
Tekerian, 1990); 
• Power generation (Bailey & Helms, 2007); 
• The military (Rustenburg, van Houtum, & Zijm, 2001); 
Decision-making in strategy and design level focused on logistic systems, which 
is a long term procedure.  
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Spare parts maintenance has four major characteristics including: 
1. Criticality: The criticality of a part is related to the critical consequences of the 
part failure on the whole process. Generally the criticality can be estimated by 
evaluating the down time costs of the process. 
2. Specificity: Spare parts can be grouped into two major sets of standard parts 
which have widely usage, so there are several suppliers that provide them and specific 
parts which have low volume demand, so suppliers are reluctant to stock them and 
their availability is not good. 
3. Demand pattern: This includes the demand size and its predictability. Demand 
volume for spare parts is usually low and irregular. Predictability is related to the 
failure process and can be estimated by statistical means. Parts can be grouped into 
two categories of parts with random failures and parts with predictable wear patterns. 
4. Value of parts: High value parts are not intended for stock holding and low 
value parts have to be managed for an effective replenishment arrangement to 
decrease the administrative costs of ordering. 
Decision-making in level of design and strategy focuses on the effect of the 
mentioned factors on logistic elements including (Huiskonen, 2001): 
• Network structure: Determines the number of echelons and their locations 
in the supply chain. 
• Positioning of materials: Defines how to position materials in the network. 
• Responsibility of control: Discusses about cooperation and risk pooling 
among the suppliers. 
• Control principles: Manage the material flow. 
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Also there is an emphasis to consider the whole supply chain including complex 
mix of materials, information and service labor in analysis. This analysis increases the 
coalition among different parties at planning Stages (Dennis & Kambil, 2003). 
Inventory control management can be classified into general parts and spare parts. 
General parts usually have high and independent demands while spare parts have 
intermittent demand (Prof. Maurizio Faccio, 2010). Since Economic Order Quantity 
(EOQ) model, many inventory control policies have been developed for general parts 
inventory control management. Some classical models can be listed as following: 
• Continuous review (Q,r); 
• Periodic review (T,S); 
• Base stock (B); 
In (Q,r) policy, an order size of Q is placed when the inventory level reaches to 
r. In (T,S) policy, at every interval time T the inventory is reviewed and replenished to 
the level S. Both continuous and periodic models are useful for high and stationary 
demands and the difference is that for the continuous review policies the interval time 
is variable and the replenishment amount is constant while for the periodic policies it 
is reverse. The base stock model is a special case of continuous review model, which 
reviews the inventory level and whenever the inventory level drops to B − 1 it 
places and order of single unit. This policy is useful for items with low demands, 
which are similar to spare parts.  
There have been considerable number of studies available for the general parts 
inventory management including (Love, 1979), (Silver, Pyke, Peterson, & others, 
1998), (Muckstadt, 2004), (Sherbrooke, 2004), (W. J. Hopp & Spearman, 2008). 
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One of the first inventory models addressing intermittent demand was introduced 
by (Williams, 1982). They considered a model similar to (Q,r) with variable interval 
time based on a Gamma distribution. A periodic review model, that determines the 
inventory level based on adjusted demand distribution using Bayesian method, 
developed by (Popovi’c, 1987). (Aronis, Magou, Dekker, & Tagaras, 2004), (HILL, 
1999) introduced a base stock model that determines the stock level based on using 
Bayesian model to forecast the demand. An expert inventory management system was 
developed by (Petrovic, Petrovic, Senborn, & Vujos̆evi’c, 1990) that considers 
additional subjective aspects for costs, lead-times and demand beyond traditional data. 
The distribution of the time between failures is exponential and subjective questions 
about reparability, repair time, cost and criticality of components are answered by 
users and users will get the lot-size and the expected inventory cost. A continuous 
review system (Q,r) is provided by (Jin & Liao, 2009) that minimizes the costs of 
purchase, storage, failure, and revision of control parameters during time intervals 
which follows an exponential distribution or constant failure rate. A similar model was 
developed later, which considers the intervals between failures as a Weibull 
distribution (Liao, Wang, Jin, & Repaka, 2008). An inventory control system for spare 
parts was proposed by (Lonardo, Anghinolfi, Paolucci, & Tonelli, 2008) that 
determines the level of spare parts by minimizing the total storage cost and assuming 
the demand as a normal distribution. The solution to this inventory optimization 
problem benefits from stochastic linear programming and it is validated by some tests 
over real historical data related to the orders and availability of 2704 spare parts in a 
period of four years that obtained from an Italian large manufacturing industry. 
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A heuristic method to obtain the order point and order level in (s,S) model by 
using Markov chains and assuming Poisson demand was developed by (Gomes & 
Wanke, 2008). The proposed method is compared with a conventional simulation 
showing that the results are the same. In spare parts inventory systems identical parts 
can be used in different equipment with different down times. Therefore, demand for 
spare parts can be classified into critical and non-critical demand. Based on a case 
study for semiconductor equipment, a (r,r,Q) inventory model for spare parts have 
been proposed that determines reorder point and reorder quantity according to 
criticality of the parts. The reorder point r and the critical level are equal and once the 
inventory level drops to the reorder level, new order with size Q will be released and 
the remaining stock is reserved for critical demand until the inventory replenished 
(Chang, Chou, & Huang, 2005). The critical or non-critical demand is assumed to be 
high enough to be modeled as the normal distribution. Service parts stock management 
seeks to increase availability of spare parts in the warehouses in right time and place to 
satisfy customer demands. Customer satisfaction can be calculated by the first fill rate 
value (FFRV). An inventory stock mix optimization problem has been formulated by 
(Lonardo et al., 2008) that determines the optimal safety stock levels for the spare 
parts that minimizes the total production and inventory costs while satisfying desired 
FFRV. There are some theoretical inventory models for spare parts. Among them, the 
most investigated policy is the so-called (S-1,S) model, a particular case of (s,S) 
models, that assumes that demands arrive as Poisson process (Feeney & Sherbrooke, 
1964). When transactions are greater than one, the use of compound-Poisson models 
for demand has been proposed (Williams, 1984). These models are difficult to apply 
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because they need assumptions to identify compound distribution parameters. In other 
words one parameter is needed for exponential distribution inter-arrival times of 
demand, and two parameters for the Gamma distribution for the demand size. Two 
different (s,Q) inventory models, known as a simple and advanced model, for spare 
parts in a confectionary producer production plant have been developed (Strijbosch, 
Heuts, & Van der Schoot, 2000). For the simple model it is assumed that demand is 
normally distributed over the lead-time and the advanced model utilizes the Gamma 
distribution for the demand. In order to find the effective inventory policy for a mail 
processing equipment manufacturer that stocks 30,000 distinct parts in a distribution 
center, a constrained optimization model with the goal of total inventory investment 
minimization subject to constraints on customer services has been developed (Wallace 
J Hopp, Spearman, & Zhang, 1997). Because of the size of the problem, the problem 
is not tractable to exact analysis and three different heuristic methods have been 
proposed to solve the optimization problem. An inventory control policy of a service 
part in its final phase for an appliance manufacturer is investigated (R. H. Teunter & 
Klein Haneveld, 2002). An order-up-to policy has been suggested that minimizes the 
total expected undiscounted costs of replenishment, inventory holding, backorder and 
disposal where demand is considered as a stationary Poisson process. 
Three different options are introduced by (Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008) to 
supply spare parts during the product life cycle between end-of-production and end-of-
service. First, setting up a large order with the final lot of production, second, setting 
up extra production runs, and third, implementing remanufacturing to manufacture 
spare parts from used parts. The authors solved the problem by proposing Decision 
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Tree, Dynamic Programming procedure and a heuristic method to find the optimal 
combination of three options. In a case study for controlling spare parts inventory 
level of an electronic equipment manufacturer, the optimal parameter S of an (S-1,S) 
inventory system is calculated by applying a Bayesian approach to forecast demands 
(Aronis et al., 2004). A heuristic method, which has close relation to the Greedy 
heuristic, based on duality theory, is developed by (Morris A Cohen, Kleindorfer, & 
Lee, 1989) that determine base stock policies for various spare parts in a facility that 
stocks various parts for set of products. As far as the usage of equipment is changing 
over time, it will result in intermittent demand for spare parts that fluctuate with time. 
Therefore, demand could be considered as a non-stationary Poisson process and an 
inventory policy similar to (S-1,S) inventory system has been proposed by (Bian, Guo, 
Yang, & Wang, 2013). Demands for spare parts for items which are no longer 
manufactured could be assumed as a Poisson process with failure rate that is 
decreasing exponentially. A dynamic programming formulation is developed by (Hill, 
Omar, & Smith, 1999) that determines replenishment policy which minimizes the total 
discounted setup cost, production cost, inventory holding cost and backorder cost over 
the time horizon. Inventory pooling known as lateral transshipments and direct 
deliveries can help companies to maintain high service levels with low cost. This 
strategy provides an inventory system which is insensitive to the lead-time distribution 
(Alfredsson & Verrijdt, 1999). The low cost information sharing and possible quick 
delivery of items with reasonable cost are two major factors that affect inventory 
management. The sharing and transshipment of items most of the times reduces 
overall cost of inventory systems (Grahovac & Chakravarty, 2001).  
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Figure 6: Inventory management crucial factors 
 
Common ownerships that have reliable and precise information can benefit from 
pooling. For instance, a centralized inventory system that deals with several stores 
with common ownership can benefit a lot from the cooperation among different stores 
and retailers. In this situation cost allocation among the stores can be studied via three 
criteria of stability, justifiability and computability (B. C. Hartman & Dror, 1996). 
Real-life spare parts network can benefit from lateral transshipment. A partial 
pooling system is developed by (Kranenburg & Van Houtum, 2009) that determines 
base stock level and lateral transshipment for warehouses by exploiting a heuristic 
procedure. The advantage of pooling in the area of repairable spare parts with lateral 
transshipment has been investigated broadly by (Lee, 1987), (Axsäter, 1990), 
(Sherbrooke, 1992), (Alfredsson & Verrijdt, 1999), (Grahovac & Chakravarty, 2001), 
(Kukreja, Schmidt, & Miller, 2001), (Kukreja et al., 2001, Wong et al., 2005, Wong, 
Oudheusden, & Cattrysse, 2007). 
Among reviewed literatures, we can list following inventory control policies that 
have been widely used in spare parts management field: 
1. Order-up-to level policy (Aronis et al., 2004, Ashayeri et al., 1996, Bian et 
al., 2013, M. A. Cohen & Lee, 1990, Feeney & Sherbrooke, 1964, 
Fleischmann et al., 2003, Gomes & Wanke, 2008, Hill et al., 1999, 
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Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008, F. Karsten, Slikker, & van Houtum, 2012, 
FJP Karsten, Slikker, & van Houtum, 2009, Lonardo et al., 2008, 
Rustenburg et al., 2001, Scudder, 1984, Tedone, 1989, R. H. Teunter & 
Klein Haneveld, 2002, Thonemann et al., 2002). 
2. Two parameters inventory policy (Q,r) (Chang et al., 2005, Gerchak & 
Gupta, 1991, Bruce C Hartman, 1994, Jin & Liao, 2009, Liao et al., 2008, 
Williams, 1982). 
3. Newsvendor policy (Dror & Hartman, 2010, Bruce C Hartman, Dror, & 
Shaked, 2000, Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008, Montrucchio & Scarsini, 
2007, Müller, Scarsini, & Shaked, 2002, Q. Wang, 1991). 
4. EOQ based policies (Dror & Hartman, 2010, Guardiola, Meca, & Puerto, 
2009, W Heuvel & van den P, 2007, Wilco van den Heuvel, Borm, & 
Hamers, 2007, S. X. Li, Huang, & Ashley, 1996, Q. Wang, 1991, Whitin, 
1955). 
 
Figure 7: The usage frequency of inventory control policies in spare parts related literatures 
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3.3. SPARE PARTS VS. GENERAL PARTS 
 
Spare parts are being used to maintain or repair the final products or equipment 
which basically deals with high level of inventory investment and customer 
satisfaction. Different factors make spare parts inventories different from other types 
of inventories. The main factors are customers’ satisfaction, variety of different parts 
and low demands that makes spare parts become unique. 
The following factors affect the uniqueness of spare parts significantly (M. A. 
Cohen & Lee, 1990), (M. A. Cohen, Zheng, & Agrawal, 1997), (Muckstadt, 2004), 
(Kumar, 2004), (José Roberto do Regoa, 2011): 
• Delays in repairing; 
• Spare parts demand which mostly is intermittent; 
• High risk of obsolescence due to complexity of products and their life 
cycles; 
 
Figure 8: Spare parts uniqueness criteria 
 
As long as spare parts inventories are not intermediate or final products, the 
policies that govern their inventories are not the same as work in progress (WIP) and 
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finished goods (FG) (Kennedy et al., 2002). This difference significantly caused by 
two following factors: first, their functions are different. It means, WIP exists to 
smooth production rate and FG exists as a source of product to be delivered to the 
customer, but spare parts exist for maintenance to keep equipment in working 
condition. Second, inventory policies are different because WIP and FG rates can be 
changed to adjust the production rate but the level of spare parts depends on the use of 
machineries and the quality of maintenance.  
Therefore demands for spare parts depend on the maintenance policy. There are 
two types of maintenance policies, scheduled or preventive and unplanned repair. For 
the first situation, demands are predictable but for the latter, they are unpredictable. 
Meanwhile, usually the cost of stock-outs is significant so the safety stock is necessary 
and the amount of stock pile can be determined according to the following 
categorization (Kennedy et al., 2002): 
• Maintenance functions; 
• Management issues; 
• Age-based replacement; 
• Multi-echelon problems; 
• Obsolescence; 
• Repairable parts; 
• Special applications; 
Maintenance functions are useful to give solutions to calculate optimal re-order 
point and quantity of the orders. In other words, these deal with when to place an 
order, how many units to be ordered while making decision between reducing the 
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costs and increasing the availability (Mamer & Smith, 1982), (Seidel, 1983). Also 
(Hegde & Karmarkar, 1993) have studied the support costs and system availability 
from the customer point of view. In another study, providing spare parts kits based on 
the ratio of the expected usage and the cost of having spares at hand is investigated by 
(Robert, 1980). Furthermore, the problem of field repair kits which is providing spares 
and the tools for the repairing has been studied by (Mamer & Smith, 1982). 
Management issues discuss about maintenance inventory very broadly. This 
comprehensive discussion starts from non-technical aspects based on (Moore, 1996): 
• Reliability; 
• Capacity objectives; 
• Systematic strategy; 
• And continues to technical aspects including: 
• Control-based forecasting; 
• Maximum likelihood estimation (Foote, 1995); 
• Recursive methods to obtain probability distribution of machine down 
times (Gupta & Srinivasa Rao, 1996); 
• Population models to group parts; 
• Optimization models (M. A. Cohen, Kleindorfer, & Lee, 1986), (M. A. 
Cohen, Kleindorfer, Lee, & Pyke, 1992), (Haneveld & Teunter, 1997); 
• Categorization techniques such as ABC, fast moving, slow moving and 
non-moving (FSN) and vital, essential and desirable (VED) to partition 
parts and criticality factor evaluations like analytic hierarchical process 
(AHP) (Gajpal, Ganesh, & Rajendran, 1994); 
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Replacement the items at the end of their pre-determined interval is a simple 
maintenance policy. The age replacement decision has been investigated for a system 
with a single component subjects to a random failure (Michael & Derek, 1996). Also 
this decision-making has been tried for extended models with many identical units by 
use of the optimal stocking policy. This policy benefits from Barlow-Proschan age 
replacement policy that is supported by the optimal (s,S) inventory policy (Zohrul 
Kabir & Al-Olayan, 1996). 
Multi-echelon problems deal with where to place spare parts. (Muckstadt, 1973) 
Introduced the MOD-METRIC system. This system determines the stock level 
according to two different factors: 
• Minimizing the expected backorder cost of the end product; 
• Using the average re-supply time for the end product; 
Also two-level inventories’ stock level can be minimized by using heuristic 
methods (Vrat, 1984). It is a fact that number of stocking policies depends on the 
number of the stocking points or levels, so a branch and bound algorithm to find an 
optimal policy is useful (M. A. Cohen et al., 1986, 1992). In field service management 
the goal is to find a proper way to prioritize customers. In order to achieve this goal, 
multi-echelon problems can be implemented where a closed queuing network model is 
used to balance the high service rate to the customers while minimizing the cost of 
holding down the spare parts (Papadopoulos, 1996). The influence of the limited 
repair capacity on multi-echelon repairable item inventory systems has been studied 
by (Diaz & Fu, 1997) that considers different repair distributions where demand for 
spare parts are generated as Poisson or compound Poisson distribution.  
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The repair distributions are as the following: 
• Single-class exponential: Single server with exponentially distributed 
service time. 
• Single-class general: Single server with service time that is governed by 
some general distribution. 
• Multi-class general: Multi servers with service time that is governed by 
some general distribution. 
However, the authors recommended that using the double binomial negative 
distribution improves the accuracy of their model. 
In order to determine the lower and upper bounds, multi-location and multi-
period inventory systems have been studied. The lower bound determination is based 
on Lagrangean decomposition and an upper bound is based on dual relaxation 
(Karmarkar, 1981). 
Spare parts are retained in inventory as an insurance against the machine 
downtimes because downtimes are expensive and processing the spares from suppliers 
can be very time consuming. Obsolescence is a problem for parts that are used rarely. 
The obsolescence cost is usually considered as a part of inventory holding cost and 
specifically contributes to those types of spares known as  insurance which have a 
high probability of not being used during the system lifetime (Karmarkar, 1981, 
Kennedy et al., 2002). The effects of obsolescence are studied in an EOQ model which 
states that ignoring the cost of being obsolete as small as 20% would lead to an 
average increase of 15% in the inventory cost (Cobbaert & Van Oudheusden, 1996). 
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The ability to repair failed parts and enter them to the inventory system can be 
examined via repairable items. The demand for the serviceable stock can be analyzed 
with two different Poisson processes, one for repairable items and the other for non-
repairable items (Allen & D’Esopo, 1968). Ready rate as a fraction of time that the 
customer back orders are zero can be used instead of expected backorder. The problem 
of inventory allocation among main assembly and sub-assemblies can be solved by 
using three methods (Silver, 1972): 
• Dynamic programming; 
• Marginal allocation (maximizing the ready rate); 
• Lagrange multipliers; 
Backward dynamic programming with a joint probability density function for 
both the demand and return can be used to calculate the optimum repair level, 
purchase level and scrap-down-to level (Simpson, 1978). A queuing analysis is 
implementable for the repairable inventory of a repair depot. The system service is 
calculated by availability, which is the probability that the spare inventory is not 
empty (Gross & Ince, 1978). The optimal level of inventory for repairable spare parts 
can be studied subject to budget constraints (Kohlas & Pasquier, 1981). 
The main problem of spare parts inventory and sales is that they have low level of 
inventory turnover which is commonly about one to two times per year. This low rate 
leads to an obsolescence of 23% of the whole inventory (G. P. Cachon & Netessine, 
2006). The obsolete parts are no longer can be sold which tides up with high cost of 
holding and warehouse. (Van Jaarsveld & Dekker, 2011) analyzed obsolescence of 
service parts in a practical environment. The authors proposed a method to estimate 
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the risk of obsolescence of service parts using the behavior of identical parts in the 
past. 
Spare parts management for some sort of special cases has been studied by 
different researchers. These special problems consist of some rare conditions which 
can be listed as the following: 
• Regular and emergency orderings, spare parts are ordered at regular 
intervals and kept for emergency failurs (Kaio & Osaki, 1981); 
• Effects of job lateness on the optimum repair parts, providing repair kits 
based on cyclic queue without the assumption of high availability of parts 
(Gross & Ince, 1978); 
• Random number of parts, where the number of parts to be replaced is a 
random variable (Bruggeman & Van Dierdonck, 1985); 
• Replenishment at the ends of phases, where parts are replace based on 
time-based maintenance (Vujossevi’c, Petrovi’c, & Senborn, 1990); 
• Spare parts management for equipment with scheduled non-continuous 
usage, where systems of equipment are used on a periodic scheduled basis 
instead of continuous usage (Bridgman & Mount-Campbell, 1993); 
 
3.4. SPARE PARTS CLUSTERING AND DEMAND 
 
Optimization problem related to inventory management includes consideration of 
inventory costs, and service level by selecting inventory control parameters, allocating 
control resources and purchasing decisions. For this purpose, item classification is 
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very useful. Classification of spare parts is an essential part of the inventory 
management because it affects the methods of the demand forecasting and inventory 
control policy (Huiskonen, 2001) (Boylan, Syntetos, & Karakostas, 2006).  
Spare parts for industrial maintenance can be classified by Vital, Essential and 
Desirable (VED) (Gajpal et al., 1994) whereas consumer goods are classified in 
Pareto’s graph with categories of high, medium and low values (ABC) (Silver et al., 
1998).  
In another classification, spare parts are categorized into three categories of 
intermittent, slow moving and smooth by (Williams, 1982). His work has been 
resumed by (Eaves & Kingsman, 2004) and categorized in more details into smooth, 
irregular, slow moving, slightly intermittent and highly intermittent. The effective 
classification can simplify and optimize the inventory policy. For instance, (R. Q. 
Zhang, Hopp, & Supatgiat, 2001) by using a modified ABC classification reduced the 
cost of inventory by 30%. 
The most commonly used classification method is the ABC classification which 
is useful where materials are fairly homogenous and differ from each other by unit 
price or demand volume. However, the ABC classification is a one-dimensional 
method that is not suitable for control policies with several factors. In this case, multi-
dimensional classifications are useful. (Duchessi, Tayi, & Levy, 1988) introduced a 
two-dimensional classification method which combines inventory cost and part 
criticality as a criteria. (Flores & Whybark, 1987) introduced a multiple-criteria 
classification method. (M. Cohen et al., 1990) used a general grouping method. 
(Petrovi’c & Petrovi’c, 1992) developed a heuristic classification model based on 
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several factors like availability of the system, essentiality, price, weight, the volume of 
the part, availability of the parts in the market, and the efficiency of repair. (Gajpal et 
al., 1994) improved the criticality analysis of the spare parts in the classification by 
using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). 
The life cycle of the spare parts is affected by finished goods life cycle. Their life 
cycle can be divided into three phases of initial, normal or repetitive and final 
(Fortuin, 1980). Therefore, the demand for spare parts depends on finished goods, and 
following factors would affect it (Fortuin & Martin, 1999): 
• Size and age of the final products (sales, running fleet, installation base, 
etc.); 
• Products maintenance characteristics (preventive, corrective, etc.); 
• Parts characteristics and their defects (wear, accident, aging, etc.); 
Demand for spare parts is volatile and unpredictable, so demand forecasting and 
inventory management is very challenging (W. Wang & Syntetos, 2011). Demand for 
spare parts arrives in irregular time intervals and with variable quantities. This 
characteristic can be evaluated by two following factors (Prof. Maurizio Faccio, 
2010): 
1) ADI - average inter-demand interval: average interval between two 
demands of the spare part; 
2) CV - coefficient of variation: standard deviation of the demand divided by 
the average demand; 
According to changes in values of ADI and CV, four typologies could be 
assumed (Ghobbar & Friend, 2003): 
 74 
 
 
Figure 9 Patterns for the characterization of the spare parts demand 
 
• Slow moving or smooth: They have low rotation rate (ADI=0 & CV=0); 
• Intermittent: They have sporadic demand, which means there are a lot of 
period without demands but variability of the demand quantity is low 
(ADI=1.32 & CV=0); 
• Erratic: The variability of the demand quantity is high but the interval 
time periods are constantly distributed (ADI=0 & CV=0.49); 
• Lumpy: They have high variability in both demand quantity and interval 
times (ADI=1.32 & CV=0.49); 
However, two additional factors should also be factored in this categorization, 
which are cost and criticality. The cost of purchase and maintenance and the criticality 
based on the risk of not completing a process that is assigned to equipment, are 
classified into low, moderate and high (Ben-Daya, Duffuaa, & Raouf, 2000). Spare 
parts demand is mostly intermittent or lumpy which means it occurs after a long 
variable periods without demand. The lack of parts leads to high losses, and demand 
forecasting can decrease the loss. The demand forecasting is necessary for inventory 
control and planning, although it has some errors (Love, 1979). Many forecasting 
methods as uncertainty reduction methods have been devised that may perform well 
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when CV is low, but they perform poorly when demand is lumpy or intermittent. 
Lumpy demand for spare parts has been observed in different industries such as the 
automotive industry, durable goods spare parts in aircraft maintenance, and 
telecommunication systems. A classical reference for demand forecasting has been 
provided by (Wheelwright & Hyndman, 1998) and a related literature review has been 
provided by (Boylan et al., 2006) for last fifty years. According to (Prof. Maurizio 
Faccio, 2010), many different forecasting methods have been introduced in literatures 
such as Single Exponential Smoothing method (SES), Croston’s method (CR), 
Syntetos-Boylan Aproximation (SBA), Moving Average method (MA), Weighted 
Moving Average method (WMA), Additive Winter method (AW), Multiplicative 
Winter method (MW), Bootstrap method (BT), Autoregressive and Moving Average 
methods (AMA), Poisson method (PM), Binomial method (BM), Grey Prediction 
method (GM) and Neural Networks (NN). 
 
Figure 10: The usage frequency of forecasting methods in spare parts related literatures 
SES, 6
CR, 13
SBA, 8
MA, 3
WMA, 2
AW, 5
MW, 4
BT, 4
AMA, 4
PM, 1
BM, 1 GM, 2
NN, 10
 76 
 
One item which is important for the demand forecasting is the determination of 
the time bucket. The shorter time bucket results in a more intermittent demand. 
Several comparisons have been performed to select proper time buckets. It can be 
monthly (Eaves & Kingsman, 2004) (R. Teunter & Duncan, 2008) or weekly 
(Ghobbar & Friend, 2003) and even daily (Gutierrez, Solis, & Mukhopadhyay, 2008) 
and the issue of choosing the time bucket has not been discussed in the literature. 
Methods used to forecast the demand and the optimal inventory level are 
determined using mathematical and operations research methods (Aronis et al., 2004). 
One of the most accurate methods for forecasting is the Single Demand Approach 
(SDA), which computes mean and variance of the demand during lead-time by use of 
three random variables. (Krever, Wunderink, Dekker, & Schorr, 2005) listed these 
random variables as follows: 
1. Amounts demanded during lead-time; 
2. Time intervals between demands 
3. Lead-time; 
Classical methods of demand forecasting like exponential smoothing are being 
used frequently for routine stock control systems which have large number of 
products. But for low demand items with intermittent demands, they are erroneous that 
result in an excessive inventory right after the demand occurs and lower before the 
demand occurs, but can be modified by separating estimation of intervals (Croston, 
1972). A proposed correction (A. A. Syntetos & Boylan, 2001) is known as the 
Syntetos-Boylan Approximation (SBA) method. Several case studies have been done 
to establish the superiority of the SBA, Croston and double exponential smoothing 
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techniques (Eaves & Kingsman, 2004, Ghobbar & Friend, 2003). Moreover, other 
more complicated models have been developed for the demand forecasting including; 
bootstrapping technique together with autocorrelation (Willemain, Smart, & Schwarz, 
2004), bootstrapping with regression analysis (Hua, Zhang, Yang, & Tan, 2006), 
neural networks (Gutierrez et al., 2008) and Enhanced Fuzzy Neural Network (EFNN) 
method which uses the fuzzy logic method together with the Analytical Hierarchical 
Process (AHP) and Genetic Algorithm (GA) (S. Li & Kuo, 2008). Some inventory 
models known as reactive (Santoro, Freire, & others, 2008) do not use directly 
demand forecasting, and even for those models, a medium-term demand forecast is 
needed. 
Demands for spare parts can also be more and more uncertain. The main reasons 
that cause this uncertainty are categorized into two groups of quick changes in 
customer’s preferences (for example in fashion industry demand for a specific color 
changes dramatically from time to time) and the structure of the supply chain (that 
means by moving to higher levels of supply chain the pattern of the demand will be 
more uncertain). This effect or phenomenon is known as Bullwip effect and several 
factors like erroneous demand forecast, long lead-times, supply shortage and backlog, 
price variations, etc. cause this effect (Inger, Braithwaite, & Christopher, 1995, Lee, 
Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997). One of the most important forms of the demand 
variability is the simultaneous increase of the inventory level and decrease of the 
customer services, the supply chain management of a system with similar 
characteristic which has multi-echelons has been investigated by (Kalchschmidt, 
Zotteri, & Verganti, 2003). Spare parts demand is intermittent, also called lumpy, 
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sporadic and erratic. It is characterized by infrequent demands, often of variable size 
with irregular intervals. Hence, researchers prefer to model demand from two 
perspectives, i.e. the demand size and inter-arrival times (Aris A Syntetos, Babai, & 
Altay, 2012). In this situation, the use of compound theoretical distributions that 
factors in the size-interval combination is very appealing. If time is considered as a 
discrete variable, demand arrives as a Bernoulli process with geometric inter-arrival 
distribution. If time is considered as a continuous variable, demand arrives as a 
Poisson process with exponential inter-arrival distribution. In order to model demand 
for spare parts various distributions have been used to represent time intervals and 
demand size. Most commonly used distributions in literatures are listed as follows: 
• The compound Poisson distribution which is a combination of a Poisson 
distribution for demand occurrence and a geometric distribution for 
demand size, known as Stuttering Poisson (D. J. Gallagher, 1969), (Ward, 
1978), (Watson, 1987); 
• The combination of a Poisson distribution for demand occurrence and a 
normal distribution for demand sizes (Vereecke & Verstraeten, 1994); 
• The combination of a Poisson distribution for demand occurrence and a 
logarithmic distribution for demand sizes, known as Poisson-Logarithmic 
process that yields a negative binomial distribution (NBD) (Quenouille, 
1949); 
• The gamma distribution as the continuous analogue of the NBD which 
covers wide range of distribution shapes (Burgin, 1975), (Burgin & Wild, 
1967), (Johnston, 1980); 
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• The combination of a Bernoulli process for demand occurrence and a 
Logarithmic-Poisson distribution for demand sizes, known as log-zero-
Poisson (Kwan, 1991); 
• The combination of a Bernoulli process for demand occurrence and a 
normal distribution for demand sizes(Croston, 1972), (Croston, 1974); 
• The Poisson distribution with unit-sized transactions (Silver et al., 1998), 
(Friend, 1960); 
 
3.5. INVENTORY SYSTEMS AND GAME THEORY 
 
The first application of Game Theory, cooperative and non-cooperative games 
goes back to (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). Supply chain management has 
both cooperative and non-cooperative interactions between different agents, and the 
cooperative games in supply chain management are called inventory games. 
Cooperative games can be categorized into deterministic and stochastic games that 
(Dror & Hartman, 2010) studied through EOQ and Newsvendor policies respectively. 
The EOQ model is designed for multi-item orders and known as the joint 
replenishment game. The latter game is based on classic-Newsvendor policy and 
known as the Newsvendor centralization game. Both of them have infinite repetition 
and used for single-Stage and stationary problems. 
The application of the Game Theory in production and inventory management 
can be divided into two groups; players determine the condition of the market and 
market equilibrium can be found by studying players’ interactions, and another group 
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which consists of individual players who compete against each other; decision makers 
find the optimal decisions under these conditions (Q. Wang, 1991). The author first 
studied the application of static games in management science, then investigated the 
discount game (both quantity and price discount) in the buyer-seller environment. 
Results showed that quantity discount is always better for the seller. The rest of the 
research focuses on Newsboy game for substitutable parts with stochastic demand and 
in the end the market of repeated purchasing products is compared to the market of 
consumer durable products. 
In first category, the presented models look for the market equilibria and 
investigate the existence, uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium and do not pay 
attention to the optimal decisions for players. This method is called Oligopolist theory 
and reviewed by (M. Shubik, 1981, 1984, 2006, M. Shubik & Levitan, 1980). 
In the second category, the primary goal of the models is to find an optimal 
decision of the players and (Parlar, 1988) started working on this theory by 
considering two retailers who sell substitutable products with random demand, and 
their goal is to order an optimal number of parts to maximize their profits. 
A recent literature review has been provided by (Dror & Hartman, 2010) that 
reviews the implementation of the cooperative games in inventory management. 
Similarly another survey is provided by (Fiestras-Janeiro, Garcia-Jurado, Meca, & 
Mosquera, 2011). According to the literature reviews, there are four different game 
setups: 
• Players face deterministic demands and use economic order quantity 
policies; 
 81 
 
• Players face stochastic demands and utilize single-order Newsvendor 
policies; 
• Players face stochastic demands and use continuous review settings 
including penalty costs; 
• Players face stochastic demands with different methods of game setup 
regarding spare parts application including infinite-horizon games, Erlang 
loss formula and queuing systems; 
Supply chain management and inventory management can benefit from Game 
Theory. In general, Game Theory can improve or clarify interactions between different 
groups who are competing against each other. Cooperative and non-cooperative games 
are used to model several supply chains with single and multi-period settings 
(Chinchuluun, Karakitsiou, & Mavrommati, 2008), (G. P. Cachon & Netessine, 2006, 
Leng & Parlar, 2005). Game Theory is a useful tool to study supply chains, it can be 
used for decision-making where there are conflicts between multiple entities. The 
application of the Game Theory in supply chain management was first reviewed by 
(G. P. Cachon & Netessine, 2006, Gerard P Cachon, 2003) in which the authors 
focused on different Game theoretical methods. (Meca & Timmer, 2007) reviewed the 
application of the cooperative Game Theory to supply chain management. In another 
survey paper by (Gerard P Cachon, 2003, Leng & Parlar, 2005), a review based on 
classification of supply chain topics has been provided. Also, (Gerard P Cachon, 2003) 
presented the literature review on supply chain collaboration with contracts. 
According to (Leng & Parlar, 2005) numbers of studies related to supply chain and 
Game Theory have been doubled in last decade compared to previous decades. 
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For instance, the Game Theory has been used to analyze detailed supply chains 
(G. P. Cachon & Netessine, 2006) where cooperative and non-cooperative games are 
used to solve static and dynamic games. The existence of the equilibrium in non-
cooperative games has been studied. Generally, extensive games have not been 
considered for supply chain games and only normal forms have been considered.  
In order to investigate distribution systems where supplier has finite or infinite 
capacity (Dai, Chao, Fang, & Nuttle, 2005) Game Theory can also be useful. In this 
case a single period game between one supplier and two retailers is considered. 
Inventory control decisions can be made by retailers using Game Theory which 
depends on the existence of the Nash equilibrium. When the pure strategy could not be 
found, the Stackelberg method is implemented to find the optimal strategy in form of 
the leader-follower game. Also, supply chain management and inventory management 
for substitutable products with stochastic demand have been investigated (Avsar & 
Baykal-Gürsoy, 2002). An extensive survey for supply chain games has been done by 
(G. P. Cachon & Netessine, 2006) which basically looks for existence and uniqueness 
of the equilibrium in non-cooperative games, however they developed different game-
theoretical techniques to study four types of games including: 
• Non-cooperative static games; 
• Dynamic games; 
• Cooperative games; 
• Signaling, screening and Bayesian games; 
The goal of supply chain management is higher benefits, lower costs and better 
service quality and Game Theory is an effective tool to achieve this goal. In another 
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review by (Leng & Parlar, 2005) supply chain games have been investigated in five 
areas: 
1. Inventory games with fixed unit purchase cost (including games with 
horizontal and vertical competition among players, usually as a single 
period game). 
2. Inventory games with quantity discounts (where the buyer as a player has 
an interest to increase the number of purchase quantity to benefit from 
lower unit price). 
3. Production and pricing competition (efficiency of the supply chain 
depends on the production and pricing decisions where production 
equilibrium can be found by using Game Theory and Cournot method 
involving capacity decisions, service quality, product quality, and 
advertising). 
4. Games with specific joint decisions on inventory (where each player 
should make two or more decisions at the same time). 
One of the first studies of the buyer-seller interaction in supply chain was 
published by (Whitin, 1955). They examined a monopolistic market position with 
respect to the seller and discussed about the inventory level by using EOQ model 
where demand was a linear function of price. The assumption of the market as a 
monopolistic market compared to competitive market will result in different strategies 
and number of research has been done by (Abad, 1988, Cheng, 1990), (Kunreuther & 
Richard, 1971), (Susan X Li & Huang, 1995), (Susan X Li, Huang, & Ashley, 1995) 
about monopolistic markets. (S. X. Li et al., 1996) studied the buyer-seller relationship 
 84 
 
in the market by constructing cooperative and non-cooperative operations which are 
formulated as an EOQ inventory models with a Game Theory framework. In form of 
non-cooperative game the seller acts as a leader and buyer is the follower, the 
equilibrium of this game is consistent with the result of the EOQ model.  
In another scenario, sellers and buyers cooperate to maximize their profits. The 
comparison of results reveals that the total payoff and the order quantity are higher in 
case of cooperation and the sale price is lower. In other words the quantity discount is 
more beneficial in the cooperative game (S. X. Li et al., 1996). 
A supplier inventory problem is investigated by assigning two-person Game 
Theory solution. The supplier utility function of the game is set up from the side of the 
supplier. This game has two players (supplier & customer) that has no dominant 
strategy and can be solved as a mixed strategy problem (Mileff & Nehéz, 2006). 
Multiple retailers who form a coalition place their joint orders to a single supplier; 
this interaction has been studied as a cooperative game which is the economic lot-
sizing game (X. Chen & Zhang, 2007). This game has a non-empty core when 
inventory holding cost and back logging cost have linear functions. This approach is 
investigated based on linear programming duality which has an optimal dual solution 
that contributes to an allocation as the core. In similar research, an economic lot-sizing 
game has been suggested between several retailers with known demand for a limited 
period of time who can reduce their cost by placing joint order (Wilco van den Heuvel 
et al., 2007). 
The contrast between cooperative and non-cooperative games has been 
investigated by (Hart & Mas-Colell, 1997) which states that non-cooperative games 
 85 
 
are strategy oriented methods while cooperative games study the outcomes and decide 
what is the optimal coalition to get the best payoff and distribute the cost among the 
players while satisfying the non-emptiness of the core.  
In order to study cooperative games in supply chain management, the literature 
can be divided into two categories of deterministic and stochastic including; the 
deterministic joint-replenishment game (this game is based on an EOQ model) and the 
Newsvendor centralization game (this game basically relies on the classic newsvendor 
setting) (Dror & Hartman, 2010). 
The EOQ game first represented by (Meca, Timmer, García-Jurado, & Borm, 
2004), where the cooperation between different firms is structured and the 
proportional division method is used for the cost allocation. The basic inventory model 
is introduced and can be extended to more precise model as an inventory model. This 
method then followed by (Anily & Haviv, 2007). They considered an infinite-horizon 
deterministic problem and showed that this game has non-empty core where optimal 
replenishment policy is determined by power-of-two policies. Also, (Dror & Hartman, 
2007) studied inventory games and cost allocation while using an EOQ model as an 
inventory policy. Similarly (W Heuvel & van den P, 2007) proceed to use this method 
for economic lot-size games. This method applied for a model with a fixed time 
horizon, known demand for a single item in a situation where backlogging is not 
allowed. (Guardiola et al., 2009) used EOQ games for production-inventory games. 
Joint replenishment can be addressed by the optimal power-of-two policies, which was 
introduced by (Roundy, 1985, 1986) and gives 98% cost effectiveness as the ratio of 
the lowest cost to the selected cost.  
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To study mentioned problem as a cooperative game, (J. Zhang, 2009) proposed a 
general sub-modular setup by use of the Lagrangian dual and strong duality to 
guarantee the non-emptiness of the core. In their setup, there is one-warehouse with 
multiple retailer inventory models and a joint cost function. Their goal is to find the 
best replenishment policy that minimizes the cost during an infinite time horizon. 
The (Q,r) games first introduced by (Bruce C Hartman, 1994) were not concave 
but it had non-empty core. The proof of having non-empty core for a normally 
distributed demand has been investigated by (B. C. Hartman & Dror, 1996). A cost 
allocation for a centralized inventory who deals with different stores with in common 
ownership is studied. Three major characteristics of the game including stability 
(existence of the core), justifiability (logical relation between cost and benefit), and 
computability are satisfied during their analysis. (Gerchak & Gupta, 1991) applied a 
continuous (Q,r) model for a single-period inventory and proved that the total benefit 
is higher in the case of coalition and they applied different methods of allocation 
resulting that some stores are not satisfied with the share cost. (Robinson, 1993) 
showed that the best cost allocation that Gupta used is not stable and they introduced a 
new policy for allocation based on Shapley value which is stable but needs 
complicated computations in case of large number of players. 
The Newsvendor game that considers different stores with single period demands 
for single item has been studied (Bruce C Hartman et al., 2000). There was a 
centralized inventory system with holding and penalty cost, the allocation cost defined 
by setting a centralized inventory cooperative game which has non-empty core and the 
existence of the non-empty core has been examined for demands with normal 
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symmetric distribution and joint multi-variate normal distribution (Bruce C Hartman 
et al., 2000). Similar studies have been conducted by (Özen, Fransoo, Norde, & 
Slikker, 2008) assuming that where there are number of M warehouses and number of 
N retailers, the retailers can order single products and after their demands realization 
they can change their demand. In this environment the cost allocation between 
retailers is investigated as a cooperative Newsvendor game. A similar game has been 
presented by (Slikker, Fransoo, & Wouters, 2005) where transshipment among 
retailers modeled and the game has non-empty core, means players have incentives for 
cooperation. Also there are several studies that show the core of the Newsvendor game 
is non-empty (Müller et al., 2002), (Slikker, Fransoo, & Wouters, 2001). (Müller et al., 
2002) proved that the Newsvendor game has non-empty core for all kind of random 
demands distribution. (Montrucchio & Scarsini, 2007) examined the Newsvendor 
solution for infinite number of retailers of single-item who attend a coalition and 
proved the game is balanced and the core exists. 
A general framework for the analysis of decentralized distribution centers with 
number of N retailer and one or more central locations has been developed. The 
demand is stochastic and when demand is unsatisfied the retailer can use excess stocks 
at other retailers or central location. A cooperative framework for the sequential 
decision-making on inventory, shipping and cost allocation is introduced which has 
non-empty core and provide pure strategies based on Nash equilibrium (Anupindi, 
Bassok, & Zemel, 2001). In this situation each retailer as an independent agent looks 
for his own interest instead of the whole system profit. Cooperation can increase their 
benefits but sometimes it conflicts with individual benefits. The game studies possible 
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scenarios of cooperation and competition. The solution consists of three different 
Stages of cooperation, cooperation-competition hybrid form known as coopetitive 
(Anupindi et al., 2001). This solution has been extended by (Granot & Sosic, 2003) 
where demand is stochastic for an identical item regarding that there is a three-Stage 
decentralized inventory system where in the first Stage before realization of the 
demand, each retailer orders his initial inventory level, then after realization decides 
on the level of inventory that he wants to share and finally residual inventories are 
allocated and transshipped for residual demands and the profit would be allocated. 
Inventory centralization is not always beneficial and it can reduce the total 
performance. This idea has been studied by (Anupindi & Bassok, 1999) to investigate 
a car manufacturer and its two outlets and compromise when it is more beneficial for 
the manufacturer to consider outlets as one (centralization) or consider them as 
competitive dealers with independent demands. The study investigates the effect of 
lost sales in stock-out situation on manufacturer profit. In other words, they look for 
what is the effect of market search in cooperative decision-making. Market search is 
the percentage of the customers who face unsatisfied order at the local retailer and 
search for the product at the other retailer. Studies show that there is a threshold for 
the market search and above the specific amount, coalition would result in loss of the 
manufacturer or even total less payoff or benefit for the manufacturer and retailers as 
the whole system. Generally, decentralized strategy would be more beneficial in case 
of the high rate of market search.  
In decentralized situation with stochastic demand one can compete first and then 
cooperate (Anupindi et al., 2001). It means retailers compete for transshipment while 
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there is a non-empty core, then they cooperate and there is a pure Nash equilibrium 
and core solution. In industries like oil and gas sector there are several inventory 
plants that stock spare parts to support facilities operations. In this condition, risk 
pooling and cost allocation by means of centralized inventory solution can lead to 
considerable savings considering ordering and holding costs. Game Theory principles 
are very beneficial for this allocation. The comparison between centralized and 
decentralized inventory of spare parts has been provided showing that centralized 
system achieve more savings and five different approaches of cost allocation have 
been investigated (Guajardo & Rӧnnqvist, 2012).  
The cost allocation in the context of repairable spare parts pooling has been 
studied regarding two different situations. First, participants cooperate in pooling 
without having any self-interest, and in second situation they participate in the game 
with interest of maximizing their benefits. Two strategies of core concept and Nash 
equilibrium have been examined to investigate two different problems respectively 
(Wong et al., 2007). The results show that in case of cooperation players can increase 
their payoffs, also the game with imperfect information is studied which indicates that 
having an agreement on downtime cost or service level can boost the required trust 
among players to convince them to cooperate (Wong et al., 2007). 
When cost of spare parts inventory is high, companies can reduce the cost of their 
inventory by pooling their stock parts. This pooling can be defined as a cooperative 
cost game which reduces expected joint holding and downtime costs (FJP Karsten et 
al., 2009). The suggested non-empty core game is applicable even for the companies 
with non-identical demands, base stock levels and downtime costs. To be precise it 
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investigates that there is a stable allocation while there is a non-identical demand and 
base stock level or there is a non-identical down time cost. When companies have non-
identical downtime costs along with non-identical base stock levels or demand rate, it 
is possible to have an empty core game. 
The stability of pooling arrangements is the main concern of the cooperation, and 
fair distribution of holding and downtime costs among participants have been studied 
by setting two different considerations; first for a setting with fixed stocking level and 
then for the optimized stock level (F. Karsten et al., 2012). In both cases a stable cost 
allocation has been provided which is equivalent to the result of the Erlang loss 
system. Furthermore, some realistic considerations have been considered as 
assumptions including; demand with Poisson process, perfect and immediate repair of 
failed parts, full pooling, constant repair lead-time, and emergency procedure in case 
of stock-out and infinite time horizon regarding the long life time of the machines. 
The cost allocation is defined as the core of the game and five different methods 
of cost allocations have been implemented, including; Egalitarian which simply 
assigns equal share to each player (Tijs & Driessen, 1986), Proportional to demand 
which assigns the cost share for each player based on his demand proportion (Wong et 
al., 2007), Altruistic which assigns the cost share for each player based on the 
proportion of his stand alone share to the total share while they are all playing alone 
(Audy, D’Amours, & Rӧnnqvist, 2012), Shapely value which allocate the cost among 
players based on their marginal cost of entering the coalition (Wong et al., 2007), and 
Equal Profit Method (EPM) which looks for stable cost allocation with shares of as 
similar as possible (EPM) (Frisk, Gӧthe-Lundgren, Jӧrnsten, & Rӧnnqvist, 2010). 
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Companies who use complex machines need to stock low-demand expensive 
spare parts. Those companies can cooperate with each other to meet their demands. 
The cooperation can be practiced by keeping their own stock-points and let the others 
to use them through lateral transshipment. A diminished total cost of spare parts 
inventory is achievable and the distribution of inventory costs among companies 
would be determined by using cooperative Game Theory models (F. Karsten, Slikker, 
Houtum, & others, 2006). 
A single firm can minimize its spare parts inventory costs by use of proper 
inventory management policies. In case of existence of collective firms, the joint 
inventory costs could be minimized by means of cooperation. A basic inventory model 
with deterministic demands for spare parts has been provided where several shops 
place their orders to a supplier in a cooperative manner. The savings of cooperation is 
allocated between shops by means of cooperative Game Theory (Meca et al., 2004). 
Among reviewed literatures, there are few papers that studied spare parts 
inventory systems and Game Theory that can be listed as follows: 
• Repairable parts: (Wong et al., 2007), (Guajardo & Rӧnnqvist, 2012), 
(FJP Karsten et al., 2009), (F. Karsten et al., 2012); 
• Consumable parts: (Meca et al., 2004); 
• Stochastic demand: Poisson process (Wong et al., 2007), (Guajardo & 
Rӧnnqvist, 2012), (F. Karsten et al., 2012), Poisson process/Erlang (FJP 
Karsten et al., 2009); 
• Deterministic demand: (Meca et al., 2004); 
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3.6. SPARE PARTS PRICING 
 
In some cases, number of spare parts is much larger than the primary products. 
Despite low number of spare parts sale (25% of total revenue for most OEMs), they 
stand for considerable portion of the suppliers profits (40-50% of all profits for most 
OEMs). In this environment, the price of the parts has more effects on the profit 
compared to the amount of sale or reduction in production cost.  
It means the price of the parts is a main factor for profits. For instance, a 
consumer durable product manufacturer increased its profit by 30% with only 2.5% 
average increase of the products or an industrial equipment manufacturer benefits 
from 35% increase in its profit by only 3% increasing its price level (Marn & Rosiello, 
1992). Also, consistent pricing will result in better customer satisfaction and their 
loyalty. The competitiveness of a company can be improved by three major activities, 
including decrease of cost of production; increase of the market share; and price 
adjustment known as the pricing strategy. In order to achieve a proper pricing strategy 
three major fields should be studied including; pricing strategies, pricing 
methodologies, and pricing tools. In a study for APL forklift manufacturer three 
pricing strategies have been investigated which are cost-based (uses the cost of the 
part then adding the standard mark-up value also known as cost-plus or mark-up 
pricing), market-based (it is based on the market willingness to buy the product or the 
comparison with other competitors prices) and value-based pricing (the customer 
decides on the value of the part and based on that, the cost of production and sale can 
be adjusted). Eight different methods were used including; spare parts pricing method, 
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market adaptation, discount policy, life cycle pricing, kitting, price elasticity and spare 
parts competition and spreadsheet were used as a tool (Cullbrand & Levén, 2012).  
 
Figure 11: Competitiveness of a company influential factors 
 
Despite the possible profit potential of selling spare parts, companies have 
neglected the proper price adjustment. The empirical research on spare parts pricing 
shows that only less than 20% of the companies benefit from systematic pricing 
strategies (Zinoecker, 2006), (Hinterhuber, 2004). The consolidation of pricing, 
production and distribution decisions in manufacturing environment has a potential to 
improve supply chain efficiencies. A literature review related to strategies that 
combine pricing decisions with production and inventory decisions have been 
provided by (Chan, Shen, Simchi-Levi, & Swann, 2004). 
An optimal control theory model has been developed by (Kim & Park, 2008) that 
studies a company’s strategy to determine spare parts price and warranty issues over 
the decision time horizon, i.e. the product’s life cycle plus its end of life service 
period. 
A market of multiple firms that face price-dependent, stochastic and substitutable 
demand has been investigated by (F. Y. Chen, Yan, & Yao, 2004). They proved that 
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there is a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium that determines the joint pricing/inventory 
decisions among the firms. 
The simultaneous determination of pricing and inventory replenishment for a 
single item in the face of an uncertain demand has been developed by (Federgruen & 
Heching, 1999). They analyzed a periodic review inventory model in which demands 
are stochastic and independent in consecutive periods but dependent on the item’s 
price.  
Traditionally, OEMs have priced the spare parts based on the upper limit of the 
marketplace in which using cost-based pricing method is tempting. This method 
causes diminishing revenues and margins, customer dissatisfaction, increased 
competition, and lost market shares, because it leads to a lack of understanding the 
potential value of the parts (Vigoroso, 2005), (T. Gallagher et al., 2005). 
Spare parts consist of thousands of components, so differentiated pricing 
strategies can be applied. One possible way of price segmentation is to differentiate 
spare parts prices based on the amount of competition. Companies can update their 
knowledge about how the spare parts are used and how the competitors enter to the 
market through field engineering and customer support. According to this concept, 
spare parts are divided into three groups; non-competition, some competition and 
heavy competition. 
According to (Docters, 2003), the first step in pricing spare parts is creating spare 
parts matrix in line with part velocity (is how fast the spare parts move off from the 
inventory) and proprietary position (is how unique are the spare parts means they are 
inelastic when only one OEM exclusively provides them). 
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Figure 12: Spare parts price matrix 
 
Three major methods of spare parts pricing have been suggested by (Vigoroso, 
2005). The first method is to categorize spare parts based on complexity and 
competition. Intuitively, the spare parts with highest complexity and least competition 
can have the highest prices. The second method is the consistency-oriented pricing. In 
this method, spare are grouped into part families, and value driver for each family is 
defined and based on the value driver a pricing logic is built. As the value driver 
increases the prices increase. The third method is to price spare parts in comparison 
with a new product. The upper bound for repair of machinery including the labor cost 
and spare parts is about 50-70% of the new product’s price. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4. RENEWAL COST VS. REPLACEMENT COST 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
To investigate the profitability of spare parts business, specifically in industries 
such as automobiles, white goods, industrial machineries and information technology, 
the research comes up with the idea of renewal cost versus the replacement cost. The 
replacement cost of a product is defined as the current market price of the product and 
the renewal cost of a product is the acquisition cost of spares to completely renew the 
product excluding labor costs. Customers purchase products from OEMs and to keep 
them in working condition, they replace failure parts with spare parts. The price of 
products and its spares are set by OEMs and our research looks for fair or sustainable 
spare parts pricing via investigation of replacement and renewal costs. In this chapter, 
these costs for some products with specific characteristics as listed below are 
calculated, and the ratio between the renewal cost and the replacement cost as a scale 
to evaluate the sustainability of the spare parts pricing is determined. 
• High volume products; 
• Products with lots of components; 
• Products with a long lifetime; 
One of the best products that can be fit in aforementioned characteristics is the 
passenger car. In this chapter, first the procedure of the data acquisition for spare parts 
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and costs calculation for two BMW car models (328i & X6) are described. Then the 
same procedure is repeated for other similar consumer products and the ratio between 
renewal cost and replacement cost are provided. 
 
4.2. REPLACEMENT COSTS 
 
The replacement cost of products is defined as the current market price of the 
product. The current prices for each vehicle have been acquired in two conditions. 
First the brand new price (replacement cost) and then the used vehicle price. The 
prices have been determined based on the KBB website data as listed in Table 9. 
Table 9: Vehicles prices 
Reference BMW 328i BMW X6 
KBB Price for used vehicle (average) $20,169.50 $41,000.00 
KBB MSRP Price for new vehicle $43,995.00 $60,495.00 
 
4.3. DATA ACQUISITION 
 
In order to determine the price of the car and its parts, parts lists are collected 
according to the procedure that is explained in detail in the Appendix. 
 
4.4. COST ANALYSIS 
 
After gathering information about parts lists for each vehicle, the price list for 
each category or main group of vehicles has been developed. The total price list 
determines the renewal cost of each vehicle which is provided in following sections. 
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4.4.1. RESULTS PER CATEGORY 
 
The following sections provide an overview of the collected data by dividing all 
MGs into four categories which are Powertrain, Chassis, Vehicle Body and Electrical 
System. 
 
4.4.1.1. POWERTRAIN 
 
The vehicle’s powertrain incorporates the engine, fuel system, exhaust system, 
transmission system, gearshift, and drive shaft. It consists of 10 MGs, 36 SGs, 77 
SSGs, and 1,503 parts for BMW 328i and 10 MGs, 43 SGs, 85 SSGs, and 1635 parts 
for BMW X6. The detailed price list is listed in Table 10. 
Table 10: Powertrain price list 
 BMW 328i BMW X6 
Main Group SGs SSGs Parts Costs SGs SSGs Parts Costs 
ENGINE 9 27 873 $29,602.39 11 27 812 $33,761.14 
ENGINE 
ELECTRICAL 
SYSTEM 
11 20 141 $5,124.17 9 13 125 $3,908.18 
FUEL 
PREPARATION 
SYSTEM 
2 4 76 $2,517.79 2 7 157 $5,475.42 
FUEL SUPPLY 3 5 125 $2,479.79 3 5 87 $3,086.12 
RADIATOR 1 5 69 $2,102.53 1 8 116 $4,077.28 
EXHAUST SYSTEM 2 4 115 $6,399.82 3 6 86 $7,843.75 
ENGINE AND 
TRANSMISSION 
SUSPENSION 
2 2 32 $514.56 2 2 29 $1,032.65 
AUTOMATIC 
TRANSMISSION 3 7 44 $10,337.60 4 8 116 $11,060.34 
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 BMW 328i BMW X6 
Main Group SGs SSGs Parts Costs SGs SSGs Parts Costs 
GEARSHIFT 1 1 2 $201.82 2 2 17 $1,181.57 
DRIVE SHAFT 2 2 26 $975.28 2 3 48 $2,301.49 
TRANSFER CASE E-
VEHICLE 
TRANSMISSION 
0 0 0 0 4 4 42 $4,599.73 
Total Results 36 77 1503 $60,255.7 43 85 1635 $78,327.67 
 
4.4.1.2. CHASSIS 
 
The chassis incorporates the front axle, rear axle, steering system, brakes, and 
pedals. It consists of 5 MGs, 28 SGs, 39 SSGs, and 766 parts for BMW 328i and 5 
MGs, 32 SGs, 44 SSGs, and 976 parts for BMW X6. The detailed price list is listed in 
Table 11. 
Table 11: Chassis price list 
 BMW 328i BMW X6 
Main Group SGs SSGs Parts Costs SGs SSGs Parts Costs 
FRONT AXLE 2 6 141 $3,980.32 4 9 224 $10,938.62 
STEERING 6 9 95 $5,670.65 7 10 128 $14,170.40 
REAR AXLE 6 10 246 $8,521.11 7 11 316 $17,395.76 
BRAKES 12 12 260 $9,230.76 11 11 288 $10,419.05 
PEDALS 2 2 24 $279.93 3 3 20 $404.24 
Total Results 28 39 766 $27,682.77 32 44 976 $53,328.07 
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4.4.1.3. VEHICLE BODY 
 
The Vehicle body incorporates the bodywork, exterior, interior, wheels, and other 
equipment. It consists of 7 MGs, 40 SGs, 116 SSGs, and 3,233 parts for BMW 328i 
and 7 MGs, 43 SGs, 118 SSGs, and 3328 parts for BMW X6. The detailed price list is 
listed in Table 12. 
Table 12: Vehicle body price list 
 BMW 328i BMW X6 
Main Group SGs SSGs Parts Costs SGs SSGs Parts Costs 
WHEELS 4 4 169 $2,842.14 5 6 76 $3,701.63 
BODYWORK 10 27 772 $33,081.34 10 21 1161 $93,224.33 
VEHICLE TRIM 18 58 1995 $26,805.39 19 63 1648 $51,883.46 
SEATS 3 11 130 $12,845.62 3 15 284 $21,875.33 
SLIDING ROOF 
FOLDING TOP 1 1 50 $1,435.94 2 2 43 $3,057.76 
EQUIPMENT PARTS 2 10 44 $484.71 2 7 44 $369.08 
RESTRAINT 
SYSTEM 2 5 73 $2,430.06 2 4 72 $2,591.88 
Total Results 40 116 3233 $79,925.20 43 118 3328 $176,703.47 
 
4.4.1.4. ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
 
The vehicle’s electrical system incorporates the vehicle cable harness, 
instruments, lighting, heater and air conditioning, audio and communication systems, 
sensors and control units. It consists of 7 MGs, 43, SGs, 107 SSGs, and 1,107 parts 7 
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MGs, 47 SGs, 133 SSGs, and 1460 parts for BMW X6. The detailed price list is listed 
in Table 13. 
Table 13: Electrical system price list 
 BMW 328i BMW X6 
Main Group SGs SSGs Parts Costs SGs SSGs Parts Costs 
VEHICLE 
ELECTRICAL 
SYSTEM 
9 62 582 $9,132.70 9 59 526 $13,389.73 
INSTRUMENTS, 
MEASURING 
SYSTEM 
1 1 3 $849.32 2 2 8 $2,491.10 
LIGHTING 6 8 133 $3,833.83 6 10 246 $6,380.02 
HEATER AND AIR 
CONDITIONING 13 16 195 $6,388.28 12 16 273 $11,405.76 
AUDIO, 
NAVIGATION, 
ELECTRONIC 
SYSTEMS 
9 13 132 $4,118.40 12 31 273 $15,291.19 
DISTANCE 
SYSTEMS, CRUISE 
CONTROL 
2 4 39 $1,562.86 2 6 103 $2,683.13 
COMMUNICATION 
SYSTEMS 3 3 23 $1,212.85 4 9 31 $2,011.53 
Total Results 43 107 1107 $27,098.24 47 133 1460 $53,652.46 
 
4.4.2. TOTAL RESULT 
 
The BMW 328i has 29 MGs, 147 SGs, 339 SSGs, and 6,609 parts, and the total 
cost of the parts of $194,961.96 versus BMW X6 which has 30MGs, 165 SGs, 380 
SSGs, and 7399 parts, and the total cost of the parts of $362,011.67. In other words, 
the renewal cost of each vehicle equals to the total cost of the spare parts that are listed 
in Table 14. 
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Table 14: Total price list 
 BMW 328i BMW X6 
Category MGs SGs SSGs Parts Costs MGs SGs SSGs Parts Costs 
Powertrain 10 36 77 1,503 $60,255.75 11 43 85 1,635 $78,327.67 
Chassis 5 28 39 766 $27,682.77 5 32 44 976 $53,328.07 
Vehicle Body 7 40 116 3,233 $79,925.20 7 43 118 3,328 $176,703.47 
Electrical System 7 43 107 1,107 $27,098.24 7 47 133 1,460 $53,652.46 
Total 29 147 339 6,609 $194,961.96 30 165 380 7,399 $362,011.67 
 
4.5. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COSTS COMPARISON 
 
Based on this estimate of the renewal cost and replacement cost of the chosen 
BMW cars, it is evident that the renewal cost of these products is excessively high. 
The comparison of the replacement cost and renewal cost for other types of products 
with variety of brands, models, the replacement cost and number of parts helps us to 
evaluate the sustainability of spare parts prices. Therefore, in the following more 
products are selected for the costs comparison. The chosen products for the study are 
among following categories: 
• Passenger cars; 
• Motorcycles; 
• All-train vehicles; 
• Refrigerators; 
• Lawn mowers; 
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• Trimmers and edgers; 
• Lawn tractors; 
• Washers; 
In Table 15 the comparison of the replacement cost and renewal cost for different 
products are listed: 
Table 15: comparison of renewal cost and replacement cost 
BRAND MODEL Replacement cost Renewal cost Number of parts 
BMW 
X6 35i $60,495.00 $362,011.00 7,399 
328i $43,995.00 $194,961.00 6,609 
Honda CB1000R $10,999.00 $42,443.00 2,227 
YAMAHA V star 250 $3,990.00 $19,627.30 1,253 
Suzuki RM-Z250 $7,399.00 $32,996.00 1,271 
Honda TRX90X $2,999.00 $13,011.00 1,027 
GE 
GSS20GEWWW $1,285.90 $5,785.75 240 
GTS20ICNCWW $580.00 $2,589.00 105 
B&D 
SPCM1936 $209.99 $1,016.00 180 
NST2018 $59.99 $230.00 51 
Craftsman 917272751 $1,614.99 $9,770.00 761 
GE WCVH6800J $1,027.12 $7,332.50 162 
 
Figure 13 shows the ratio between renewal cost and replacement cost: 
 
Figure 13: Ratio between renewal cost and replacement cost 
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The results show us the renewal cost of products is high and the ratio between the 
renewal cost and the replacement cost follows a certain pattern. The consistency of 
this ratio states that most OEMs implement cost-based or mark-up pricing to retrieve 
the final price of spare parts. According to (Vigoroso, 2005), cost-based pricing is 
popular and most OEMs use this method for spare parts price setting. Despite 
popularity of this method, it significant weak points (Hinterhuber, 2008, Kotler & 
Armstrong, 2010, Nagle & Holden, 2002, Noble & Gruca, 1999). The main 
disadvantages of cost-based pricing are under-pricing and over-pricing that leads to 
lower-than-average profitability, and ignoring competitiveness of the parts in the 
market. These factors are against the spare parts prices sustainability as a long term 
profitability of the OEMs without compromising consumer loyalty and satisfaction. 
This issue can be addressed in competition-based pricing or strategic pricing that will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5. SPARE PARTS INVENTORY GAMES 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Supply chain management and inventory management can benefit from Game 
Theory. In general, Game Theory can improve or clarify interactions between different 
groups who are competing against each other. Cooperative and non-cooperative games 
have been used to model supply chains with single and multi-period settings 
(Chinchuluun et al., 2008). Game Theory is a useful tool to study supply chains, for it 
can be used for decision-making when there are conflicts between multiple entities. 
For instance, it has been used to analyze detailed supply chains (G. P. Cachon & 
Netessine, 2006) where cooperative and non-cooperative games are used to solve 
static and dynamic games. The majority of related studies focus on the existence of the 
equilibrium in non-cooperative game. 
Game Theory is the logical analysis of situations of conflicts and cooperation, 
such situations can be defined as a game in which (Straffin, 1993): 
• There are at least two players; 
• Each player has a number of possible strategies; 
• The strategies chosen by each player determine the outcome of the game; 
• Associated with each possible outcome of the game is a collection of 
numerical payoffs, one to each player; 
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Game Theory studies how players should play rationally based on set strategies 
and try choosing an action that gives them maximum profit. Game Theory is 
categorized into non-cooperative and cooperative games. Non-cooperative games use 
the notion of equilibrium to determine rational outcomes of the game. Most common 
related concepts are Nash Equilibrium, dominant strategy and sub game perfect 
equilibrium, which are defined as the following: 
• Nash Equilibrium: chosen strategies by the players are in Nash 
Equilibrium if no player can benefit by unilaterally changing his/her 
strategy; 
• Dominant strategy: dominant strategy results in the highest payoff no 
matter what the strategies of the other players are; 
• Sub game perfect equilibrium: in extensive form, strategies are in the sub 
game perfect equilibrium if they constitute a Nash Equilibrium at every 
decision point; 
In cooperative games, groups of players or all of the players form binding 
agreements to make coalitions. In cooperative games, determination of the solution 
concept depends on satisfying sets of assumptions known as axioms. The most 
common axioms are: 
• Pareto optimality: the total utility allocated to the players must be equal to 
the total utility of the game; 
• Individual rationality: the utility of each individual in coalition must be 
greater than his utility when playing alone; 
• Kick-back: the allocated utility to each individual must be non-negative; 
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• Monotonicity: the allocated utility to each player should increase when the 
overall utility increases; 
According to definite assumptions, spare parts inventory games in the form of 
normal, cooperative and non-cooperative, non-zero-sum, evolutionary, and 
competitive fringes will be investigated. The proposed games will study the OEMs’ 
decision-making on spare parts pricing strategies, inventory levels, batch productions 
and re-manufacturing efforts. 
 
5.2. OEM AGAINST MARKET 
 
5.2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Spare parts, for many companies producing durable products, are the most 
profitable function of the corporation. The OEM, in a competitive and uncertain 
aftermarket, can benefit from Game Theory to manage his spare parts inventory. We 
study the spare parts inventory game as an N-person non-zero-sum single-shot game. 
Our game is restricted to a two-person (the OEM and the market), non-cooperative 
game setup. The market can be considered as an unreasoning entity whose strategic 
choices affect the payoff of the OEM, but which has no interest in the outcome of the 
game. This is modeled as the game against nature which means the OEM plays against 
the market. In our game, the OEM decides on his pricing strategy (in a competition 
against will-fitters to absorb more customers) and the order-up-to stock level. The 
OEM’s inventory level strategy does not have a dominant level therefore the game has 
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a mixed strategy solution. The solution of the mixed strategy determines the optimal 
strategy of the OEM to maximize his payoff in the aftermarket business. In other 
words, the theory of games in our spare parts inventory problem provides the optimal 
pricing strategy and the expected payoff distribution in relation to the expected market 
demand, and the OEM chooses his level of inventory with respect to the probability of 
the market’s demand. 
 
5.2.2. INVENTORY GAME, OEM AGAINST NATURE 
 
This game investigates spare part inventory problem as an N-person non-zero-
sum single-shot game. In order to achieve this goal, the problem is restricted in two-
person (the OEM and the market), non-cooperative game setup. The game has been set 
up from the OEM viewpoint, which means the solution of the game gives him the 
maximum payoff or minimum loss. 
It has been assumed that the game is a non-cooperative game and the market is 
unkind and chooses hostile strategies. In spare parts stock control literature, it has been 
considered that the parts’ failures are random and the Poisson process with constant 
failure rate represents spare parts demand. A more realistic modeling assumption 
declares that failure rate during the products’ life span varies and it is not constant 
over the product life cycle and post product life cycle. This consideration justifies the 
non-stationary Poisson demand process assumption for spare parts. The OEM knows 
the demands for spare parts arrive as a non-stationary Poisson process, but he is not 
aware of the exact distribution of the failure intensity factors and can only forecast the 
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bounds of the intensity factors. Also, the sale price changed by the OEM in 
comparison to the will-fitters sale prices has an influence on the demand intensity 
factors which is estimated by the OEM.  
We consider the market as an unreasoning entity whose strategic choices affect 
the payoff of the manufacturers, but which has no interest in the outcome of the game. 
The aforementioned characteristic of the market enables us to consider the spare parts 
inventory game as a game against nature. Literature related to this includes: 
(Chinchuluun et al., 2008, Dror & Hartman, 2010, Meca et al., 2004, Mileff & Nehéz, 
2006), but none of the research discussed the application of the game against nature in 
the spare parts inventory management. One of the recent study related to the 
application of the game against nature in the strategic decision-making is provided by 
(Beckenkamp, 2008). The author discussed the psychological aspect of decision-
making in games against nature where the selected strategies improve the effects of 
Minimax-strategies in the cases of risk-aversion. In our study we model the spare parts 
inventory management as a game against nature which means the OEM competes with 
will-fitters on the sale prices, at the same time playing against the market to optimize 
spare part inventory levels. 
 
5.2.3. THE MARKET DEMAND 
 
Spare parts demand is intermittent or lumpy which means it often occurs after a 
long variable period without any demand. The lack of parts leads to high losses for 
suppliers, and demand forecasting methods can decrease the loss. Demand forecasting 
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is very important, although it has some errors (Love, 1979). (Wheelwright & 
Hyndman, 1998) introduced a classical method for demand forecasting and (Boylan et 
al., 2006) has provided a related literature review covering forecasting over the last 
fifty years. 
In our inventory game we assume that the OEM has limited information about the 
market’s expected demand. The OEM knows that demands for spare parts arrive as a 
non-stationary Poisson process with varying failure rates or intensity factors, but the 
exact distribution of these factors over the time is not observed and only the upper and 
lower bounds of the intensity factors are forecasted.  
In the aftermarket business, other than the OEM as an original manufacturer, 
there are other low cost manufacturers, known as will-fitters, who can manufacture the 
same parts and deliver them to the market. Based on the sale price of the 
manufacturers, the total demand for the spare parts will be allocated among suppliers. 
In other words, manufacturers compete with each other on their sale prices to absorb 
more customers, so the sale price is a decision variable for the OEM to optimize his 
payoff in the aftermarket.  
Original parts may face failure because of defects and aging, and once they fail, 
demands for spare parts will arise. Due to the intermittent and slow moving 
characteristics of spare parts demand, we consider the demand for spare parts as a 
Poisson process. A Poisson process with an intensity factor or rate of λ is a 
stochastic process in which the inter-arrival time distribution is exponential with mean 
time of μ = 1/λ and the arrival distribution is Poisson with the rate of λ. If λ is 
constant over time, the process is a stationary Poisson process and when λ changes 
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over time, the process is a non-stationary Poisson process. In the case of spare parts 
management, the rate of demand depends on three factors: quality, usage and 
maintenance, which are not constant over time. Intuitively, we can assume that the 
demands are a non-stationary Poisson process in which the demand rate is a function 
of time λt.  
In this study, we assume that the OEM introduces a new product to the market 
and he wants to forecast demands for spare parts in the next future. The OEM 
considers that there are two major phases of the original parts failure: the initial phase 
(introduction phase) and the repetitive phase (growth, maturity and decline phase). 
Figure 14 graphs products in the market and demand for the spare parts during the 
product life span for automotive electronics industry (Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008). 
 
Figure 14: Demand for spare parts distribution during product life span 
Modified from (Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008) 
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Demands for spare parts arrive as a non-stationary Poisson process with two 
levels of intensity factors:  
• Upper bound or `λfb: The repetitive phase of the original parts 
consists of the period right before the end of the original production and 
post product life cycle as the repetitive support, which has higher failure 
intensity; 
• Lower bound or λ=f: The initial phase of the original parts consists of 
the period right after the introduction of the original products to the 
market as the initial support, which has lower failure intensity; 
Regarding the competition among the OEM and will-fitters based on the sale 
prices, and the demand intensity factors, the following parameters are known by the 
OEM which is listed in Table 16: 
Table 16: The market demand 
Variable spare part sale price Upper bound demand rate Lower bound demand rate    
 
5.2.4. THE OEM COST FUNCTION 
 
The OEM strategies are determination of the sale price and the spare parts stock 
level in the order-up-to level inventory. The payoff of the OEM is the profit of the 
OEM Kz which is the difference between the cost of production and inventory K 
and the revenue K which attained by selling spare parts. Let X be a random 
variable and Pr{X=x} determines the probability that the random variable X takes on 
a specific value x from some unspecified probability distribution. The expected 
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value or mean of the random variable X is equal to E[X] that is calculated in 
Equation (37): 
  
EWXX =-x	Pr	{X = x}de3  
  (37) 
As it was mentioned in the last section, we assume that the demand arrives as a 
Poisson process. The Poisson distribution is given by Equation (38): 
  px = λTee2t(x!  
  (38) 
Where the mean E[X], from Equation (37) is found to be λT. It is assumed that 
λ is the average annual demand for spare parts or the intensity factor and T is the 
average lead-time measured in years. The origin of the single-item inventory theory is 
a queuing theorem of Palm’s (Sherbrooke, 2004). If the demand for an item is a 
Poisson process with an intensity factor of λ and if the lead-time for each failed unit 
is independently and identically distributed according to any distribution with mean 
T years, then the steady-state probability distribution of the number of failure units 
in the lead-time has a Poisson distribution with mean λT. The most common 
inventory policy for low demand, high cost repairable items is the order-up-to level 
policy that is a one-for-one policy with a stock level of S and re-order point of 
S − 1.  
There are two principal measures of item performance (i) the fill rate which is the 
percentage of demands that can be met at the time they are placed, and (ii) the 
backorders which is the number of unfilled demands that exist at a point in time. The 
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expected fill rate and number of backorders are non-negative quantities, and they are 
calculated as Equations (39) and (40). Moreover, the expected number of parts in 
inventory is derived as Equation (41). 
Expected fill rate: 
  
EFRS =-Pr	{X = x}2e3E  
  (39) 
Expected backorder: 
  
EBOS = - x − SPr	{X = x}de3g  
  (40) 
Expected inventory: 
  
EIS =-S − xPr	{X = x}e3E  
  (41) 
The goal is to reach a low level of the backorder or a high level of fill rate with 
minimum investment on inventory. We must calculate the cost of production and 
inventory, as well as the revenue from selling the products. Equation (42) gives us the 
cost of production and inventory:  
  K = c × S + p × EBOS + h × EIS 
  (42) 
Equation (43) gives us the revenue of selling products: 
  K = c> × D × EFRS 
  (43) 
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Equation (44) gives us the OEM payoff: 
  	Kz = K − K 
  (44) 
As we can see the cost of production and inventory and the revenue of selling 
products are functions of the sale price and inventory levels, which are the strategic 
actions of the OEM. Moreover there are different parameters that affect the cost of 
production and inventory. The parameters in Equation (42) and (43) are listed in Table 
17.  
Table 17: Cost of production and inventory parameters 
Notation Parameter definition  Demand (in units per period)  Spare parts inventory level (in units)  Variable cost of production (in dollars per unit)  Penalty cost (in dollars per unit per period)  Holding cost (in dollars per unit per period)  Sale price (in dollars per unit) 
 
5.2.5. THE GAME SETUP 
 
Game Theory is applied to determine the sale price and the spare part stock level 
for an OEM who manufactures single-item spare parts, keeps them in inventory with 
order-up-to level inventory policy and sells them to the market. The game is set up 
between the OEM and the market and the solution of the game maximizes the profit of 
the OEM in the buyer-seller environment. The game has been set up from the OEMs 
perspective, which means the solution of the game gives him the maximum payoff or 
minimum loss. In order to achieve this goal, the problem is restricted to a two-person, 
non-cooperative game setup. Players choose their strategies simultaneously and the 
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game is a static game that can be modeled and solved by finding the Nash 
Equilibrium. This configuration requires the following assumptions: 
• Players play simultaneously; 
• The OEM possesses the information of the original parts failure rates and 
can predict the allocated demand rates including: the upper bound 
intensity factor `λfb and the lower bound intensity factor λ=fwith 
respect to his selected sale price; 
• The market as a nature has two choices of Poisson process demand types 
with upper and lower bounds intensity factors;  
• The probability that the market plays with lower bound demand is  or 
PMarketr ¡; 
• Respectively the probability that the market plays with upper bound 
demand would be 1 − ; 
• The OEM has several strategies which are order-up-to inventory levels (as 
discrete numbers) that varies from 1 to N; 
The game setup can be shown in strategic or matrix form. Table 18 gives us the 
information of the game setup in the matrix form. This matrix known as the payoff 
matrix and the value of each cell is the payoff the OEM: 
Table 18: The payoff matrix of inventory game 
  
Market (Nature) 
  Dlower Dupper 
O
EM
 
Order-up-to level 
S1 KB(S1,Dlower) KB(S1,Dupper) 
… … … 
SN KB(SN,Dlower) KB(SN,Dupper) 
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Regarding the probability of market decision-making PMarketr ¡, the 
expected utility of the OEM will be calculated from Equation (45): 
EXOEMo = PMarketr ¡ × UOEMo, Marketr ¡ + PMarketr¢££ ¡× UOEMo, Marketr¢££ ¡	i: order − up − to	levels = 1,… , N 
   (45) 
Equation (46) tells us that the total probability of market decision-makings equals 
to 1. 
  PMarketr ¡ + PMarketr¢££ ¡ = 1	 
   (46) 
The investigation of the payoff matrix declares there is no dominant strategy in 
this game that leads to lack of a pure strategy. Therefore, the game has a mixed 
strategy solution, which depends on the probability of the market’s demand. 
 
5.2.6. THE MIXED STRATEGY SOLUTION 
 
In Game Theory, a game has a mixed strategy solution where a player has to 
choose his/her strategies over available sets of available actions randomly. A mixed 
strategy is a probability distribution that assigns to each available action a likelihood 
of being selected. In 1950, John Nash proved that each game (with a finite number of 
players and actions) has at least one equilibrium point known as Nash Equilibrium. 
This saddle point exists whenever there is a dominant strategy. In this game this can 
be explained based on the OEM payoff matrix where there is a specific level of 
inventory for the OEM that satisfies Equation (47). In case of existence of this specific 
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level of inventory, the selected inventory level would be the dominant strategy for the 
OEM: 
  
§Kzso∗, D=f > Kz`so , DfbKz`so∗, Dfb > Kz`so , Dfb∀	so	&	i ª 
  (47) 
In the decision-making problem, since there is no dominant level of inventory the 
OEM is making a choice between different alternatives. If the payoff for each 
alternative is known, the decision is made under certainty. If not, the decision is made 
under uncertainty. The major solution for decisions under uncertainty and risks are 
expected utility (EU) and subjective expected utility (SEU). Given a choice of an 
action and different possible payoffs in nature, SEU is calculated by multiplying the 
payoff for each option by the subjective probabilities. The decision maker chooses an 
action with the highest expected utility. The subjective expected utility (SEU) 
determines the inventory level for the OEM. 
 
5.2.7. NUMERICAL STUDY 
 
In order to demonstrate the decision-making of the OEM based on the implication 
of the game against nature and the mixed strategy solution, we consider a single-item 
spare part inventory game. The sample parameters of our spare parts management 
system are listed in Table 19. Also we assume that the average lead-time T equals to 1. 
Table 19: Parameters of the sample spare part inventory 
Notation Parameter value  Dlower:  & Dupper:  
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Notation Parameter value  Dlower:  & Dupper:   Decision variables (1 to 10)  40  60  5  Decision variables (90 to 130) 
 
 
As mentioned in previous section, the OEM decision variables are the spare part 
order-up-to level and the sale price. Demand for spare parts arises when the original 
parts fail, then the emerging demand would be allocated among the OEM and will-
fitters in the aftermarket business. The main factor that affects the allocation of the 
demand among the suppliers is the spare part sale price. We assume that the OEM can 
forecast the demand bounds (including the lower bound intensity factor and the upper 
bound intensity factor) with respect to its sale price. In Table 20 the forecasted 
demand rates versus the spare part sale prices are depicted. 
Table 20: Parameters of the sample spare part inventory 
Spare part sale price:  Upper bound demand rate: «¬­® Lower bound demand rate: «¯°±­® 
90 5.5 3.5 
100 5 3 
110 4.5 2.5 
120 4 2 
130 3.5 1.5 
 
At each sale price level, the expected utility of the OEM for 10 different levels of 
inventory as a function of the probability that the market chooses to play with the 
lower bound intensity factor in the aftermarket business PMarketr ¡ has been 
calculated. According to the results of the game against nature, the optimal decision 
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variables of the OEM are determined. Table 21 shows the result of our spare part 
inventory game: 
Table 21: Parameters of the sample spare part inventory 
Spare part sale 
price 
Optimal order-up-
to levels  
(higher-lower) 
Share of lower 
order-up-to level 
Guaranteed 
payoff Maximum payoff 
90 7- 6 76% 2 59 
100 6- 5 88% 18 90 
110 6- 5 91% 26 115 
120 5- 4 78% 24 127 
130 4- 3 83% 14 130 
 
As we can see the Minimax of the OEM payoff or the guaranteed payoff of the 
game reaches to its maximum level at the sale price of 110. In other words, the 
optimal sale price for the OEM is 110 and the optimal inventory policy is to keep the 
order-up-to level of the spare part inventory at 6 and 5 for the 9% and 91% times of 
the production horizon respectively. Figure 15 depicts the trend of the OEM’s 
guaranteed payoff versus the sale price. 
 
Figure 15: The OEM’s guaranteed payoff vs. The sale price 
 
In the following the detailed description of the optimal solution of the game is 
presented. In Table 22, the resulting expected fill rate, expected backorder and 
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expected inventory level with respect to different values of the stock levels for the 
lower bound and upper bound of the demand are listed.  
Table 22: Numerical example for a single-item inventory 
Mean annual demand (λ) 2.5 
1 
40 
4.5 
1 
40 
Average lead-time (T) 
Item cost () 
S EFR(S) EBO(S) EI(S) EFR(S) EBO(S) EI(S) 
0 0.00 2.50 0.00 0.00 4.50 0.00 
1 0.08 1.58 0.08 0.01 3.51 0.01 
2 0.29 0.87 0.37 0.06 2.57 0.07 
3 0.54 0.41 0.91 0.17 1.75 0.25 
4 0.76 0.17 1.67 0.34 1.09 0.59 
5 0.89 0.06 2.56 0.53 0.62 1.12 
6 0.96 0.02 3.52 0.70 0.32 1.82 
7 0.99 0.01 4.51 0.83 0.15 2.65 
8 1.00 0.00 5.50 0.91 0.07 3.57 
9 1.00 0.00 6.50 0.96 0.03 4.53 
10 1.00 0.00 7.50 0.98 0.01 5.51 
 
According to EBO(S), EI(S) and related stock levels, the cost of inventory 
including the holding and backorder costs is calculated. Figure 16 shows the OEM’s 
inventory cost versus the spare part order-up-to levels. 
 
Figure 16: The OEM’s inventory cost vs. the order-up-to level 
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Figure 17: The OEM payoff distribution vs. the probability of the lower bound intensity factor 
 
The expected utility of the OEM for 10 different levels of inventory as a function 
of the probability that the market chooses to play with the lower bound intensity factor 
in the aftermarket business PMarketr ¡ has been calculated. The results are 
depicted in Figure 17 where the OEM payoff distribution is graphed vs. the probability 
of the lower bound intensity factor. 
According to the results of the SEU, the optimal decision variables of the OEM 
are determined that maximizes his payoff in the aftermarket game. This decision-
making is the inventory policy of the OEM that states the OEM should change his 
inventory level based on the probability of the market’s intensity factor or demand: 
• A1: If 0<PMarketr ¡<0.03 then select the inventory level of 8; 
• A2: If 0.03<	PMarketr ¡<0.45 then select the inventory level of 7; 
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• A3: If 0.45<	PMarketr ¡<0.72 then select the inventory level of 6; 
• A4: If 0.72<	PMarketr ¡<0.98 then select the inventory level of 5; 
• A5: If 0.98<	PMarketr ¡<1.00 then select the inventory level of 4; 
The lowest point in the upper envelope of the expected payoff involves an 
inventory level of 6 and an inventory level of 5. According to the results of mixed 
strategy for that 2	 × 	2 matrix game, the optimal decision variables of the OEM are 
determined. The solution of the mixed strategy states that the OEM should switch 
between inventory levels of 6 and 5 with probability of 9% and 91% respectively. The 
resulting mixed strategy guarantees the payoff of 26 for the OEM in the long run. 
On the other hand, the OEM has an opportunity to invest in performing a 
comprehensive market survey and precise data analysis to develop an accurate demand 
forecasting for the spare parts. Let us assume this investment costs the OEM 
C~=f²³>:o´µ. The method that is provided in our study helps the OEM to make decision 
to whether perform more precise demand forecasting. Equation (48) could evaluate the 
effort of the OEM to invest on extra demand forecasting: 
  if	maxKz − GTKz > C~=f²³>:o´µ	then	invest	on	extra	demand	forecasting 
  (48) 
Where GTKz is the result of the mixed strategy solution for the OEM’s payoff. 
In our proposed numerical study the max	Kz is equal to 115 and GTKz equals to 
26. Therefore, as long as C~=f²³>:o´µ is less than 89, extra effort on demand forecasting 
would be a rational activity. 
In order to examine the accuracy of the Game theoretical solution, a Monte Carlo 
simulation has been developed which relies on random sampling to obtain numerical 
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results. The simulation runs many times to obtain the payoff of the OEM with respect 
to uncertainty of the market. 
The simulation follows the following particular pattern: 
1. Defining a domain of possible inputs; 
2. Generating random inputs from a given probability distribution (uniform 
distribution) over the domain; 
3. Implementing the spare part inventory policy and performing a 
deterministic computation over the inputs; 
4. Aggregating the results; 
The goal of the simulation is to show the comparison of the Game Theory 
approach and any other inventory and production policy.  
 
Figure 18: Simulation results - The OEM payoff vs. the probability of the lower bound intensity factor 
Comparison of General Policies & Game Theory 
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In figure 18, the payoff of the OEM vs. the probability of the lower bound 
intensity factor while implementing Game Theory solution and some other inventory 
policies (General Policies; including different levels of order-up-to level inventory 
with different strategies of keeping inventory for example setting order-up-to level to 
4 and 8 and switching among them with probability of 30% and 70% respectively and 
etc.) is depicted. As we can see Game Theory approach guarantees the payoff of 26 for 
the OEM by switching among order-up-to levels of 6 and 5 with probability of 9% and 
91% respectively.  
The performance of the Game Theory approach is graphed in Figure 19 where 
general policies are considered as implementing order-up-to level of 5 and 6 with 
different strategies to keep the inventory such as 30% lower level and 70% upper level 
and etc. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation states that Game Theory approach 
allocates guaranteed payoff to the OEM in an uncertain market situation. 
 
Figure 19: Simulation results - The OEM payoff vs. the probability of the lower bound intensity factor 
Comparison of General Policies (identical levels with different strategies) & Game Theory 
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5.3. OEM AGAINST WILL-FITTER 
 
5.3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This spare part inventory game is an N-person non-zero-sum single-shot game. 
The model is restricted to a non-cooperative three-person (two manufacturers and the 
market) game. The market is an unreasoning entity whose strategic choices including a 
bargain seeker or a price taker affect the payoff the manufacturers. The will-fitter has a 
fixed pricing strategy but the OEM can decide on his sale price to compete with the 
will-fitter. This interaction is modeled as the game against nature which means the 
manufacturers play against the market. The game is designed from the OEM 
viewpoint and it has no dominant strategy. A mixed-strategy solution that determines 
optimal strategies of the OEM to maximize his payoff in the aftermarket business is 
developed. An alternative scenario, where the OEM can implement re-manufacturing 
processes to manufacture more sustainable parts with cheaper costs, is also considered 
to determine the optimal re-manufacturing effort. 
 
5.3.2. INVENTORY GAME, OEM AND WILL-FITTER AGAINST NATURE 
 
The goal of this section is to investigate the inventory game in the case of an N-
person non-zero-sum single-shot game. In order to achieve this goal, the problem is 
restricted to a non-cooperative three-person game. The game has three players: the 
OEM (who has a flexible sale-pricing strategy, and he can be a traditional 
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manufacturer or a re-manufacturer), the will-fitter (who has a solid sale-pricing 
strategy, and he is only traditional manufacturer) and the market. The game has been 
set up from the OEM stand point which means the solution of the game gives him the 
maximum payoff or minimum loss. 
We assume that the game is a non-cooperative game and the market is unkind and 
chooses hostile strategies. The manufacturers can only forecast the market base of 
spare parts. Moreover, they know that the market consists of two types of customers: 
• Price takers, who purchase the parts with available prices in the market; 
• Bargain seekers, who are searching for less expensive prices; 
We consider the market as an unreasoning entity whose strategic choices affect 
the payoff the manufacturers, but which has no interest in the outcome of the game. 
The aforementioned characteristic of the market enables us to consider the spare parts 
inventory game as a game against nature. In our study we model the spare parts 
inventory management as a game against nature which means the manufacturers of the 
spare part compete with each other and meanwhile play against the market. 
 
5.3.3. THE MARKET DEMAND 
 
In our spare part inventory game, we assume that the manufacturer has only 
limited information about the market’s expected demand. The market has two options, 
i.e. present itself as either a price taker or as a bargain seeker. These strategies can 
vary randomly, so there is a probability that the market chooses the price taker action 
or switches to the bargain seeker action. Demand for the products follows a general 
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linear demand function (Trivedi, 1998, Wu, 2012). In other words, demand from the 
manufacturer i, Do is a general linear demand function of his own selling price po 
and his competitor selling price `p·b where i=1, 2 (number of the manufacturers) and 
j=3-i. Equation (51) develops the demand function, where parameter ao is the market 
base for the product, the parameter ¸ is the self-price elastic coefficient and the 
parameter β is the cross-price elastic coefficient. This formula represents that the 
demand for the products depends on its own sale price and its competitor’s sale price. 
Unlike demands for finished goods, the total demand for spare parts will remain 
unchanged. We assume that the part’s demand is mostly dependent on its own sale 
price, so we consider that α > β > 0 which means that the demand for parts is more 
sensitive to changes of the self-price sale as Equation (49): 
  Do = ao−∝ `po − p·b + βp· −	po			∀	i = 1,2	and	j = 3 − i 
  (49) 
 
5.3.4. THE OEM COST FUNCTION-TRADITIONAL MANUFACTURER 
 
The aim of this game is to develop an inventory control policy for the OEM. In 
the case of traditional manufacturing, the OEM manufactures parts directly from the 
raw material, so the control policy is the determination of the pricing strategy and 
levels of inventory. In this setup, the OEM is flexible to change his sale price to 
optimize his profit, while his competitor has a solid sale-pricing strategy. 
Spontaneously, this price change will affect his level of inventory. In order to develop 
the OEM pricing strategies, we consider three standard pricing strategies, which are 
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listed as the following. The OEM can switch among them to increase his profit in the 
aftermarket business competition. 
• Regular pricing (RP), in this strategy the OEM selects his sale price, 
regardless of his competitor’s sale price; 
• Matching price (MP), in this strategy the OEM matches his sale price with 
his competitor’s sale price; 
• Price guarantee (PG), in this strategy the OEM’s sale price is n% 
cheaper than his competitor’s sale price;  
The payoff or profit of the OEM is the payoff of the game and it is the profit of 
the OEM or Kz which is equal to the difference between the cost of production and 
inventory or K and the revenue from selling parts or K which is acquired by 
selling products. The cost of production and inventory K is calculated based on a 
very basic inventory model known as the EOQ model which is formulated in Equation 
(1). Also, this formulation in an optimized solution provides the optimal lot-size (s∗). 
Equation (2) determines the optimal lot-size.  
Equation (50) determines the revenue of selling products: 
  K = p × D 
  (50) 
And Equation (51) calculates the OEM payoff: 
  	Kz = K − K 
  (51) 
As we can see the OEM’s payoff is a function of the demand and the optimal 
inventory level or lot-size, which are the strategic actions of the players. Moreover, 
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there exist different parameters that affect the cost of production and inventory. Table 
23 lists required parameters to calculate the payoff of the game: 
Table 23: Cost function parameters and variables 
Notation Parameter definition  Demand (in units per period) ¼ Market base demand for the product (in units)  Spare parts inventory level (in units)  Variable cost of production (in dollars per units)  Holding cost (in dollars per unit per period) ½ Setup cost (in dollars) 
P Variable sale price (in dollars per unit) 
N Price guarantee percentage 
 
5.3.5. THE OEM COST FUNCTION FOR THE RE-MANUFACTURER 
 
We consider the re-manufacturing as the process of re-using used products and 
use them to manufacture new parts. According to (Savaskan, Bhattacharya, & Van 
Wassenhove, 2004, Savaskan & Van Wassenhove, 2006), we assume that there is no 
difference between the re-manufactured and ordinary manufactured parts. Re-
manufacturing requires the collection of the used products, which is known as reverse 
channels. We assume that the recycling processes insert a total collection cost, and the 
scaling parameter B can estimate it (Savaskan et al., 2004, Savaskan & Van 
Wassenhove, 2006). Furthermore, the OEM can decide to re-manufacture whole or 
some part of his production. This decision-making is known as re-manufacturing 
effort which is indicated as the re-manufacturing effort parameter ¾ that varies 
between zero and one; 0 < τ < 1. 
The spare parts inventory control policy for the OEM in the case of re-
manufacturing is the determination of pricing strategy, levels of inventory, and 
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decision-making on re-manufacturing effort. By considering the re-manufacturing 
process, the cost of production and inventory will change. Equation (52) provides this 
cost. 
  K = hs∗2 + ADs∗ + c1 − τ + cfτD + B τ2  
  (52) 
Table 24 lists additional required parameters to calculate the payoff of the game 
in case of re-manufacturing: 
Table 24: Re-manufacturing parameters 
Notation Parameter definition À Re-manufacturing effort Á Variable cost of re-manufacturing (in dollars per units) Â Collection scaling parameter 
 
5.3.6. THE GAME SETUP 
 
Using Game Theory, we determine the spare parts inventory control policy for the 
OEM who manufactures a single part and sells it to the market, while competing with 
a will-fitter who manufactures the same part. This inventory game is set up from the 
OEMs viewpoint. The inventory game is set up between the OEM and the market and 
the solution of the game maximizes the profit of the OEM in the buyer-seller 
environment. Players choose their strategies simultaneously and the game is a static 
game and it is solved by finding Nash Equilibrium. The following procedure describes 
the interaction between two manufacturers: 
• Will-fitter chooses his sale price regardless of the market; 
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• OEM has an option to decide on his decision variable to choose the right 
sale price;  
• The resulting sale prices generate demand distribution among the 
manufacturers;  
The assumptions are: 
• Players play simultaneously; 
• The OEM possesses only the information of the part’s market base; 
• The market as a nature has two options of acting as either price taker or a 
bargain seeker; 
• The probability that the market plays as a price taker is P;  
• Intuitively, the probability that the market plays as a bargain seeker would 
be 1-P; 
• The OEM has three strategies of pricing (regular price (RP), matching 
price (MP) and price guarantee (PG)); 
• The OEM also can decide on his re-manufacturing effort percentage 
(GMEP); 
The game setup can be shown in matrix form. Table 25 gives us the information 
of the game setup in the matrix form. This matrix is known as payoff matrix and the 
value of each cell is the payoff of the OEM in the aftermarket game: 
Table 25: The payoff matrix of inventory game 
  
Market (Nature) 
  Price Taker Bargain Seeker 
O
EM
 
G
M
EP
 
Pricing Method 
RP KB(SRP, DPT) KB(SRP, DBS) 
MP KB(SMP, DPT) KB(SMP, DBS) 
PG
 
KB(SPG, DPT) KB(SPG, DBS) 
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Regarding the probability of market decision-making (price taker probability), the 
expected utility of the OEM is calculated from Equation (53): 
EXOEM>¡ = PMrÃÄUOEM>¡ , MrÃÄ + 	PMrÅUOEM>¡ , MrÅ		∀	r: RP,MP, PG 
    (53) 
Equation (54) tells us that the total probability of market decision-makings equals 
to 1. 
   PMrÃÄ + 	PMrÅ = 1 
    (54) 
The investigation of the payoff matrix declares there is no dominant strategy in 
this game that leads to lack of a pure strategy. Therefore, the game has a mixed 
strategy solution, which depends on the probability of the market’s choices (the price 
taker or the bargain seeker) that varies the allocated demands among manufacturers. 
 
5.3.7. THE MIXED STRATEGY SOLUTION 
 
The mixed strategy solution follows the mixed strategy solution description that 
has been discussed in the section 5.2.6. In order to illustrate the decision-making of the 
OEM based on the mixed strategy solution, we consider an inventory game with a 
single Stage demand, which has the following parameters (Table 26).  
Table 26: Sample parameters to illustrate the mixed strategy solution of the game 
Notation Parameter value ¼ 10  12 ® 9.5 Æ 50  3 
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Notation Parameter value ½ 50 
P1 25 
P2 20 
n 10 
α 0.5 
β 0.3 
 
Assume all the parameters are the same for both manufacturers except their sale 
prices. The goal of the OEM is to maximize his payoff based on his competition with 
the will-fitter and the market choices. The expected utility of the OEM as a function of 
the market decision-making probability to play with price taker action is calculated. In 
the discussion that follows, the OEM inventory control policy is explained for the re-
manufacturing situation. 
 
Figure 20: The OEM (Re-manufacturer) payoff distribution vs. The probability of the market's price 
taker action 
 
Figure 20 shows the OEM payoff distribution vs. the probability of the market's 
price taker action or P(MrÃÄ) in case of re-manufacturing. We assume that there are 
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five possible re-manufacturing effort percentages (RMEP) available that the OEM can 
decide to select among them. For instance, if the OEM chooses RMEP of 10, it means 
he manufactures 10% of his production out of re-manufacturing processes. In this 
decision-making problem, the OEM makes a choice between different alternatives. If 
the payoff for each alternative is known, the decision is made under certainty. If not, 
the decision is made under uncertainty. The major solution for decisions under 
uncertainty and risks are expected utility (EU) and subjective expected utility (SEU) 
determines the pricing strategies and re-manufacturing efforts of the OEM as follows: 
• A1: If 0<P(MrÃÄ)<0.30 then select the price guarantee strategy with re-
manufacturing effort of 100 and related inventory level; 
• A2: If 0.30<P(MrÃÄ)<0.62 then select the price guarantee strategy with re-
manufacturing effort of 75 and related inventory level; 
• A3: If 0.62<P(MrÃÄ)<0.88 then select the matching price strategy with re-
manufacturing effort of 50 and related inventory level; 
• A4: If 0.88<P(MrÃÄ)<1 then select the regular price strategy with re-
manufacturing effort of 25 and related inventory level; 
Based on the chosen strategies, the optimal payoff and inventory level for the 
OEM are derived which are depicted in Figure 21. The lowest point in the upper 
envelope of the expected payoff involves MP strategy with RMEP of 50 and RP 
strategy with RMEP of 25. According to the results of mixed strategy for that 2	 × 	2 
matrix game, the optimal decision variables of the OEM is determined. The solution of 
the mixed strategy states that the OEM should switch randomly among MP strategy 
with RMEP of 50 and RP strategy with RMEP of 25 with probability of 74% and 26% 
 136 
 
respectively. The resulting mixed strategy guarantees the payoff of 33.08 for the OEM 
in the long run. 
 
Figure 21: The OEM (Re-manufacturer) payoff and inventory level vs. The probability of the market's 
price taker action 
 
5.3.8. NUMERICAL STUDY 
 
In this section the spare parts inventory management of the OEM during 1-year of 
production has been investigated. We assume that each year of production consists of 
6 periods and the manufacturers possess the market’s base demand for the spare parts 
during these periods. It is assumed that the market’s base demand follows a uniform 
distribution which is known by the manufacturers. Figure 22 shows the market’s base 
expected demand in 1-year of production.  
In order to generate the payoff matrix for the game in 6 periods, it is assumed that 
the production, inventory and market conditions are not changing during 1-year of 
production and the required parameters are consistent with the values that are listed in 
Table 26. 
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Figure 22: The base market demand in 1-year of production 
 
The strategy of the OEM is to maximize his payoff by choosing the best sale 
price, re-manufacturing effort and inventory level. The expected utility of the OEM 
with respect to the probability of the market’s price taker action P can be calculated in 
each period. Table 27 lists the optimal pricing strategies and re-manufacturing efforts 
of the OEM.  
Table 27: The OEM (Re-manufacturer) strategies of the game 
  
1-Year Production Periods 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
O
EM
 
Pricing 
Method 
RP 0.88<P<1 GMEP=25 
0.78<P<1 
GMEP=50 
0.85<P<1 
GMEP=25 
0.8<P<1 
GMEP=50 
0.8<P<1 
GMEP=50 
0.78<P<1 
GMEP=50 
MP 0.62<P<0.88 GMEP=50 
0.65<P<0.78 
GMEP=75 
0.65<P<0.85 
GMEP=50 
0.7<P<0.8 
GMEP=75 
0.65<P<0.7 
GMEP=75 
0.7<P<0.8 
GMEP=50 
0.7<P<0.78 
GMEP=75 
PG
 
0<P<0.3 
GMEP=100 
0.3<P<0.62 
GMEP=75 
0<P<0.65 
GMEP=100 
0<P<0.45 
GMEP=100 
0.45<P<0.65 
GMEP=75 
0<P<0.7 
GMEP=100 
0<P<0.6 
GMEP=100 
0.6<P<0.65 
GMEP=75 
0<P<0.7 
GMEP=100 
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This decision-making provides the OEM payoff distributions and inventory levels 
that have been depicted in Figure 23 (the results for re-manufacturer is provided). The 
strategies of the OEM during these periods are listed in Table 27. 
As we can see the SEU and mixed strategy solutions can determine the OEM’s 
decision-making on spare part pricing, inventory level and RMEP while the OEM 
implements the very basic inventory policy that is introduced as the EOQ. In next 
section we show that the same strategic problem solving is still useful for more 
complicated inventory control policies. Perhaps one of the most commonly used 
inventory policy for spare part management is the reorder point and order size policy 
known as (Q,r). We assume that demand for spare part arrives as a Poisson process, in 
batches of size one. The mean arrival rate is known by the manufacturers and they 
manage their inventory based on a (Q,r) policy, introduced in chapter 2.  
 
Figure 23: The OEM (Re-manufacturer) maximum expected utility vs. Price taker demand probability 
for each period 
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By consideration of the following parameters, the cost function of the OEM is 
calculated based on our proposed algorithm in the section 2.5.3.3. In our numerical 
study we assume that the annual demand rate for spare part is a=30, lead-time L=45 
days, holding cost h=30, backorder cost b=100, setup cost=15, cost of production 
c=12, cost of re-manufacturing cr=10.5 and cost of collecting used parts B=110. 
Figure 24 shows the OEM payoff distribution vs. the probability of the market's 
price taker action or P(MrÃÄ) in case of re-manufacturing. We assume that as before 
there are five possible re-manufacturing effort percentages (RMEP) available that the 
OEM can select them.  
 
Figure 24: The OEM (Re-manufacturer) payoff distribution vs. The probability of the market's price 
taker action 
 
The subjective expected utility (SEU) determines the pricing strategies and re-
manufacturing efforts of the OEM as follows: 
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• A1: If 0<P(MrÃÄ)<0.40 then select the price guarantee strategy with re-
manufacturing effort of 75 and related inventory level; 
• A2: If 0.40<P(MrÃÄ)<0.5 then select the matching price strategy with re-
manufacturing effort of 50 and related inventory level; 
• A3: If 0.5<P(MrÃÄ)<1 then select the regular pricing strategy with re-
manufacturing effort of 25 and related inventory level; 
Based on the chosen strategies, the optimal payoff and re-order point and order 
lot-size for the OEM are derived and are depicted in Figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25: The OEM (Re-manufacturer) payoff and inventory level vs. The probability of the market's 
price taker action 
 
The lowest point in the upper envelope of the expected payoff involves MP 
strategy with RMEP of 50 and RP strategy with RMEP of 25. According to the results 
of mixed strategy for that 2	 × 	2 matrix game, the optimal decision variables of the 
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OEM is determined. The solution of the mixed strategy states that the OEM should 
switch randomly among MP strategy with RMEP of 50 and RP strategy with RMEP of 
25 with probability of 0.5 and 0.5 respectively. The resulting mixed strategy 
guarantees the payoff of 91 for the OEM in the long run. 
In order to examine the accuracy of the Game theoretical solution, a Monte Carlo 
simulation has been developed which relies on random sampling to obtain numerical 
results. The simulation runs many times to obtain the payoff of the OEM with respect 
to uncertainty of the market. 
The simulation follows the following particular pattern: 
1. Defining a domain of possible inputs; 
2. Generating random inputs from a given probability distribution (uniform 
distribution) over the domain; 
3. Implementing the spare part inventory policy and performing a 
deterministic computation over the inputs; 
4. Aggregating the results; 
The goal of the simulation is to show the comparison of the Game Theory 
approach and any other inventory and production policy. In figure 26, the payoff of 
the OEM vs. the probability of the market’s price taker action while implementing 
Game Theory solution and some other inventory policies (General Policies; including 
different pricing strategies, inventory level and re-manufacturing effort) is depicted. 
As we can see Game Theory approach guarantees the payoff of 33.08 for the OEM by 
switching randomly among MP strategy with RMEP of 50 and RP strategy with 
RMEP of 25 with probability of 74% and 26% respectively. 
 142 
 
 
Figure 26: Simulation results - The OEM payoff vs. The probability of the market's price taker action 
Comparison of General Policies & Game Theory 
 
 
Figure 27: Simulation results - The OEM payoff vs. the probability of the lower bound intensity factor 
Comparison of General Policies (identical prices with different strategies) & Game Theory 
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The performance of the Game Theory approach is graphed in Figure 27 where 
general policies are considered as implementing the same pricing strategies, same re-
manufacturing efforts with different strategies to keep the inventory. The results of the 
Monte Carlo simulation states that Game Theory approach allocates guaranteed payoff 
to the OEM in an uncertain market situation. 
 
5.4. EVOLUTIONARY SPARE PARTS INVENTORY GAME 
 
5.4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The OEM, in a competitive and uncertain aftermarket, can benefit from Game 
Theory to manage his spare parts inventory. We study the spare parts inventory game 
in the case of an N-person non-zero-sum repeated game where players play 
simultaneously. This game is restricted to a two-person (the OEM and the will-fitter), 
cooperative and non-cooperative game setup. The game has two players 
(manufacturers) who manufacture the same spare parts. Based on their sale prices, 
they have an option to design a contract and cooperate with each other or compete 
with each other in the aftermarket without creating any agreements. The pricing 
strategies have been investigated through repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma spare parts 
inventory game and the stability of the cooperation or defect in sale price 
determination has been studied through evolutionary stable strategy analysis of the 
two famous games of Prisoners’ Dilemma and Stag Hunt. Moreover, the 
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implementation of the re-manufacturing in manufacturing processes to increase the 
profitability of the spare parts inventory games is investigated. 
 
5.4.2. REPEATED INVENTORY GAME 
 
Every game with finite numbers of players and actions has at least one Nash 
Equilibrium. For all the games, the Nash Equilibrium is Pareto optimal except for the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma. In 1950 Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood at the RAND 
Corporation devised a game known as the Prisoners’ Dilemma that is a non-zero-sum 
game with an equilibrium which is unique but fails to be Pareto optimal. In the years 
since 1950 this game has become known as the Prisoners’ Dilemma and it is the most 
widely used and studied game in the social science. 
The general form of the Prisoners’ Dilemma has been depicted in Figure 28.  
 ÇÈÉÊËÌËÈÉÍ:	Î > Ï > Ð > Ñ	&	Ï > Ñ + Î2 	
Figure 28: The general form of Prisoners’ Dilemma 
 
There are two players and they can decide to cooperate or defect. According to 
their chosen strategies, there are four different possible payoffs of the game including: 
•Player 1: D
•Player 2: D
•Player 1: D
•Player 2: C
•Player 1: C
•Player 2: D
•Player 1: C
•Player 2: C
(R,R) (S,T)
(U,U)(T,S)
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• Both players cooperate (CC): both players will get the reward of the 
cooperation (R); 
• Player 1 cooperates and player 2 defects (CD): player 1 will get the sucker 
payoff (S) and player 2 will get the temptation payoff (T); 
• Player 1 defects and player 2 cooperates (DC): player 1 will get the 
temptation payoff (T) and player 2 will get the sucker payoff (S); 
• Both players defect: both players will get the uncooperative payoff (U); 
Many social phenomena seem to have the Prisoners’ Dilemma at their core. In the 
case of our inventory game, there are two spare parts manufacturers, deciding to cut 
their sale prices or not. If the will-fitter does not cut the prices, the OEM can attract 
more customers by cutting prices. If the will-fitter cuts its prices, the OEM had better 
cut prices in order not to lose its own customers. If both manufacturers cut prices, both 
will get lower benefits than if neither of them had cut prices. 
In this inventory game, we assume that manufacturers have to decide on their sale 
prices and inventory levels as long as there is a demand for spare parts. In other words, 
they have to repeat playing the inventory game to satisfy demands for spare parts. In 
repeatedly play, the hope of arriving at the mutually beneficial outcome (CC) rather 
than reaching to a less profitable outcome (DD), encourages the manufacturers to 
cooperate.  
In fact, this idea is under influence of a logical domino-type argument. Suppose 
players know this game lasts for 100 times, in the last game the strategy (D) dominates 
the strategy (C) because there is no future to induce mutual cooperation. The plays fall 
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backwards like dominos, and affect previous games and even the first game must be 
(DD).  
Now, let’s assume because of the intermittent and uncertain characteristic of the 
demand for spare parts, manufacturers do not know how many games will be played. 
According to (Martin Shubik, 1970), after each play of Prisoners’ Dilemma, the next 
play will occur with probability (p).  
Manufacturers follow the strategy of Grim Trigger, means both players cooperate 
until one player defects, and then both players defect. If manufacturers never choose 
the strategy (D), the payoff for each player is calculated from Equation (55): 
  R + pR + pR + p5R +⋯ = R1 − p 
  (55) 
If one player decides to defect in the mth game, the resulting payoff for each 
player can be calculated from Equation (54). 
  R + pR + pR +⋯+ pÓ2R + pÓT + pÓgU +⋯ = R − pÓR + 1 − ppÓT + pÓgU1 − p  
  (56) 
Hence, manufacturers should never choose the strategy (D) as long as 
Equation	55 	≥ 	Equation	56 for all values of m. In other words, it makes 
sense for the manufacturers to choose the strategy (C), if the probability of the playing 
the next game (p) is larger than a threshold value.  
The threshold can be calculated from Equation (57):  
  p > T − RT − U 
  (57) 
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5.4.3. EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
 
In Game Theory it has been assumed that players are capable of unlimited acts of 
reasoning. In such a situation, once they find the solution to a game, they play that 
strategy from then on. In real world players will not find the solution immediately and 
they spend a lot of time and energy to find the solution. These types of players, who 
have to make mistakes to find the optimal solution, are considered bounded rational. 
Making mistakes and the trial-and-error procedure is part of their learning how to 
play, and while they are in learning phase they are out of the equilibrium. The game 
during out of equilibrium situation can be described via a dynamic system known as 
the replicator dynamic. Dynamic replicators are used to describe the evolution of 
systems and evolution of players’ behavior in games. Bounded rational players, who 
obeying replicator dynamics, find the equilibrium called an evolutionary stable 
strategy (ESS). 
Replicator dynamics says that if a player earns above-average payoff, its 
percentage in the whole population increases and if a player earns below-average its 
population will decrease. In our evolutionary game we assume that manufacturers, 
who are bounded rational players, have two strategies: 
• Cooperate: Selecting the sale prices according to an agreement with the 
other player to increase the total payoff; 
• Defect: Selecting the sale prices according to an individual better off 
payoff, or cutting sale prices to increase the resulting payoff; 
The investigation of the game will determine the stable strategies of the players. 
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5.4.4. THE MARKET DEMAND 
 
The life cycle of the spare parts is affected by finished goods life cycle. Their life 
cycle can be divided into three phase: initial, normal or repetitive and final (Fortuin, 
1980). Hence demands for spare parts depend on finished goods, and following factors 
would affect the demand (Fortuin & Martin, 1999): 
• Size and age of the final products (sales, running fleet, installation base, 
etc.); 
• Products maintenance characteristics (preventive, corrective, etc.); 
• Parts characteristics and their defects (wear, accident, aging, etc.); 
Spare parts demand is intermittent or lumpy which means it occurs after a long 
variable periods without demand. The lack of parts leads to high losses, and demand 
forecasting can decrease the loss. The demand forecasting is very important, although 
it has some errors (Love, 1979). A classical method for demand forecasting has been 
done by (Wheelwright & Hyndman, 1998) and a related literature review has been 
provided by (Boylan et al., 2006) for last fifty years. 
In some related literatures, the demand for the manufacturers follows a general 
linear demand function (Trivedi, 1998)(Wu, 2012). In other words, demand for the 
supplier i, Xo is a general linear demand function of his own sales price Po and his 
competitor sales price `P·b where i=1,2 (number of the manufacturers) and j=3-i.  
In our study we suppose that the manufacturers can forecast the market’s 
expected demand for spare parts over the normal or repetitive phase of the product life 
cycle (Fortuin, 1980) which is the market base for the products, that is parameter (X).  
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The total market demand equals to the summation of the market demand for both 
manufacturers as it is shown in Equation (58). 
  
X =-Xoo3 				∀i = 1,2	 
   (58) 
In order to simulate stochastic behavior of the demand, we assume that the 
demand distribution is Poisson. In other words, the mean of total market demand is 
known and the standard deviation of the demand σ can be calculated from Equation 
(59). 
  σo = ÖXo 
  (59) 
We assume that the market is a bargain seeker that means she purchases the 
products with lower prices. This characteristic will determine the demand allocation 
for the manufacturers. 
 
5.4.5. THE MANUFACTURER COST FUNCTION-TRADITIONAL MANUFACTURER 
 
The aim of our game is to develop a pricing strategy and an inventory control 
policy for the manufacturer of the spare parts. In case of traditional manufacturing, the 
OEM and will-fitter both manufacture parts directly from the raw material, so the 
control policy would be the determination of the pricing strategy and inherently the 
level of inventories. The payoff of the manufacturers is the payoff of the game and it 
would be the profit of the manufacturers `πob which is the difference between the cost 
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of production and inventory `Yob and the revenue `Rob which attained by parts sales. 
We suppose that the manufacturers follow the Newsvendor inventory control policy. 
Based on Newsvendor system we follow the listed assumptions: 
• Products are separable (in this study we consider a single-item inventory); 
• Planning is done for a single period; 
• Demand is random; 
• Deliveries are made in advance of demand; 
• Costs of overage or shortage are linear; 
To develop the model, manufacturers produce Qo units and the demand is Xo 
units. Based on Newsvendor inventory policy, introduced in the section 2.5.1, the cost 
of production and inventory `Yob is calculated. Equation (60) shows the derived 
formula to calculate the cost of inventory.  
  
YQo = C=oØQo − XohÙE gXodXo + C>o ØXo − Qo
d
hÙ
gXodXo 
  (60) 
The optimal production quantity Qo∗ is derived from Equation (61). Equation 
(62) gives us the revenue of parts sales Ro	and Equation (63) gives us the 
manufacturers’ payoffs `πob: 
  GQo∗ = C>oC=o + C>o 
  (61) 
  Ro 	= PoXo 
  (62) 
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  πo = Ro − Yo		 
  (63) 
As we can see the manufacturers’ payoffs are functions of demand, production 
level (optimal inventory level) and sales prices which are the strategic actions of the 
players. Moreover, there are different parameters that affect the cost of production and 
inventory and sales revenues as listed in Table 28: 
Table 28: Cost function parameters and variables 
Notation Parameter definition Ú Production rate (in units) Û Cost of production (in dollars per units) 
P Sale price (in dollars per units) Û Shortage cost (P-Ü (in dollars per unit) Û° Overage cost or holding cost (IÜ (in dollars per unit) 
ir Interest rate (percentage per year) Ý Mean of demand (in units per period) Þ Standard deviation of demand (in units) 
G(X) CDF of demand 
g(X) PDF of demand 
 
5.4.6. THE MANUFACTURER COST FUNCTION FOR THE RE-MANUFACTURER 
 
We consider Green manufacturing as the process of re-manufacturing used 
products and use them as new ones as it was discussed in the section 5.3.5. By 
considering re-manufacturing process, the shortage cost will be changed and can be 
calculated from Equation (62). The cost of production and inventory will change 
which is written as Equation (63). 
The cost of shortage in the case of re-manufacturing: 
  C>o = P − ßCfoτ + C1 − τà 
  (64) 
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The cost of production and inventory Yo: 
  
YQo = C=oØQo − XohÙE gXodXo + C>o ØXo − Qo
d
hÙ
gXodXo + B τ2  
  (65) 
Parameters are being used to calculate the cost of production and inventory while 
using re-manufacturing are listed in Table 29: 
Table 29: Green manufacturing parameters 
Notation Parameter definition á remanufacturing effort Û® variable cost of remanufacturing (in dollars per units) Æ Collection scaling parameter 
 
5.4.7. THE GAME SETUP 
 
In this setting, Game Theory is applied to determine the inventory control policy 
for manufacturers who manufacture a single-item spare part and sell it to the market 
while they can cooperate or compete with each other. Our spare part inventory game 
has two players who have two different strategies: cooperation and defect. Decision-
making on sale price (and re-manufacturing effort in the Green manufacturing 
situation) is/are their strategies which determine their production quantities and 
inventory levels. The market has a cyclic demand which is stochastic, and in each 
period the mean of demand is known. The total demand has to be distributed among 
players and manufacturers’ pricing strategies affect their allocated demand. We 
assumed that the market is a bargain seeker which means it purchases from the 
supplier who offers lower prices. In this environment manufacturers can cooperate 
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with each other or compete with each other that means each of them has two 
strategies: 
• Strategy 1: Cooperate, manufacturers set their sale prices in such a way 
that gives them the highest profit;  
• Strategy 2: Defect, manufacturers cut their sale prices in such a way that 
attracts more demand share; 
The inventory game is a two-person non-zero-sum static game, so we are looking 
for the Nash Equilibrium as the solution of the game. Based on the players strategies 
(cooperate or defect) different payoffs would be assigned for each supplier. The payoff 
matrix is depicted in Table 30: 
Table 30: The payoff matrix of inventory game 
  
Will-fitter 
  
COOPERATE 
(C) 
DEFECT      
(D) 
O
EM
 COOPERATE  
(C) πCC,πCC πCD, πCD 
DEFECT       
(D) πDC,πDC πDD, πDD 
 
Evolutionary Game Theory is used to study the evolutionary stability of strategies 
followed by two manufacturers. The concept of ESS was proposed by (Maynard 
Smith, 1974, J Maynard Smith & Price, 1973, John Maynard Smith, 1993). Later on 
(Taylor & Jonker, 1978) proposed a dynamic equation known as the dynamic 
replicator that reflects the dynamics and interactions between players in the game.  
Assuming that the probability that the OEM cooperates is α and β is the 
probability that the will-fitter cooperates, replicator dynamics are given in Equations 
(66) and (67): 
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i dαdt = αWUãäcooperate − Average	OEMXAverage	OEM = αUãäcooperate + 1 − αUãädefectl 
  (66) 
  
i dβdt = βåUo2~o::fcooperate − Average	will − fitteræAverage	will − fitter = βUo2~o::fcooperate + 1 − βUo2~o::fdefectl 
  (67) 
Where UÓ³´~³²:ffÙcooperate is the expected utility of the manufacturer1 
(i=1 OEM & i=2 will-fitter) when he cooperates and Average	manufacturero is the 
average payoff for manufacturer1. The stable states of the replicator dynamic 
equations are the Nash Equilibrium known as evolutionary equilibriums (EE). When 
dα/dt = 0 and dβ/dt = 0 the EE are pure strategies of E1=(1,1), E2=(1,0), E3=(0,1), 
E4=(0,0) and the fifth EE point is the mixed strategy solution that is driven as 
Equation (68): 
  Eç = è πDC − πDDπCD − πDD + πDC − πCC , πCD − πDDπDC − πDD + πCD − πCCé 
  (68) 
 
According to (Friedman, 1991) the stability of EE can be analyzed by the Jacobi 
matrix which can be derived from Equation (69). The stability of the EE depends on 
the sign of Jacobi matrix eigenvalues. If both eigenvalues are negative the EE is the 
stable strategy otherwise that would be an unstable strategy. 
  
J = ëìì
ìí ∂∂α AdαdtD ∂∂β AdαdtD∂∂α AdβdtD ∂∂β AdβdtDîïï
ïð
 
  (69) 
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5.4.8. NUMERICAL STUDY 
 
In this section the inventory management of the manufacturers during 1-year of 
production has been investigated. We assume that the manufacturers possess the 
market base demand for the product during the production year. In order to generate 
the payoff matrix for the game, it is assumed that the production, inventory and 
marketing conditions are not changing during the production horizon and the required 
parameters are consistent with Table 31. We suppose all the parameters are the same 
for both manufacturers. 
Table 31: Sample parameters used to generate the payoff matrix                                                                                                                              
traditional manufacturer 
Notation Parameter value Û 10 
P Decision variable 
ir 25 Û° 0.048 Ý 50 
 
We assumed that the market is a bargain seeker, so based on strategies on sale 
prices in cooperation and competition the total demand will be distributed among 
manufacturers. This can be listed as below: 
• CC or DD: Demands for spare parts are distributed among manufacturers 
equally; 
• CD or DC: Demands for spare parts are distributed among manufacturers 
unequally, the manufacturer who cuts the prices will attract all the 
customers to himself; 
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In other words, when both players cooperate or defect, the annual mean of 
demand for each of them is 25 units and once each of them cut prices, he attracts the 
whole demand which means the annual mean of demand for him would be 50 units. 
Figure 29 depicts the distribution of the demand in case of cooperation and defect. 
 
Figure 29: PDF of market demand 
 
The determination of the sale prices generates the demand distribution among 
manufacturers. Based on resulting demands, manufacturers decide on their inventory 
levels which allocate their profits in the aftermarket game.  
We first need to determine rational pricing strategy for the manufacturers. The 
minimum sale price that makes the spare parts inventory game profitable for the 
manufacturers is equal to 15.13, which is defined as the marginal cutting sale price. 
Next, we need to find the minimum cooperative sale price that establishes the spare 
parts inventory game as a Prisoners’ Dilemma. The minimum cooperative sale price is 
equal to 16.72. However, in order to maintain the Prisoners’ Dilemma condition, the 
reward of the cooperation should be less than the temptation payoff (R<T). Hence, the 
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maximum cooperative sale price is equal to 18.68. Now, we can setup a repeated 
Prisoners’ Dilemma spare parts inventory game.  
According to Equation (57), we can graph the threshold of the possibility of the 
future game vs. the maximum cooperative sale price which states that manufacturers 
should never defect as long as the probability of the future game is greater than the 
calculated thresholds (Figure 30).  
 
Figure 30: Probability of the next play vs. Cooperative Sale Price 
 
The resulting payoff of the spare parts inventory game for each manufacturer is 
depicted in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31: Payoff vs. Cooperative Sale Price 
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Now we can investigate the evolutionary spare parts inventory game. For the 
traditional manufacturing, the resulting payoff matrix is symmetrical because we 
assumed that the production and inventory costs are the same for both manufacturers.  
The symmetrical payoff matrix is: 
πCC = πCC 
πCD = πDC 
πDC = πCD 
πDD = πDD 
Stability of the evolutionary equilibrium (EE) points depends on the sign of the 
}}ñ ßòñò:à as the stability term, the result of the analysis is represented as Table 32: 
Table 32: The local stability of EE 
EE Stability term 
Û -(óôÜÜ –óôõÜ) 
 (óôÜõ –óôõõ) 
ö÷ø­ù −	 `óôÜÜ	–óôõÜb`	óôÜõ	–óôõõb	óôÜÜ	–óôõÜ − 	óôÜõ	–óôõõ 
 
To investigate the evolutionary stable strategies, two experiments have been 
considered (the first experiment is the experiment with minimum acceptable sale price 
and the second one is the experiment with maximum acceptable sale price). The 
simulation software (Sandholm & Dokumaci, 2007) is used to study the evolutionary 
dynamics of two manufacturers’ strategies in the market. The experiments are logistic 
systems based on decision-making to cooperate or defect by selecting related sale 
prices. By using the software the phase diagram of each experiment has been obtained 
as Figure 32. The colors in the contour plot represent speeds of motion under the 
dynamic: red is fast and blue is slow. In the first experiment, the tendency to leave the 
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cooperation is fast and as sale price increases this movement becomes slower till it 
reaches to its slowest speed in the second experiment. 
 
Figure 32: Phase diagram of experiments (1 & 2) 
 
Also, the characterizations of the stability of EE for each experiment are listed in 
Table 33. The results of the ESS analysis are consistent with the results of the repeated 
Prisoners’ Dilemma stating that as the sale prices increase, manufacturers stay in 
cooperation with less future play probability. However, the results of the ESS state 
that the Nash Equilibrium of the game is (DD), which means both players defect, and 
the equilibrium point is evolutionary stable (ES). 
Table 33: The ESS analysis of the experiments (1 & 2) 
S:Stable - U:Unstable - NE:Nash Equilibrium 
 EXPERIMENTS 
 
1 2 
P D=15.13 & C=16.72 D=15.13 & C=18.68 
Payoff 10 10 
EE NE S/U NE S/U 
E1 
 
U 
 
U 
E2 
 
U 
 
U 
E3 
 
U 
 
U 
E4 ● S ● S 
E5 NA 
 
NA 
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The increase of the sale price above the value of the maximum cooperative sale 
price would change the game type from Prisoners’ Dilemma to Stag Hunt game. 
Basically, Stag Hunt studies the conflicts between safety and cooperation. The general 
form of the Stag Hunt game is depicted in Figure 33. 
 ÇÈÉÊËÌËÈÉÍ:	Ï ¨ Î Õ Ð ¨ Ñ		
Figure 33: The general form of Stag Hunt 
 
This game has two Nash Equilibriums and it has a mixed strategy solution. In 
other words, this game has two ES equilibriums (including cooperation and defect) 
and it has unstable mixed strategy equilibrium. The midpoint sale price is the sale 
price that leads to a mixed strategy with 50% chance of cooperation or defect, in other 
words, it is the sale price that makes the value of α and β equal to 50%. Two different 
Stages of sale prices can be considered for this spare parts inventory game including: 
• If maximum cooperative sale price û sale price ü midpoint sale price: 
manufacturers should cooperate with each other with probability range of 
0g to 50%; 
• If midpoint sale price û sale price: manufacturers should cooperate with 
each other with probability range of 50 to 1002%; 
•Player 1: D
•Player 2: D
•Player 1: D
•Player 2: C
•Player 1: C
•Player 2: D
•Player 1: C
•Player 2: C
(R,R) (S,T)
(U,U)(T,S)
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Figure 34: Phase diagram of experiments (3 – 5) 
 
In the following, three different sale prices have been provided that can be 
investigated via ESS analysis. By using the software the phase diagram of each 
experiment has been obtained as Figure 34. The tendency to join the cooperation has 
its slowest speed in the third experiment and as the sale price increases the speed of 
this tendency becomes faster and it reaches to the fastest movement in the fifth 
experiment. Also, the characterizations of the stability of EE for each experiment are 
listed in Table 34. 
Table 34: The ESS analysis of the experiments (3 – 5) 
S:Stable - U:Unstable - NE:Nash Equilibrium 
 EXPERIMENTS 
 
3 4 5 
P D=15.13 & C=18.69 D=15.13 & C=19.1 D=15.13 & C=25 
payoff 11.37 49.54 215.35 
EE NE S/U NE S/U NE S/U 
E1 ● S ● S ● S 
E2 
 
U 
 
U  U 
E3 
 
U 
 
U  U 
E4 ● S ● S ● S 
E5 (0.02,0.98) U (0.50,0.50) U (0.94,0.06) U 
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Now, we can study the situation where the manufacturers can implement re-
manufacturing strategy. This game is also symmetrical. The minimum sale price that 
makes the spare parts inventory game profitable for the manufacturers is calculated as 
14.76, which is equal to the marginal cutting sale price. In Figure 35 the effect of the 
re-manufacturing effort on minimum profit is depicted. 
 
Figure 35: Minimum payoff vs. Re-manufacturing effort 
 
The result shows us that implementing re-manufacturing effort of 17% can 
guarantee the minimum payoff with value 10 with sale price of 14.76.  
 
Figure 36: Probability of the next play vs. Cooperative Sale Price 
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In order to satisfy the Prisoners’ Dilemma constraints, the minimum cooperative 
sale price changes to 16.3 and the maximum cooperative sale price changes to 18.24. 
Now, we can setup a repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma spare parts inventory game. 
According to Equation (57), we can graph the threshold of the possibility of the future 
game vs. the maximum cooperative sale price which states that manufacturers should 
never defect as long as the probability of the future game is greater than the calculated 
thresholds as Figure 36. The resulting payoff of the spare parts inventory game for 
each manufacturer is depicted in Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37: Payoff vs. Cooperative Sale Price 
 
To investigate the evolutionary stable strategies, two experiments have been 
considered (the first experiment is the experiment with minimum acceptable sale price 
and the second one is the experiment with maximum acceptable sale price). The phase 
diagram of each experiment has been obtained as Figure 38. In the sixth experiment, 
the tendency to leave the cooperation is fast and as sale price increases this movement 
becomes slower till it reaches to its slowest speed in the seventh experiment. 
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Figure 38: Phase diagram of experiments (6 & 7) 
 
Also, the characterizations of the stability of EE for each experiment are listed in 
Table 35.  
Table 35: The ESS analysis of the experiments (6 & 7) 
S:Stable - U:Unstable - NE:Nash Equilibrium 
 EXPERIMENTS 
 
6 7 
P D=14.76 & C=16.3 D=14.76 & C=18.24 
Payoff 10 10 
EE NE S/U NE S/U 
E1 
 
U 
 
U 
E2 
 
U 
 
U 
E3 
 
U 
 
U 
E4 ● S ● S 
E5 NA 
 
NA 
 
 
The increase of the sale price above the value of maximum cooperative sale price 
would change the game type from Prisoners’ Dilemma to Stag Hunt game. In the 
following, three different sale prices have been provided that can be investigated via 
ESS analysis. The phase diagram of each experiment has been obtained as Figure 39. 
The tendency to join the cooperation has its slowest speed in the eighth experiment 
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and as the sale price increases the speed of this tendency becomes faster and it reaches 
to the fastest movement in the tenth experiment 
 
Figure 39: Phase diagram of experiments (8 – 10) 
 
Also, the characterizations of the stability of EE for each experiment are listed in 
Table 36. 
Table 36: The ESS analysis of the experiments (8 – 10) 
S:Stable - U:Unstable - NE:Nash Equilibrium 
 EXPERIMENTS 
 
8 9 10 
P D=14.76 & C=18.25 D=14.76 & C=18.66 D=14.76 & C=25 
Payoff 11.49 49.65 224.14 
EE NE S/U NE S/U NE S/U 
E1 ● S ● S ● S 
E2 
 
U 
 
U  U 
E3 
 
U 
 
U  U 
E4 ● S ● S ● S 
E5 (0.02,0.98) U (0.50,0.50) U (0.94,0.06) U 
 
5.5. COOPERATIVE SPARE PARTS INVENTORY GAME 
 
5.5.1. INTRODUCTION 
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In this spare part inventory game, we study the inventory game in case of an N-
person and non-zero-sum game where players play simultaneously. Our game is 
restricted in three-person (there are three manufacturers who can manufacture a 
substitutable spare part), cooperative game setup. In our problem, we investigate the 
cooperation of manufacturers while there is a cost asserted as a binding agreement 
cost. Determination of decision-making on cooperation or defect depends on spare 
part sale price variations and the cost of binding agreement which are investigated as 
the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Stag Hunt game. Meanwhile different methods of benefit 
allocation among cooperative manufacturers are investigated. Moreover, a centralized 
inventory configuration for manufacturers who decide to rely on a cooperative 
inventory system is designed and a comparison between inventory levels and cost of 
inventory for two different cases of centralized and decentralized inventory 
configuration is studied. To investigate the effect of the Green manufacturing on cost 
of inventory we assume that one of the manufacturers can implement re-
manufacturing to produce spare parts and the role of re-manufacturing on payoffs of 
the manufacturers in cooperative inventory games is investigated and the optimal level 
of re-manufacturing effort is calculated. 
 
5.5.2. COALITION AND BENEFIT ALLOCATION 
 
In spare parts management, the variability of the demand affects the safety stock 
and increase the average inventory cost. In this situation, risk pooling as a method to 
protect against demand variability can decrease the average inventory. In spare parts 
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business when there exists several companies that provide the same parts who may 
have different high and low demands can take advantage of cooperation. Risk pooling 
benefits from the aggregating demand across different manufacturers that results in 
less volatile demand size and decrease the inventory cost. The profit of reduction in 
cost of inventory should be allocated among the participants while the companies’ 
profit share may vary in relation to their demands behavior (Guajardo & Rӧnnqvist, 
2012). The cost allocation in general parts inventory systems has been studied 
adequately (Dror & Hartman, 2007, Gerchak & Gupta, 1991, Gupta & Srinivasa Rao, 
1996, Bruce C Hartman et al., 2000, Robinson, 1993). However, the body of research 
for the cost allocation in spare parts inventories is not extensive. The first study has 
been carried out by (Wong et al., 2007) and recently series of related research has been 
provided by (F. Karsten et al., 2012, FJP Karsten et al., 2009). 
The goal of this section is to investigate the spare parts inventory problem as an 
N-person non-zero-sum game where players (manufacturers) can cooperate or 
compete with each other through cooperative or competitive sale prices strategies. 
Manufacturers must play simultaneously, and in the case of cooperation, they have to 
decide how to allocate the profit of the resulting coalition. In order to achieve this 
goal, the problem is restricted to three-person game, and it is investigated through 
cooperative game setup. The game has three players including three manufacturers 
who manufacture a single-item substitutable spare part and compete with each other in 
the market. Also, in another consideration, it is possible for manufacturers to 
implement re-manufacturing effort into the manufacturing processes to increase their 
profit. 
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5.5.3. THE MARKET DEMAND 
 
In this study it has been assumed that the OEM only has limited information 
about the market’s expected demand. Original parts may face failure because of 
defects and aging, and once they fail, demands for spare parts will arise. Therefore, 
demands for spare parts depend on the following three factors: 
• Quality of parts; 
• Usage rate of products; 
• Maintenance quality of products; 
Due to the nature of characteristics of spare parts demand, spare parts demand 
arrival is considered as a Poisson process with a constant intensity factor or rate of 
λ. The demand for the manufacturers follows a general linear demand function as 
discussed in the section 5.3.3 where i=1,2,3 (number of the manufacturers) and j=4-i. 
So the demand function can be written as Equation (68), where parameter λo is the 
market base for the product, the parameter α is the self-price elastic coefficient and the 
parameter β is the cross-price elastic coefficient.  
This formula represents that the demand for the products depends on its own sale 
price and its competitor sale price. We assume that the product’s demand is mostly 
dependent on its own sale price, so we consider that α > β > 0 which means that the 
demand for products is more sensitive to changes of the self-price sale. 
We suppose that the manufacturers can only forecast the original products failure 
rate or intensity factor that determines the expected demand for spare parts, which is 
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parameter λ. In other words the mean of the market demand for spare parts is 
derived based on Equation (70). 
Do = λo−∝ ýN − 1po − þ-p k ≠ i+ βýþ-p

 k ≠ i− N − 1po 				∀	i, j = 1,2,3	and	i≠ j	and	N = 3 
    (70) 
 
5.5.4. THE MANUFACTURER COST FUNCTION-TRADITIONAL MANUFACTURER 
 
The aim of our game is to develop an inventory control policy for the 
manufacturers and study the cooperation between them and discuss about the profit 
allocation among cooperative players. In case of traditional manufacturing, the 
manufacturers manufacture products directly from the raw material, so the control 
policy is the determination of the sale price strategies and inherently the level of 
inventory. The payoff of the manufacturers is the profit of the manufacturer `Kzob 
which is the difference between the cost of production and inventory `Kob and the 
revenue `Kob which attained by selling products.  
The goal is to reach a low level of the backorder or a high level of fill rate with 
minimum investment on inventory as it was discussed in the section 5.2.4. We must 
calculate the cost of production and inventory, as well as the revenue from selling the 
products. Equation (42) gives us the cost of production and inventory, Equation (43) 
gives us the revenue of selling products and Equation (44) gives us the revenue of 
selling products. 
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As we can see the cost of the production and inventory is a function of demand 
and inventory level, which are the strategic actions of the players. Moreover there are 
different parameters that affect the cost of production and inventory. The parameters 
in Equation (42) are listed in Table 37. 
Table 37: Cost of production and inventory parameters 
Notation Parameter definition  Spare parts inventory level (in units)  Variable cost of production (in dollars per unit)  Penalty cost (in dollars per unit per period)  Holding cost (in dollars per unit per period) 
 
Similarly the revenue of selling products is also a function of demand and 
inventory level. The parameters in Equation (43) are listed in Table 38: 
Table 38: Revenues of selling products parameters 
Notation Parameter definition  Demand (in units per period)  Variable cost of sells (in dollars per unit) 
 
5.5.5. THE MANUFACTURER COST FUNCTION FOR THE RE-MANUFACTURER 
 
We consider Green manufacturing as the process of re-manufacturing as it was 
discussed in the section 5.3.5. By considering re-manufacturing process, Equation (71) 
gives us the cost of production and inventory: 
  K = `c1 − τ + cfτbS + p × EBOS + h × EIS + Bτ2  
  (71) 
Parameters are being used to calculate the cost of production and inventory while 
using Green manufacturing are listed in Table 39: 
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Table 39: Green manufacturing parameters 
Notation Parameter definition á remanufacturing effort Û® variable cost of remanufacturing (in dollars per units) Æ Collection scaling parameter 
 
5.5.6. CENTRALIZED VS. DECENTRALIZED 
 
Inventory pooling known as lateral transshipments and direct deliveries can help 
companies to maintain high service levels with low cost. The effectiveness of the 
spare parts inventory pooling or resupply has been investigated by (Muckstadt, 2004) 
who provides examples of systems using centralized and decentralized strategies. The 
author declared that in centralized arrangements companies can decrease the amount 
of inventory and safety stocks to one third of the decentralized situation. 
In our study, we assume that companies can cooperate with each other in two 
different inventory systems coordination: 
• Decentralized; 
• Centralized;  
In the decentralized coordination, each manufacturer has his own production and 
inventory system, while in the centralized coordination, cooperative manufacturers run 
a single inventory system to meet their cumulative demand. 
 
5.5.7. COOPERATION AND BENEFIT ALLOCATION 
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Companies who use complex machines need to stock low-demand expensive 
spare parts. Those companies can cooperate with each other to meet their demands. A 
diminished total cost of spare parts inventory is achievable and the distribution of 
inventory costs among companies would be determined by using cooperative Game 
Theory models (F. Karsten et al., 2006). 
We assume that manufacturers can cooperate with each other based on their 
product sale price. Also, in the case of centralized inventory system they can rely on a 
single inventory system for their coalition. Hence, basically manufacturers have two 
strategies to take: 
• Cooperate: Make a coalition and establish the product sale price based on 
the coalition agreement to have an equally distributed market demand; 
• Defect: Decrease the sale price to encourage the market to purchase the 
product from them; 
In a cooperative game, communication between players is allowed, so they can 
agree to reach a better outcome than Nash Equilibrium. Cooperative games can be 
studied in characteristic function form. Our game in characteristic function form is a 
set of N players and a function πwhich assigns a number π(S) to any subset S	C	N. 
The number Kz(S) assigned to the coalition (S) is interpreted as the amount that 
players in the set (S) could win if they formed a coalition. A game in characteristic 
form is said to be super-additive when KzS ∪ T ≥ KzS + KzT for any two 
disjoint coalition S and T. 
For a coalition S	C	N, we refer KzS to the optimal expected payoff if all players 
in coalition S would implement cooperation. N is the grand coalition (N=3) where 
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all 3 players cooperate with each other and KzN is its optimal expected payoff. For a 
given benefit allocation we refer Vo to the benefit or payoff allocated to player i. 
 
5.5.8. THE CORE OF THE GAME 
 
A benefit allocation vector V = V, … ,V´ is said to be in the core of the game if 
it satisfies constraints formulated in Equations (72 – 74) (Rapoport, 1970, Martin 
Shubik, 1985)(Guajardo & Rӧnnqvist, 2012). 
  Vo ≥ Kz(i)  ∀i ∈ N 
  (72) 
  - Vo ≥ Kz(S)o∈   ∀S ∈ N 
  (73) 
  - Vo = Kz(N)o∈  
  (74) 
Constraint 1 or Equation (72) corresponds to the individually rational condition, 
which says that the benefit allocated to each player i must not be greater than its stand-
alone payoff. Constraint 2 or Equation (73) corresponds to a stability condition 
(coalition rationality), which states that there is no subsets of players such that if they 
would form a coalition separate from the rest they would perceive less benefit than the 
allocation (V). Constraint 3 or Equation (74) corresponds to the efficiency condition 
(collective rationality), which states that the sum of the benefits allocated to all the 
players equals the optimal payoff of the grand coalition, and thus it takes full 
advantage of cooperation. The core of the game is the set of all vectors (V) satisfying 
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three aforementioned constraints. In other words, a payoff allocated vector in the core 
assures that the savings of cooperation are achieved and makes all players to stay in 
the grand coalition, without incentives for a player to stay alone or within a smaller 
coalition. 
 
5.5.9. BENEFIT ALLOCATION METHODS 
 
In the case of coalition players can increase their payoffs or benefits. In this 
section we introduce two different methods for the benefit allocation among players of 
the game. 
 
5.5.9.1. SHAPLEY VALUE 
 
Shapley (Shapley, 1952) suggested a solution concept for cooperative games 
which provides a unique imputation and represents payoffs distributed fairly by an 
outside arbitrator. The Shapley value is determined based on three axioms: 
• The symmetries in payoffs (Axiom 1); 
• Irrelevance of a dummy player (Axiom 2); 
• The sum of two games (Axiom 3); 
Axiom 1 implies that if some players have symmetric roles in payoff then the 
Shapley values to these players should be the same. From Axiom 2, the Shapley value 
to the player who adds nothing to any coalition should be determined as zero. Axiom 3 
says that if two games have the same player set, then the characteristic value of the 
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sum game for any coalition should be the sum of the characteristic values of two 
games. Based on the three Axioms, Shapley determines the unique values that is 
derived from Equation (75) in which S denotes a coalition and |S| is the size of S 
(Leng & Parlar, 2005). 
  Vo = - |S|− 1! N − |S|!N!o∈ WKzS − KzS − iX 
   (75) 
 
5.5.9.2. BARGAINING SET 
 
In a cooperative game if players desire the stability offered by the core, they will 
be unable to reach an agreement, so they have no choice but to relax their stability 
requirements. The bargaining set is a solution that allows players to reach an 
agreement while guaranteeing some stability (Aumann & Maschler, 1961, Davis & 
Maschler, 1962). 
In a game with coalition structure, an objection of player i against player j is a 
pair (P,Y) where: 
• P	C	N is a coalition such that i ∈ P	and	j ∉ P; 
• Y ≤ KzP	(Y is a feasible payoff distribution for the players in P); 
• ∀k ∈ P, Y ≥ V	and	Yo > Vo (player i strictly benefits from Y, and the 
other members of P do not do worse in Y than in V); 
An objection (P,Y) of player i against player j is a potential threat by coalition 
P, which contains i but not j, to deviate from V. The goal is not to change S, 
but to obtain a side payment from j to i to modify V. 
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An counter-objection to (P,Y) is a pair (Q,Z) where: 
• Q	C	N	is	a	coalition	such	that	i ∈ Q	and	j ∉ Q;	
• Zh ≤ KzQ	Y	is	a	feasible	payoff	distribution	for	the	players	in	Q;	
• ∀k ∈ Q, Z ≥ V		the	members	of	Q	get	at	least	the	value	in	V;	
• ∀k ∈ Q ∩ P, Z ≥ Y		the	members	of	Q	which	are	also	members	of	P	
get	at	least	the	value	promised	in	the	objection;	
In a counter-objection, player j must show that it can protect its payoff Kzj in 
spite of the existing objection of i. 
A game with coalition structure the vector V = V, … ,V´	 is stable if for each 
objection at V there is a counter-objection. The pre-bargaining set preBS is the set of 
all stable members of V = V, … ,V´, so coreN, Kz, SCpreBSN, Kz, S. 
Let IN, Kz, S = VϵV,,Vo ≥ Kz{i}∀i ∈ N be the set of individually 
rational payoff vector in V, ,. The bargaining set BS is defined by Equation (76): 
  BSN, π, S = IN, π, S ∩ preBSN, π, S 
   (76) 
 
5.5.10. THE GAME SETUP 
 
Game Theory is applied to determine the inventory control policy for 
manufacturers who manufacture a single part and sell it to the market while they can 
cooperate or compete with each other. Our inventory game has two players who have 
two different strategies: coalition or competition. Decision-making on sale price (and 
re-manufacturing efforts in a Green manufacturing situation) involves strategies which 
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determine their production lot-size and inventory levels. The market has a cyclic 
demand which is stochastic, and in each period the market base for the spare part for 
each manufacturer is known and the distribution of the demand is Poisson. The total 
demand has to be distributed among players and manufacturers’ sale price strategies 
affect their allocated demand. In this environment manufacturers can cooperate with 
each other or compete with each other that means each of them has two strategies: 
• Strategy 1: Coalition, manufacturers set their sale prices in such a way that 
gives them the highest profit; 
• Strategy 2: Competition, manufacturers set their sale prices in such a way 
that attracts more demand share; 
The inventory game is a three-person non-zero-sum game, so we are looking for 
Nash Equilibrium as the solution of the game. Based on the players strategies 
(cooperate or defect) different payoffs would be assigned for each manufacturer. The 
payoff matrix is depicted in Table 40. 
Table 40: The payoff matrix of inventory game 
  MANUFACTURER 3 
  (C) (D) 
  
MANUFACTURER 2 MANUFACTURER 2 
  
(C) (D) (C) (D) 
M
A
N
U
FA
C
TU
R
ER
 
1 
(C) KzCCC,KzCCC, Kz5CCC KzCDC,KzCDC,Kz5CDC KzCCD,KzCCC,Kz5CCD KzCDD,KzCDD,Kz5CDD 
(D) KzDCC,KzDCC, Kz5DCC KzDDC,KzDDC,Kz5DDC KzDCD,KzDCD,Kz5DCD KzDDD, KzDDD, Kz5DDD 
 
Moreover we assume that in the case of cooperation, each manufacturer must 
invest on the cooperation agreement with the value Kã.  
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Also, it has to be mentioned that the payoff matrix has been provided for two 
different scenarios of centralized and decentralized inventory management. In the 
centralized strategies, cooperative manufacturers run a single inventory system to meet 
their cumulative demand while in decentralized situation each manufacturer has his 
own inventory system. 
Investigation of the payoff matrix tells us, changes in the value of the cooperation 
agreement or Kã determines the type of the spare parts inventory game. In other 
words, the aforementioned value changes the type of the game from Stag Hunt game 
to Prisoners’ Dilemma and non-emptiness of the core of the game which affects the 
cooperation of the manufacturers. The following procedure determines the type of the 
game and the non-emptiness of the core: 
• If Kã ≤ MinKz
 − KzrrrKz − KzrrrKz5 − Kzrrr5  the cooperative strategy is feasible for 
manufacturers, otherwise there is no motivation for cooperation; 
• If Kã ≤ MaxKzrr
 − KzrrrKzrr − KzrrrKzrr5 − Kzrrr5  the cooperate strategy dominates the 
defect strategy, or the game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the 
cooperate; 
• If MaxKzrr − KzrrrKzrr − KzrrrKzrr5 − Kzrrr5  	≤ Kã ≤ Min
Kz − KzrKz − KzrKz5 − Kzr5  the game 
has two Nash Equilibriums which are the cooperate and the defect or the 
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game is a Stag Hunt game, but according to the cooperation agreement 
manufacturers can benefit more through cooperation; 
• If Kã ≥ MinKz
 − KzrKz − KzrKz5 − Kzr5  the game has a Nash Equilibrium which 
is the defect or the game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, but according to 
the cooperation agreement manufacturers can benefit more through 
cooperation; 
• If Kã ≤ Min


` g b2` g b` g b2` g b` g b2` g b 
 ! the essential constraint of 
the core of the game is satisfied; 
 
5.5.11. NUMERICAL STUDY 
 
In this section the inventory management of the manufacturers during 1-year of 
production has been investigated. We assumed that the manufacturers possess the 
market base demand for the product during the production year. In order to generate 
the payoff matrix for the game, it is assumed that the production, inventory and 
marketing conditions are not changing during the production horizon and the required 
parameters are consistent with Table 41.  
We suppose all the parameters are the same for all manufacturers except fill rates 
and the lead-time T is 1-year. 
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Table 41: Sample parameters used to generate the payoff matrix                                                                                           
Traditional manufacturer 
Notation Parameter value  3 Á 40  70 " 2 Á# Cooperate:150 & Defect:100 
α 0.005 
β 0.003 
EFR M1= 0.79, M2=0.89, M3=0.99 
 
First, we start with the decentralized coordination where manufacturers are 
traditional manufacturers. The resulting payoff matrix is depicted in Table 42. The 
core of the game is non-empty and in the normalized form the resulting imputation 
ratios for the manufacturers are [0.5386 0.5293 0.5138]. 
Table 42: The payoff matrix of inventory game - Decentralized coordination & Traditional 
manufacturer 
  MANUFACTURER 3 
  (C) (D) 
  
MANUFACTURER 2 MANUFACTURER 2 
  
(C) (D) (C) (D) 
M
A
N
U
FA
C
TU
R
ER
 
1 (C) 153.2,162.6,114.3 132.1,54.4,57 132.1,122.3,-35 99,31,-35 
Demand 3,3,3 2.6,3.8,2.6 2.6,2.6,3.8 2.2,3.4,3.4 
Inventory 5,6,8 5,7,8 5,6,10 4,7,9 
(D) 54.3,122.3,57 N:0 44,30,-71 N:0 44,98,-34.3 31,25,-34 
Demand 3.8,2.6,2.6 3.4,3.4,2.2 3.4,2.2,3.4 3,3,3 
Inventory 6,6,8 6,7,7 6,5,9 5,6,8 
 
Investigation of the payoff matrix provides the following information: 
• If Kã ≤ 122.2 the cooperative strategy is feasible for manufacturers, 
otherwise there is no motivation for cooperation; 
• If Kã ≤ 73 the cooperate strategy dominates the defect strategy, or the 
game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the cooperate; 
 181 
 
• If 73 ≤ Kã ≤ 98.9 the game has two Nash Equilibriums which are (i) 
cooperate, and (ii) defect, or the game is a Stag Hunt game, but by a 
cooperation agreement manufacturers, can gain additional benefits; 
• If Kã ≥ 98.9 the game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the defect or the 
game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, but according to the cooperation 
agreement manufacturers can benefit more through cooperation; 
• If Kã ≤ 94.15 the essential constraint of the core of the game is 
satisfied; 
In Figure 40 the maximum expected payoff of the game for each manufacturer 
based on bargaining set and Shapley value has been depicted. 
 
Figure 40: Manufacturers’ maximum expected payoffs - Decentralized coordination                                                              
Traditional manufacturers 
 
Then, we investigate the centralized coordination where manufacturers are 
traditional manufacturers. The resulting payoff matrix is depicted in Table 43. The 
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core of the game is non-empty and in the normalized form the resulting imputation 
ratios for the manufacturers are [0.5304 0.5402 0.5335]. 
Table 43: The payoff matrix of inventory game - Centralized coordination & Traditional manufacturer 
  MANUFACTURER 3 
  (C) (D) 
  
MANUFACTURER 2 MANUFACTURER 2 
  
(C) (D) (C) (D) 
M
A
N
U
FA
CT
U
R
ER
 
1 (C) N: 1&2&3 638.3 N:1&3 280.4,54.4 N:1&2 343.5,-34.8 N:0 99,31,-34.3 
Demand 9 5.2,3.8 5.2,3.8 2.2,3.4,3.4 
Inventory 17 12,7 9,10 4,7,9 
(D) N:2&3 280.4,54.3 N:0 44,30,-71 N:0 44,98,-34.3 N:0 31,25,-34 
Demand 5.2,3.8 3.4,3.4,2.2 3.4,2.2,3.4 3,3,3 
Inventory 12,6 6,7,7 6,5,9 5,6,8 
 
Investigation of the payoff matrix provides the following information: 
• If Kã ≤ 181.76 the cooperative strategy is feasible for manufacturers, 
otherwise there is no motivation for cooperation; 
• If Kã ≤ 73 the cooperate strategy dominates the defect strategy, or the 
game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the cooperate; 
• If 72 ≤ Kã ≤ 158.36 the game has two Nash Equilibriums which are (i) 
cooperate, and (ii) defect, or the game is a Stag Hunt game, but by a 
cooperation agreement manufacturers, can gain additional benefits; 
• If Kã ≥ 158.36 the game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the defect or 
the game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, but according to the cooperation 
agreement manufacturers can benefit more through cooperation; 
• If Kã ≤ 141.7 the essential constraint of the core of the game is satisfied, 
so this game does not match the Prisoners’ Dilemma, and it remains as a 
Stag Hunt game while 73 ≤ Kã ≤ 141.7; 
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In Figure 41 the maximum expected payoff of the game for each manufacturer 
based on bargaining set and Shapley value has been depicted. 
 
Figure 41: Manufacturers’ maximum expected payoffs - Centralized coordination                                                               
Traditional manufacturers 
 
Now, we can consider the effect of re-manufacturing. It is assumed that only one 
of the manufacturers can switch to re- manufacturing to benefit more in their payoffs. 
The required parameters are listed in the Table 47: 
Table 44: Sample parameters used to generate the payoff matrix                                                                                           
Green manufacturer 
Notation Parameter value á 0<À<1 Û® 25 Æ 50 
 
First, we study the decentralized coordination where there is a Green 
manufacturer. The resulting payoff matrix is depicted in Table 45. The optimal level 
of GMEP is 30%. The core of the game is non-empty and in the normalized form the 
resulting imputation ratios for the manufacturers are [0.5386 0.5293 0.5138]. 
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Table 45: The payoff matrix of inventory game - Decentralized coordination & Green manufacturer 
  
MANUFACTURER 3 
  
(C) (D) 
  
MANUFACTURER 2 MANUFACTURER 2 
 
 
(C) (D) (C) (D) 
M
A
N
U
FA
C
TU
R
ER
 
1 (C) 153.2,162.6,132.3 132.1,54.4,75 132.1,122.3,-12.3 99,31,-14 
Demand 3,3,3 2.6,3.8,2.6 2.6,2.6,3.8 2.2,3.4,3.4 
Inventory 5,6,8 5,7,8 5,6,10 4,7,9 
(D) 54.3,122.3,75 44,30,-55.7 44,98,-14 31,25,-16 
Demand 3.8,2.6,2.6 3.4,3.4,2.2 3.4,2.2,3.4 3,3,3 
Inventory 6,6,8 6,7,7 6,5,9 5,6,8 
 
Investigation of the payoff matrix provides the following information: 
• If Kã ≤ 122.2 the cooperative strategy is feasible for manufacturers, 
otherwise there is no motivation for cooperation; 
• If Kã ≤ 73 the cooperate strategy dominates the defect strategy, or the 
game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the cooperate; 
• If 73 ≤ Kã ≤ 98.9 the game has two Nash Equilibriums which are (i) 
cooperate and, (i) defect, or the game is a Stag Hunt game, but by a 
cooperation agreement manufacturers, can gain additional benefits; 
• If Kã ≥ 98.9 the game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the defect or the 
game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, but according to the cooperation 
agreement manufacturers can benefit more through cooperation; 
• If Kã ≤ 94.15 the essential constraint of the core of the game is satisfied, 
so this game does not match the Prisoners’ Dilemma, and it remains as a 
Stag Hunt game while 73 ≤ Kã ≤ 94.15; 
In Figure 42 the maximum expected payoff of the game for each manufacturer 
based on bargaining set and Shapley value has been depicted. 
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Figure 42: Manufacturers’ maximum expected payoffs - Decentralized coordination                                                                   
Green manufacturer (M3) 
 
Then, we investigate the centralized coordination where there is a Green 
manufacturer. The resulting payoff matrix is depicted in Table 46. The optimal level 
of GMEP is 30%. The core of the game is non-empty and in the normalized form the 
resulting imputation ratios for the manufacturers are [0.5338 0.5436 0.5295]. 
Table 46: The payoff matrix of inventory game - Centralized coordination & Green manufacturer 
  
MANUFACTURER 3 
  
(C) (D) 
  
MANUFACTURER 2 MANUFACTURER 2 
 
 
(C) (D) (C) (D) 
M
A
N
U
FA
C
TU
R
ER
 
1 (C) N: 1&2&3 651.1 N:1&3 293.9,54.4 N:1&2 343.5,-12.3 N:0 99,31,-14 
Demand 9 5.2,3.8 5.2,3.8 2.2,3.4,3.4 
Inventory 17 12,7 9,10 4,7,9 
(D) N:2&3 293.9,54.3 44,30,-55.7 44,98,-14 N:0 31,25,-16 
Demand 5.2,3.8 3.4,3.4,2.2 3.4,2.2,3.4 3,3,3 
Inventory 12,6 6,7,7 6,5,9 5,6,8 
 
Investigation of the payoff matrix provides the following information: 
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• If Kã ≤ 186 the cooperative strategy is feasible for manufacturers, 
otherwise there is no motivation for cooperation; 
• If Kã ≤ 73 the cooperate strategy dominates the defect strategy, or the 
game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the cooperate; 
• If 73 ≤ Kã ≤ 162.6 the game has two Nash Equilibriums which are the 
cooperate and the defect or the game is a Stag Hunt game, but according 
to the cooperation agreement manufacturers can benefit more through 
cooperation; 
• If Kã ≥ 162.6 the game has a Nash Equilibrium which is the defect or 
the game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, but according to the cooperation 
agreement manufacturers can benefit more through cooperation; 
• If Kã ≤ 139.5 the essential constraint of the core of the game is satisfied, 
so this game has no Prisoners’ Dilemma type and it remains as a Stag 
Hunt game while 73 ≤ Kã ≤ 139.5; 
 
Figure 43: Manufacturers’ maximum expected payoffs - Centralized coordination                                                                                
Green manufacturer 
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In Figure 43 the maximum expected payoff of the game for each manufacturer 
based on bargaining set and Shapley value has been depicted. 
In Table 47 the cumulative payoff, the cumulative inventory level and GMEP for 
the Green manufacturer of the game for different combinations of decentralized, 
centralized, traditional and Green manufacturing are listed. 
• Decentralized, traditional manufacturer main manufacturer (DC-T); 
• Decentralized, Green manufacturer main manufacturer (DC-G); 
• Centralized, traditional manufacturer main manufacturer (C-T); 
• Centralized, Green manufacturer main manufacturer (C-G); 
Table 47: The cumulative payoff 
 DC-T DC-G C-T C-G 
TOTAL PAYOFF 430.1 448.1 638.3 651.1 
TOTAL INVENTORY 
LEVEL 19 19 17 17 
GMEP 0 30 0 30 
 
5.6. SPARE PARTS’ PRICE LEADERSHIP 
 
5.6.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the aftermarket business, the supply of spare parts can be investigated through 
the life span of the parent product. In other words, the spare part supply can be 
categorized into two periods of the time span before end-of-production of parent 
product and the time span after that period. In first period, OEMs have a monopolistic 
market for their aftersales services but in the second period there is a competition 
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among OEMs and will-fitters. Game Theory can improve or clarify interactions 
between different manufacturers who are competing against each other based on 
determination of sale prices to attract more market demand share. In our study, we 
consider the OEM as the price leader and the will-fitters as fringe and the spare part 
inventory game is setup as a competitive fringe game. The solution of the game 
determines the OEM sale price decision-making and inventory level. 
 
5.6.2. COMPETITIVE FRINGE SPARE PART INVENTORY GAME 
 
Spare parts are manufactured along with the original or parent product. The 
manufacturer keeps the inventory of spare parts for after sale services during warranty 
period, rendering period, and post warranty period. Availability of the spare parts 
during the life span of the product affects the competitiveness of the OEM in the 
market, meanwhile there are some legal obligations for the OEM to supply spare parts 
during that period in some countries. In other words, the OEM should supply spare 
parts for the parent product during product life cycle and the time span between end-
of-production and end-of-service. For instance, in automobile industry in Germany, 
the life span of the products is 15 years (Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008). 
Normally there is a monopoly for the OEM to supply spare parts during the 
product life cycle. By the beginning of the end-of-production, other manufacturers 
who can produce the same parts, known as will-fitters, enter to the aftermarket and 
absorb some share of the demand for spare parts. When a monopoly ends, the OEM 
maintains a cost advantage over later manufacturers. The OEM becomes a dominant 
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firm: a price-setting firm that competes with price taking firms. The small price taking 
firms that compete with a dominant firm are called the competitive fringe. 
In other words, the dominant-firm model of price leadership assumes that there is 
a main manufacturer known as OEM and many small manufacturers known as will-
fitters whose production rates are not large enough to affect the sale price. According 
to (Scherer & Ross, 1970), “Dominant firm price leadership occurs when an industry 
consists of one firm dominant in the customary sense of the world i.e. controlling at 
least 50% of the total industry output plus a competitive fringe of firms, each too small 
to exert a perceptible influence on price through its individual output decisions”. 
When will-fitters in the fringe acting as price takers, the OEM is left as the only player 
who is able to set price and maximize the profit subject to its residual demand curve. 
 
5.6.3. THE MARKET DEMAND 
 
In many markets, the successful manufacturer has the skill to plan its 
production/inventory in advance to take benefit of the predicted demand conditions. In 
fact, a considerable amount of time and money is spent to forecast the demand. In a 
competitive market, the transmission of the information from demanders to suppliers 
is not efficient. The dominant firm has an incentive to invest in demand information, 
and the size of the competitive fringe depends on information costs and demand 
variability. In other words, the competitive fringe shrinks when the information cost 
and demand variability increase. 
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During the product life cycle, the OEM manages its spare parts production and 
inventory economically in a monopolistic market. Moreover, the demand for spare 
parts is predictable because of existence of the customer linkage, current information 
on performance of the market demand for the parent product and up-to-date time 
series data (Inderfurth & Mukherjee, 2008). Once the OEM stops the production of the 
parent product, the time span between end-of-production and end-of-service, there is 
no demand for the parent product but spare parts should be supplied as the 
replacement parts for the existing products. Spare parts management in this phase 
become challenging because of the demand uncertainty and emergence of the will-
fitters into the market.  
Spare parts demand is intermittent and due to the nature of characteristics of spare 
parts demand, we can consider the demand for spare parts as a Poisson process as it 
was discussed in the section 5.2.3. The OEM can forecast the parent products failure 
rate or intensity factor that determines the expected overall demand for spare parts, 
which is parameter λ. We suppose that the sale price affects the overall market 
demand. Once the OEM raises the price, some customers will leave the market and 
their demand is met from refurbished parts by third parties. The overall market 
demand is a function of sale price c> and the parent product failure rate λ as it is 
formulated in Equation (77) that provides the market demand curve. The OEM differs 
from a monopolist in one respect. If the monopolist raises the sale price, some 
customers will leave the market. However, if the OEM raises the price, there is a 
possibility that a price increase encourages some customers to start buying from the 
will-fitters. So the OEM must factors in the reaction of the will-fitters. 
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  Qr = fc>, λ 
   (77) 
 
5.6.4. THE MANUFACTURER COST FUNCTION 
 
The manufacturers cost function includes cost of production, holding cost and 
backorder cost. The OEM strategies are determination of the sale price and the spare 
parts stock level in the order-up-to level inventory that it was discussed in the section 
5.2.4. In this section, implementation of the order-up-to level inventory policy is 
explained and the marginal costs of production and inventory for the manufacturers 
(MCo	∀i ∈ {OEM	&will − fitters}) are provided.  
We must calculate the cost of production and inventory. Equation (78) gives us 
the cost of production and inventory in which expected backorder (EBO) and expected 
inventory (EI) are calculated from Equations (40 & 41):  
  MC1 = co × S1 + p1 × EBOS1 + h1 × EIS1 
   (78) 
The profit or the payoff the manufacturers is calculated as the difference between 
revenue from selling parts and cost of production and inventory which is described in 
Equation (79) in which expected fill rate (EFR) is calculated from Equation (39): 
  Π1 = c> × Q1 × EFRS1 − MC1 
   (79) 
As we can see the cost of the production and inventory is a function of demand 
and order-up-to level which is the strategic actions of the players. Moreover there are 
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different parameters that affect the cost of production and inventory. The required 
parameters are listed in Table 48. 
Table 48: Cost of production and inventory parameters 
Notation Parameter definition  Spare parts inventory level (in units)  Variable cost of production (in dollars per unit)  Penalty cost (in dollars per unit per period)  Holding cost (in dollars per unit per period)  Sale price (in dollars per unit) * Demand 
 
We suppose that both the OEM and will-fitters are applying one-for-one policy 
for their spare parts inventory management. According to the formulation and 
parameters that are introduced in this section, the marginal costs of the manufacturers 
are calculated. 
 
5.6.5. THE GAME SETUP 
 
In our study, the spare part inventory control is modeled as a dominant firm with 
a competitive fringe game where the OEM plays as the dominant firm and the will-
fitters are playing as the competitive fringe. This game is the combination of the 
monopoly and perfect competition games. As in perfect competition, it is rational to 
assume that the small firms or will-fitter are price takers. However, it is not rational to 
neglect the impact of the OEM price setting. Therefore, the OEM sets the market price 
and the will-fitters form their inventory decision-making considering this market price. 
The OEM is Strategic, means it takes into account the impact that its actions have on 
the will-fitters’ actions. The will-fitters are Non-strategic. 
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The equilibrium of the dominant firm-competitive fringe determines the 
manufacturers spare part inventory policy including the OEM price setting and 
allocation of the market demand among the manufacturers and consequently the level 
of inventory. 
The solution of the game can be described in three steps as follows: 
• Find the residual demand; 
• Find the OEM’s optimal quantity supply; 
• Find price and will-fitters quantity supply; 
The residual demand equals to the difference between market demand and will-
fitters marginal cost when price is: 
• Below the intersection of market demand and will-fitters marginal cost; 
• Above the vertical intercept of will-fitters marginal cost; 
Otherwise the residual demand equals to the market demand. Intersection of the 
market demand and will-fitters marginal cost is calculated from Equation (80): 
  Qrc> = Q+c> 	 ∴ solve	for	c> → c>∗ = c> 
      (80) 
Vertical intercept of the will-fitters marginal cost is derived from Equation (81): 
  Q+c> = 0 ∴ solve	for	c> → c>∗ = c> 
      (81) 
So the final residual demand is calculated from Equation (82): 
  Residual	Demand = ,	Qrc> − Q+c> if	c> ≤ c> < c>	Qrc>	 otherwise - 
      (82) 
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The OEM’s optimal quantity supply Qãä is determined by MR = MCãä. MR, is the inverse residual demand with double the slope. Therefore, the OEM will 
allocate Qãä units out of the overall market demand to itself. The price setting c>∗ 
is given by substituting Qãä into the inverse residual demand MR. Finally, the 
will-fitters quantity supply Q./ is given by the will-fitters marginal curve at the 
setting price c>∗. 
 
5.6.6. NUMERICAL STUDY 
 
In this section the spare part inventory management of a single-item for the 
manufacturers during 1-year of production has been investigated. We assume that the 
OEM possesses the market demand intensity rate during the time span after product 
life cycle. The game has two types of players: the OEM and will-fitters and the 
solution of the dominant firm-competitive fringe game provides price setting and 
inventory policy for the manufacturers.  
We suppose that will-fitters are acting as fringe altogether, and each manufacturer 
implements its own inventory and production settings. These required parameters for 
the OEM and will-fitters are listed in Table 49. Both manufacturers have the same 
lead-time and fill rates. 
Table 49: Sample parameters used to generate the marginal costs 
Notation OEM Will-fitter Á 8 10  80 100 " 1.6 2 Á# Decision variable Price taker 
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Notation OEM Will-fitter 
T 1 1 
EFR >0.8 >0.8 
 
The overall market demand arrives as a Poisson process and the intensity rate of 
the demand is a function of the sale price that is given as an arbitrary function 
(Equation 83):  
 Qr = 02²1E.ç  (83) 
The cost of production and inventory for the OEM and will-fitters are calculated 
based on implementing order-up-to level inventory policy and the results are listed in 
Table 50: 
Table 50: The manufacturers’ costs 
S 2Ü342 2Ü526577
Initial cost 9.83 12.29 
1 29.1 36.38 
2 41.33 51.66 
3 54.19 67.63 
4 67.72 84.65 
5 78.76 98.46 
6 89.96 116.03 
7 101.23 126.53 
8 112.53 140.66 
9 123.83 154.78 
10 133.65 167.07 
 
In figure 44 the trend of the suppliers’ inventory costs vs quantity supply is 
depicted. As we can see, it is practical to consider this trend linear, which results in a 
constant marginal cost. The solution of the game is represented in figure 45 and 
explained as the three following steps: 
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Figure 44: The Dominant firm-competitive fringe inventory costs vs. quantity supply 
 
Step1: Find the residual demand 
Residual	Demand = 8	 W0,4X if	c> ≥ 15	17 − 9:0.5 otherwise; 
Step 2: Find the OEM’s optimal quantity supply 
 
Inverse	Residual	Demand = 	 15.124 if	0 ≤ Q < 4−0.5Q + 17 otherwise ' 
MR = 	 15.124 if	0 ≤ Q < 4−Q + 17 otherwise ' 
MRQ = MCãäQ ∴ solve	for	Q → Qãä∗ = 5 
 
Step 3: Find price and will-fitters quantity supply 
 
Replace	Qãä∗ 	in	Inverse	Residual	Demand	 ∴ 17 − 0.5Qãä∗ → c>∗ = 14.5 Replace	c>∗	in	MC~ 	 ∴ Q~∗ = 0 
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Figure 45: Price-supply diagram 
 
After determination of the price setting, and the optimal quantity of the 
manufacturers we can refer to the marginal cost function and determine the allocated 
order-up-to levels for each manufacturer. Table 51 lists the optimal sale price, quantity 
supply and levels of inventory for the OEM: 
Table 51: The optimal spare part inventory policy 
Notation OEM 
Q 5 Á# 14.5 
S 8 < 12.5 
 
So the OEM enters the parts to the market with a price that makes the will-fitters 
to drop out of the market and leave all of the demand to the OEM. The potential 
supply of fringe is irrelevant and the OEM becomes a monopoly. In another scenario 
we assume that the OEM still follows order-up-to level inventory policy and fringe 
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firms supply spare parts to the market with a given quantity-price function or supply 
curve that is known by the OEM. In other words, the overall market demand rate is 
Qr = 30 − c> and the will-fitters supply curve is ßQ~ = ²12=E.> à which are predicted 
by the OEM. The solution of the game is represented in figure 46 that results in 
Qãä∗ = 10.26 ,Q~∗ = 3.23 ,c>∗ = 16.59 and the demand rate that is satisfied 
through refurbishment is 16.51. 
 
Figure 46: The competitive fringe price-supply diagram 
 
In next section we investigate the effect of holding cost on pricing strategy. In 
table 52, the changes of the OEM’s holding cost and its effect on the price setting, 
OEM’s marginal cost, allocated demand rate, optimal sale price, average inventory 
level, cost and profit are listed. 
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Table 52: The effect of holding cost on pricing strategy 
h MC QOEM QWF Price AIL Cost Profit 
0.40 11.77 10.60 3.04 16.44 3.67 147.87 5.79 
0.80 11.87 10.49 3.11 16.49 3.77 147.49 6.98 
1.20 11.97 10.38 3.17 16.54 3.87 147.29 7.90 
1.60 12.07 10.26 3.23 16.59 3.97 147.28 8.53 
2.00 12.17 10.15 3.29 16.64 4.08 147.45 8.89 
2.40 12.27 10.03 3.36 16.69 4.18 147.80 8.98 
2.80 12.37 9.92 3.42 16.74 4.29 148.33 8.78 
3.20 12.47 9.81 3.48 16.79 4.40 149.04 8.31 
3.60 12.57 9.69 3.54 16.84 4.51 149.93 7.58 
4.00 12.67 9.58 3.61 16.89 4.62 150.99 6.57 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The comparison of the renewal cost and replacement cost of different products 
with variety of prices and parts declares that the cost of the renewal of the products is 
significantly higher than the replacement cost. This implies that the price of the spare 
parts is much more than the cost of the parent products and the ratio between the 
renewal cost and the replacement cost follows a certain pattern. The consistency of 
this ratio states that most OEMs implement cost-based or mark-up pricing to retrieve 
the final price of spare parts. The main disadvantages of cost-based pricing are under-
pricing and over-pricing that leads to lower-than-average profitability, and ignoring 
competitiveness of the parts in the market. These factors are against the spare parts 
prices sustainability. This issue has been addressed as a competition-based pricing or 
strategic pricing by setting up the spare parts inventory games that are listed in Table 
53. 
Table 53: List of spare parts inventory games 
 Game Players Cooperation  
1 OEM Against Market OEM & Market Non-cooperative e 
2 OEM Against Will-fitter OEM, Will-fitter & Market Non-cooperative 
3 Evolutionay Spare Parts Inventory Game OEM and Will-fitter Cooperative/Non-cooperative 
4 Cooperative Spare Parts Inventory Game 3-Manufacturer Cooperative 
5 Spare Parts‘ Price Leadership OEM & Will-fitters Non-cooperative 
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In the first game, Game Theory is applied to determine the sale price and the 
spare part stock level for an OEM who manufactures single-item spare parts, keeps 
them in the inventory with order-up-to level inventory policy and sells them to the 
market. This non-cooperative game has two players: the OEM and the market. In the 
aftermarket business, other than the OEM as an original manufacturer, there are other 
low cost manufacturers, known as will-fitters, and they compete with each other on 
their sale prices to absorb more customers. The OEM possesses the information of the 
original parts failure rates and can predict the allocated demand rates including: the 
upper bound intensity factor and the lower bound intensity factor with respect to its 
selected sale price. The market can be considered as an unreasoning entity whose 
strategic choices affect the payoff the OEM, but which has no interest in the outcome 
of the game. In this game there is no dominant level of inventory for the OEM, so the 
game has the mixed strategy solution. The solution of the mixed strategy provides the 
OEM’s optimal sale price and the OEM’s expected payoff distribution in relation to 
the market’s expected demand. The OEM chooses his optimal level of inventory with 
respect to the probability of intensity factors that the market can choose among them. 
Furthermore, the comparison of the maximum attainable payoff and guaranteed payoff 
in the uncertain situation would justify the OEM’s extra investment on the demand 
forecasting efforts. 
The second game studies the spare parts inventory problem as an N-person non-
zero-sum single-shot game. This non-cooperative game has three players: the OEM, 
the will-fitter and the market. The manufacturers can only forecast the market’s base 
demand for the parts during the production horizon. The game has been modeled as a 
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game against nature which means the manufacturers play against the market. In this 
game there is no dominant level of inventory for the OEM, so the game has the mixed 
strategy solution. The solution of the mixed strategy determines the strategy of the 
OEM to maximize his payoff in the aftermarket business. The strategies of the OEM 
are the determination of the level of inventory and sale prices in traditional 
manufacturing system. Furthermore, in another consideration, we implement the re-
manufacturing processes in the inventory game in which the OEM has an ability to 
produce the whole or some part of his production out of the recycling process or re-
manufacturing. In this environment, the solution of the game provides the re-
manufacturing effort and the cost of collection of reusable products for the OEM. In 
other words, the theory of games in our spare parts inventory problem provides the 
expected payoff distribution in relation to the probability of the market’s expected 
actions. The OEM chooses his optimal level of inventory, pricing strategy and re-
manufacturing effort with respect to the probability of the demand distribution.  
The third game investigates the spare parts inventory problem as an N-person, 
non-zero-sum and repeated game. This cooperative/non-cooperative game has two 
players: the OEM and his competitor known as the will-fitter. It has been assumed that 
the original product is in its normal or repetitive phase. In this phase, demands for 
spare parts are stochastic and repetitive which arrive as a Poisson process. The 
manufacturers are implementing the Newsvendor inventory policy to stock spare parts 
for the upcoming demands over the production horizon. Manufacturers must decide on 
their pricing strategy and respectively their level of inventory to optimize their payoff 
in the aftermarket. The pricing strategies have been investigated through repeated 
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Prisoners’ Dilemma game and ESS analysis where there is a transition from Prisoners’ 
Dilemma to Stag Hunt games. Moreover, the effect of the re-manufacturing is 
investigated as an option for the manufacturers to manufacture more sustainable parts 
and increase the profitability of the spare parts business. Based on the results that have 
been provided in previous sections we can present the following conclusions: 
1. The minimum sale price that makes the spare parts inventory game 
profitable for the manufacturers is derived which is defined as the 
marginal cutting sale price.  
2. The minimum cooperative sale price that establishes the spare parts 
inventory game as a Prisoners’ Dilemma is derived. 
3. The maximum cooperative sale price is derived which states that 
manufacturers should never defect as long as there is a probability for the 
future game. 
4. The results of the ESS state that the Nash Equilibrium of the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma spare parts inventory game is (DD), which means both players 
defect, and the equilibrium point is evolutionary stable (ES). 
5. The increase of the sale price above the value of the maximum 
cooperative sale price changes the game type from Prisoners’ Dilemma to 
Stag Hunt game. 
6. The Stag Hunt spare parts inventory game has two Nash Equilibriums and 
it has a mixed strategy solution. In other words, this game has two ES 
equilibriums (including cooperation and defect) and it has unstable mixed 
strategy equilibrium. 
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7. In Stag Hunt game, as sale price increases the chance of cooperation 
increases. 
8. The optimal re-manufacturing effort is derived and implementation of the 
re-manufacturing states that manufacturers can reach to similar payoffs as 
the traditional manufacturing processes by inserting lower sale prices. In 
other words, implementation of the re-manufacturing can guarantee more 
sustainable parts both environmentally friendly wise and price wise while 
satisfying the expected payoff for the manufacturers. 
The fourth game investigates the cooperation of the spare parts’ manufacturers in 
a three-person (there are three manufacturers who can manufacture a substitutable 
spare part) cooperative game setup. In this game, manufacturers can decide to 
cooperate with each other on sale prices and acting in a centralized inventory system 
while there is a cost asserted as a binding agreement cost. Determination of decision-
making on cooperation or defect depends on spare part sale price variation and the 
cost of binding agreement which are investigated as the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Stag 
Hunt game. Two different methods of Shapley value and Bargaining set are 
implemented to allocate benefits of cooperation among cooperative manufacturers. 
Moreover, a centralized inventory configuration for manufacturers who decide to rely 
on a cooperative inventory system is designed and a comparison between inventory 
levels and cost of inventory for two different cases of centralized and decentralized 
inventory configuration is studied. To investigate the effect of the Green 
manufacturing on cost of inventory, it has been assumed that one of the manufacturers 
can implement re-manufacturing to produce spare parts and the role of re-
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manufacturing on payoffs of the manufacturers in cooperative inventory games is 
investigated while the optimal level of re-manufacturing effort is calculated. The 
results of the game can be listed as follows: 
1. The variation of sale prices and cost of cooperation agreement changes the 
type of the inventory game from Prisoners’ Dilemma to Stag Hunt game 
which changes the Nash Equilibrium of the game. 
2. Our method first checks the non-emptiness of the core of the game. Then 
it determines whether manufacturers should cooperate or defect for given 
sale prices and variation of the cost of cooperation agreement. 
3. The centralized inventory system configuration provides more profit for 
the manufacturers with less inventory level. 
4. In the centralized configuration there will be no Prisoners’ Dilemma game 
and the game stays as the Stag Hunt game. 
5. Re-manufacturing improve the total profit of the manufacturers while the 
inventory level stays the same. 
In the last game, the competition of the OEM and will-fitters in the aftermarket 
business during the time span between end-of-production and end-of-service of the 
original or parent product is investigated. Unlike the period during the product life 
cycle, there is no monopoly for the OEM to supply spare parts after the end-of-
production cycle. In this period other competitors enter to the market and compete 
with the OEM to absorb more market demand share for the spares. Spare parts demand 
is intermittent and the demand arrival is considered as a Poisson process. The OEM 
can forecast the parent products failure rate or intensity factor that determines the 
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expected overall demand for spare parts. The sale price affects the overall market 
demand. Once the OEM raises the price, some customers will leave the market and 
their demand is met from refurbished parts by third parties and the rest of customers’ 
demands are allocated among the OEM and will-fitters. In this environment the OEM 
is considered as the dominant firm and will-fitters are considered as fringes. The 
interaction of the spare parts suppliers is studied as the competitive fringe game. In 
first scenario, both groups of manufacturers implement order-up-to level inventory 
policy to manage their spare parts stock levels that results in constant values marginal 
costs. Hence, the OEM enters the parts to the market with a price that makes the will-
fitters to drop out of the market and leave all of the demand to the OEM. The potential 
supply of fringe is irrelevant and the OEM becomes a monopoly. In another scenario it 
has been assumed that the OEM still follows order-up-to level inventory policy and 
fringe firms supply spare parts to the market with a given quantity-price function or 
supply curve that is known by the OEM. The price leadership solution determines the 
optimal sale price and inventory level for the OEM. 
This research has introduced several game theoretical approaches to study OEM’s 
decision-making on inventory levels, Green manufacturing and pricing strategies. The 
suggested strategic spare parts pricing methods factor in the customers’ willingness to 
purchase the spare parts, the demand uncertainty, the market uncertainty, the 
competitiveness of the parts in the market, the stability of the cooperation or 
competition in price setting, the marginal costs of designing an agreement for 
cooperation, and the marginal cost of production and inventory. The consideration of 
aforementioned factors in spare parts price setting is a convincing reason for the 
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OEMs to replace cost-based pricing with strategic pricing to gain more profits in the 
aftermarket business. However, the ratio between the renewal cost and the 
replacement cost of the products can be distinguished as a factor to count the fairness 
of the pricing. Because of the high ratio for the selected products, it is evident that the 
spare parts pricing is unfair. Hence, it is possible to add this ratio to the price 
sustainability description and include it into strategic pricing formulations as a factor 
that affects the demand and supply curves. 
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APPENDIX 
 
7. DATA ACQUISITION 
 
ONLINE DATABASE: The main source of gathering information is an unofficial 
online database which is RealOEM.com. Despite being an unofficial website, there is 
very accurate and up-to-date parts information in this website. It is possible to find a 
specific car on this website via two ways, one is selecting a car using its model and 
other detailed specification, and the other way is to search a car through its vehicle 
identification number (VIN) which is used in this study.  
 
Figure 47: Subassembly diagram and corresponding parts list 
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After the vehicle has been identified in the catalogue, the desired subassembly 
diagrams and parts lists can be accessed. However, this process does not include the 
identification of additional features in the vehicle such as seat heating or sunroof. 
These features have to be screened in the parts list manually. Figure 47 shows how 
subassembly diagrams and the corresponding parts lists are illustrated in the database. 
The website provides a diagram and corresponding catalogue with the following 
information for each part: 
• Number (No.) – A number for identifying a part from the diagram in the 
list and vice versa; 
• Description – Name of the part, e.g. “Support Fender Left”; 
• Supplement – Additional information about usage criteria. For example, if 
a part comes only in combination of a certain feature; 
• Quantity (Qty) – The used quantity of this part in this subassembly; 
• Production period (From, Up To) – Indicates in which time period a 
certain part has been used; 
• Part Number – Unique serial number for every BMW part; 
• Price; 
• Notes; 
• Photo; 
 
STRUCTURE OF BMW PARTS LISTS: BMW uses a structure for arranging 
subassemblies. This structure shall be illustrated in this section. The whole vehicle is 
divided into Main Groups (MG) such as Engine, Transmission, Front Axle etc. These 
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MG are further divided into so called Sub Groups (SG) and Sub Sub Groups (SSG). 
This structure has been illustrated in Table 54. 
Table 54: BMW subassembly structure 
 
 
PRESENTATION OF THE VEHICLES: For this study, two models of BMW cars 
including 328i and X6 have been selected. The 328i is chosen by the criteria of highest 
market presence of BMW cars. The 3 series is the best-selling model of BMW in 
recent years. The X6 is chosen as a high price and luxury car among BMW series. The 
exact vehicles which have been chosen for this study are presented as the following: 
1. Models: As it was mentioned two BMW models are selected and the 
detailed information of the vehicles is listed in Tables 55. 
Table 55: BMW 328i Sedan & BMW X6 SUV model information 
 
BMW 328i Sedan (E90) BMW X6 3.5i (E71) 
Exterior Jet Black Mineral silver metallic (A14) 
Interior Leather Dakota Gray Leather Nevada (LUSW) 
Transmission Automatic Automatic 
Fuel Type Gas Gas 
Mileage (03/05/2012) 37,000 - 
Production Date 04/17/2008 11/09/2008 
VIN WBAVA37588NL54270 5UXFG43529L222179 
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BMW 328i Sedan (E90) BMW X6 3.5i (E71) 
Type Code VA37 SC 
Steering Left Left 
Doors 4 4 
Engine N52K N54 
 
2. Features: The detailed features of two vehicles have been identified and 
listed in Tables 56. 
Table 56: BMW 328i Sedan & BMW X6 SUV features information 
BMW 328i BMW X6 
Code Description Code Description 
S205A Automatic transmission S1CAA Dummy-SALAPA 
S249A Multifunction steering 
wheel S248A Steering wheel heater 
S2BGA BMW alloy wheel, double 
spoke 161 S2VBA Tyre pressure control (TPC) 
S2VBA Tire pressure control (TPC) S316A automatic trunk lid 
mechanism 
S2XAA Sport leather wheel + shift paddles S319A 
Integrated universal remote 
control 
S319A Integrated universal remote 
control S322A Comfort access 
S403A Glass roof, electrical S3AGA Reversing camera 
S430A Interior/outside mirror with 
auto dip S430A 
Interior/outside mirror with 
auto dip 
S431A Interior mirror with 
automatic-dip S431A 
Interior mirror with 
automatic-dip 
S441A Smoker package S441A Smoker package 
S459A Seat adjuster, electric, with 
memory S459A 
Seat adjuster, electric, with 
memory 
S465A Through-loading system S464A Ski bag 
… … … … 
 
PROCEDURE FOR COLLECTING DATA: This section provides a quick overview 
about the procedure that has been developed and executed for downloading the 
information of thousands parts from the database while maintaining a uniform data 
structure. 
1. Downloading Data: Before the actual downloading process was started, all 
relevant MGs, SGs and SSGs were identified. This was necessary since 
 212 
 
not all of them are included in the vehicles which were analyzed in this 
study. By using a VBA Excel program, it was possible to download all 
parts lists of a MG into an Excel file. In these individual files the first 
sheet represents the overall results for this MG. This sheet is followed by 
sheets for every SG containing all SSGs accordingly. 
2. Revising Data: As mentioned before, after the data had been downloaded 
from the database, it had to be revised. The following measurements have 
been performed: 
• Deleting irrelevant parts such as: 
• Parts that do not fit the production period of the vehicle; 
• Parts that only come in combination with features which are not 
included in the vehicle; 
• Sample comparisons of prices with different websites; 
• Entering missing prices by searching the part number on websites 
such as: 
• http://parts.bmwofsouthatlanta.com/ 
• http://www.ecstuning.com/ 
• http://www.online-teile.com/bmw/ 
• Entering missing quantities; 
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